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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an examination of the way dominance and monopoly are assessed in the EU 
and US antitrust law. In particular, it focuses on the two main factors which, in the view of 
this thesis, may play an important role in the application of antitrust rules. These factors 
are a firm’s size and bigness. With the main focus on these two factors, this thesis assesses 
whether the EU Commission holds an antagonistic approach to dominant firms as a way to 
promote consumer welfare and economic efficiency which are the main aims of antitrust 
law. As a matter of comparison, this thesis similarly considers the US approach to firms in 
a monopolistic position. 
This research is inclined to believe that ‘size’ and ‘bigness’ make a firm large in the 
context of antitrust law. Size is defined by the number of market shares a firm has in a 
relevant market. Bigness, on the other hand, is defined by a non-exhaustive list of all 
commercial and technological advantages a firm has over its rivals. Both elements, 
therefore, constitute dominance and monopoly, and place a firm into a privileged position 
over its competitors.  
The belief that dominant firms are inherently detrimental to the primary goals of antitrust 
may itself harm consumer welfare and economic efficiencies. This is explained by the fact 
that large firms have access to more resources which may be necessary for some industries. 
The obstacles for their growth may lead to the stagnation in the progression of markets 
which, in turn, will be reflected on the consumers and economy.   
Despite this being a common concern of various stakeholders, the Commission and the EU 
courts set low market share thresholds in order to measure a firm’s size and admit all 
firm’s privileges into the definition of a dominant position. It creates an impression that 
dominant firms are not welcomed in the EU internal market. US antitrust law, on the other 
hand, appears to have a less strict approach to firms in a monopolistic position by allowing 
firms to grow as long as there is no illegality behind it. The US market share threshold is 
much higher than in the EU and it has an almost complete disregard of a firm’s privileges 
and advantages. This thesis, therefore, came to the conclusion that EU competition law has 
a strong distrust toward dominant firms, whilst US antitrust law holds a neutral position. 
This research then proceeds to find an explanation of such a disparity between two leading 
antitrust regimes.  
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Chapter 1:   Introduction 
“The work of the greatest artists may command the highest prices, their 
incentive has not been money. It has been the desire to achieve professional 
success. That will be the spirit of business in the future”—Louis D. 
Brandeis.
1 
 
Antitrust law is not just a set of economic principles which is applicable to a particular 
industry and which is confined to set limits on its application; rather, “as a movement, 
antitrust is cyclical […] antitrust has not been static, as a body of law, because it is 
addressed to markets that are dynamic and diverse”.2 Diversity, flexibility and efficiency 
are the main features of antitrust law. Diversity on a market should promote 
competitiveness and innovation, i.e. various market players bring new ideas which are 
likely to increase productivity on a relevant market. Flexibility is reflected more in the 
rules and principles of antitrust itself, i.e. the law should be flexible and adaptable in order 
to keep pace with developments such as globalisation and the emergence of new economy 
markets. Lastly, efficiency is a key to market success and development, i.e. only efficiently 
performing markets can provide consumers with maximum welfare. It has been argued that 
antitrust law is also “an expression of a social philosophy, an educative force, and a 
political symbol of extraordinary potency”.3 Therefore, antitrust law should be perceived 
as a flexible and necessary tool for controlling markets which embodies various notions, 
principles, rules and traditions derived from historical events and economic and political 
influence.  
 
 
                                                          
1
Brandeis, L., D., The Curse of Bigness Miscellaneous Papers (The Viking Press, New York: 1934), p.40. 
2
 Sullivan, E., T., The Political Economy of the Sherman Act: The First One Hundred Years (Oxford 
University Press, New York, Oxford: 1991), at p.4.  
3
 Bork, R., H., & Bowman, Jr., W., S., “The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy. The Crisis in 
Antitrust” [1965] 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363 at p. 364.  
 
 
 
2 
 
1.1 Aims of the thesis 
This thesis examines the extent to which the ‘size’ and ‘bigness’ of a firm are central to the 
establishment of dominance under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and, as a comparison, of monopoly under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act 1890 (the Sherman Act).
4
 In order to become subject to either legal 
provisions, a firm should hold a dominant or a monopolistic position
5
 on a relevant market. 
Antitrust authorities
6
 use various factors in order to identify a firm’s market status and this 
thesis studies whether the size and bigness of a firm are one of those factors. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Section 2) and Article 102 TFEU (Article 102) permit the 
condemnation of unilateral anti-competitive action when, subject to other conditions being 
satisfied, the relevant actor is engaged in ‘monopolisation’, or is in possession of a 
‘dominant position’. Despite the employment of almost identical tools for the assessment 
of dominance or monopoly, differences in the results exist.
 7
  Neither Section 2 nor Article 
102 expand on these requirements; and no indicators as to how ‘monopoly’ or ‘dominance’ 
are to be defined are provided in the primary legislation.  
Therefore, a key question for the thesis is why in the application of competition law the EU 
recognises dominance as potentially arising at market share levels well below those which 
are in place before monopoly may be found to exist in the US. This thesis submits that the 
answer lies, at least in part, in different approaches taken towards the ‘size’ and ‘bigness’ 
of firms by the US and EU regimes. Neither of these words is found in the relevant 
legislation but  this is simply a matter of terminology as ‘bigness’ and ‘size’ may create 
opportunities for abuse of dominance or monopolisation. 
The originality of this research lies in the fact that it assesses the determination of 
dominance and monopoly in the EU and US through the application of two factors: size 
and bigness (both of which are defined below). The research into US antitrust law has 
                                                          
4
 The precise research question is addressed in 1.4. below.  
5
 According to Section 2, a firm can also become subject to its prohibitions if it attempts to monopolise.  
6
 For the purposes of this thesis, ‘antitrust authorities’ relate to both the US Department of Justice (DOJ), the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Commission of the European Union (the Commission). 
Furthermore, ‘antitrust law’ includes US antitrust law and EU competition law. ‘Dominance’ is used in the 
context of EU competition law and ‘monopoly’ is used in the context of US antitrust law, unless specified 
otherwise.  
7
 Gifford, D., J., & Kudrle, R., T., “European Competition Law and Policy: How Much Latitude for 
Convergence with the United States?” [2003] The Antitrust Bulletin 727 at p. 732.  
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revealed that the word ‘size’ is used in various antitrust law cases, while the word ‘bigness’ 
is prevalent in academic writings. Meanwhile, research into the EU competition law on 
dominance did not reveal any use of either ‘size’ or ‘bigness’ in either case law or 
literature. Furthermore, no academic work is found to provide a comparative approach to 
the role ‘size’ and ‘bigness’ play in the assessment of dominance and monopoly in the EU 
and US. This thesis adds to the literature by offering both a comparative analysis of the 
assessment of dominance and monopoly in the EU and US, in general, and providing a 
focus on the importance of ‘size’ and ‘bigness’, in particular. 
 
1.2. Terminology and Concepts: Dominance, Size, Bigness and 
Market Power 
For the purposes of this research, the concepts of dominance, market power, size of a firm 
and bigness are defined separately.
8
   
1.2.1. Dominance 
The concept of a dominant position is a unique term which only exists in EU competition 
law. In United Brands, dominance was defined as “a position of economic strength”9 on a 
relevant market. Dominance of a firm is assessed by two factors:
10
 first, by the existence of 
a large market share;
11
 second, the Commission takes other factors into account. Therefore, 
the combination of both elements will lead to the establishment of dominance for the 
purposes of Article 102.  For the purposes of this research, the size of a firm is defined 
with reference to the size of a firm’s market share; bigness is defined by reference to the 
additional factors used by the Commission to identify dominance. 
                                                          
8
 It should be noted from the outset that, for the purposes of clarity, a firm which possess both the size and 
bigness will be referred in this thesis as a large firm.   
9
 Case 27/76, United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, para. 65. 
10
 Despite the fact that ‘dominance’ is used by EU competition law and ‘monopoly’ is used in US antitrust 
law, both terms are not interchangeable. However, when this thesis is employing both terms in the context of 
Article 102 and Section 2, they should be seen as having the same meaning, i.e.  a firm with economic power. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this research, ‘bigness’ and ‘size’ are also considered as potential elements of 
the definition of monopoly under Section 2.   
11
 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, para. 41.  
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1.2.2. Size 
In the context of antitrust law, the word ‘size’ was firstly mentioned in US Steel12 where 
the Supreme Court responded to the government’s contentions that Steel’s size contributed 
to its monopolistic growth and, therefore, monopolisation. Without direct reference, Steel’s 
size was inferred based, according to the government, on the combination of firms which 
went under the corporation; thereby, granting the corporation with an unlawful monopoly 
power.
13
 No economic assessment was offered at the time; therefore, the entire analysis 
was conducted based on the facts albeit in a very concise and shortened manner.  
The subsequent influence of economics on antitrust law transformed “the fear from a 
concern about absolute size to one of relative size (market shares)”;14 with the latter is now 
being measured by market shares. Therefore, in US antitrust law, if a firm has ninety 
percent market share it is enough to infer market power; whilst, sixty or sixty-four percent 
might not be enough to trigger the application of Section 2.
15
 Following this, it can be 
presumed that seventy percent market share
16
 could be seen as a threshold where Section 2 
might become applicable. In EU competition law, on the other hand, forty percent market 
share is seen as a threshold below which dominance is unlikely to exist.
17
  
It should be noted from the outset that the way ‘size’ is perceived by antitrust authorities, is 
different from the way size may be assessed for other purposes. For instance, it has been 
suggested that “size approximation must be based on volume sales, capital investment, 
number of transactions, gross margin, or similar measures”18 but, on the other hand, the 
Financial Times measures the size of a firm as being determined by its market value as 
compared with other firms irrespective of the market on which the particular firm 
operates.
19
 The boundaries of the relevant market play a vital role in the determination of 
                                                          
12
 United States v United States Steel Corp 251 US 417 (1920).  
13
 Steel’s monopoly power was in general assessed, in addition to its size, by its capital and power of 
production--United States v United States Steel Corp at p.450.  
14
 Orbach, B., & Rebling, G., C., “The Antitrust Curse of Bigness” [2011-2012] 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605 at 
605.  
15
 US v Alcoa , 148 F.2d 416 (2
nd
 Cir. 1945) 424.  
16
 For instance, US v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953)—seventy-five 
percent was enough to infer market power;  
17
 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009/C 45/02, para. 14. The Commission, however, 
reserves the right to investigate a firm even below forty percent market share—see Chapter 4.  
18
 Douglas, E., “Size of Firm and the Structure of Costs in Retailing” [1962] 35(2) The Journal of Business 
158 at p. 159.  
19
 See Chapter 7.  
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the firm’s size in the antitrust analysis. In the early US case law on monopoly, ‘size’ was 
an aggregation of all factors which made that particular corporation as being ‘too big to 
handle’.20 It was mentioned earlier, that initially US antitrust law had dealt with an 
absolute corporate size where a firm was undoubtedly large in every possible way.
21
 The 
breath of their capacity and ability to disregard rules were predominantly as a result of 
their size and influential market position.  
1.2.3. Bigness 
Like with the word ‘size’, ‘bigness’ comes from US antitrust law. Unlike ‘size’, however, 
‘bigness’ was never expressly referred in the selected US antitrust law cases; rather, the 
term became an implied description of large trusts and corporations. EU competition law 
does not have any reference to the definition of bigness albeit offering a clear definition of 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).
 22
 This could only be explained by the fact that 
‘bigness’ is a relative word; therefore, the difficulty in placing ‘bigness’ into a one single 
definition becomes undeniable.  
Stigler perhaps provided the best explanation of bigness, 
“Bigness in business has two primary meanings. First, bigness may be 
defined in terms of the company’s share of the industry in which it operates 
[…] Second, bigness may mean absolute size—the measure of size being 
assets, sales, or employments as a rule”.23  
Stigler’s definition of bigness can be interpreted as carrying two main explanations of 
bigness. First reflects modern assessment of market power by considering firm’s market 
shares. According to Stigler,
24
 a firm which has an absolute big size, i.e. Stigler’s second 
                                                          
20
 See Chapter 7.  
21
 Standard Oil Trust is the best example of an absolute corporate size—see Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey 
v. United States 221 US 1 (1910). 
22
 “Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are non-subsidiary, independent firms which employ fewer 
than a given number of employees [with] 250 employees, as in the European Union […] while the United 
States considers SMEs to include firms with fewer than 500 employees. Small firms are generally those with 
fewer than 50 employees […] Financial assets are also used to define SMEs”—OECD, 2005, OECD SME 
and Entrepreneurship Outlook: 2005, OECD Paris, at p. 17.  
23
 Stigler, G., J., “The Case Against Bigness”, [1952] Fortune, May, at p.123.  
24
 Ibid, at p.123. 
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definition of bigness, may still be small if a market is wide and vice versa.
25
  Whilst, 
second type of bigness includes various factors which reflect firm’s overall size and which 
makes bigness absolute.
 26
   
Furthermore, large firms can be described as firms which “usually possess larger 
(organisational and technological) experience; they have well-established relationships 
with suppliers, customers, and distribution networks; and they usually have (access to) 
financial capital”.27 This description applies to firms which have not only established their 
presence but which have also achieved a certain level of recognition on a market and this 
definition corresponds with Stigler’s perception of bigness.  
In a globalised world, all firms which operate in multinational markets are of a 
considerable size, however measured. Their size becomes their asset as it correlates with 
success and their ability to do business. Such firms become well-known market players.
28
 
The appearance of multinational corporations which deliver their products and services 
into various markets is a reality of the 21
st
 century; Google, for instance, is one of the best 
examples of such reality.
29
 Bigness of such firms is not even disputable and their economic 
power is not only evidenced by market shares but also by other various indicators.
30
 The 
public do not even need to have knowledge about such firms’ market shares or turnover to 
consider those firms as being large. These firms can be labelled as de facto monopolists of 
absolute size with economic market power. There are other firms, however, which are not 
large on a worldwide market but which are getting too big for the particular market on 
which they operate. Therefore, bigness can be split into two groups, first, include firms 
which are considered to be de facto monopolists and second, firms which are growing very 
fast in terms of size and market influence, both on domestic and worldwide markets.  
                                                          
25
 This reinforces the argument that in antitrust law, the narrower a market is, the larger (or more dominant) a 
firm gets—see Chapters 5 and 6 with reference to the case study.  
26
 According to Stigler, both types of bigness overlap as some firms can have large market shares relative to 
their relevant markets is addition to absolute bigness due to the number of assets, sales and employees--
Stigler, G., J., “The Case Against Bigness” at p.123. 
27
 Blees, J., Kemp, R., Maas, J. & Mosselman, M., “Barriers to Entry: Differences in Barriers to Entry for 
SMEs and Large Enterprises”, Scientific Analysis of Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Zoetermeer, May 2003, at 
p. 135.  
28
 For example, Microsoft Corp. and Google Corp. For the EU antitrust proceedings against Microsoft Corp., 
see Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft Corporation v Commission [2005] judgment of 17 September 2007. See also 
the summary of the Commission’s investigation on: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/microsoft/investigation.html>.  For the US antitrust proceeding 
against Microsoft Corp., see United States v Microsoft Corporation 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
29
 The case against Google is examined in Chapter 7.  
30
 E.g., market value, number of employees and products, industry standard, network effect, volume sales and 
so on.  
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Therefore, for the purposes of this research, bigness is going to be assessed by all 
commercial advantages and privileges a firm has over its competitors; and these 
advantages and privileges, in this thesis, will be referred as ‘other factors’.31 These factors 
which are used to define bigness, as derived from the case law, vary; therefore, it is 
difficult to decide which one would be the best to address the research question. EU case 
study revealed that the courts are willing to consider all privileges a firm has in its 
possession, for instance, access to capital, advertising, economies of scale, vertical 
integration, Research & Development (R&D) and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). 
Some of those privileges can be achieved illegally like, for example, in Standard Oil where 
the Supreme Court found an illegality behind the formation of a trust.
32
 However, bigness 
may also be achieved via business acumen and success which, in turn, provide a firm with 
commercial, technological and financial advantages over its competitors. Such firms, for 
the purposes of this research, are large in antitrust law context and, therefore, such firms 
become the focal point of the analysis.  
1.2.4. Market Power 
Antitrust law offers clear economic based definition of market power. In US antitrust law, 
market power is “the power to control prices or exclude competition”; 33 whilst, in EU 
competition law market power is an ability “to raise price above the competitive level”.34 
Both definitions feature a firm’s ability to price above the competitive level thereby 
excluding competition. Therefore, in antitrust law, dominance or monopoly will not be 
found unless a firm possesses market power in a relevant market. The clear similarity 
between the EU and US is that for a firm to be able to price anti-competitively, such a firm 
needs to have power. ‘Bigness’ and ‘size’, in this context, may place a firm in a superior 
market position, thereby, granting it with a required level of market power. Antitrust law 
relies on market shares and, possibly, other factors; therefore, the larger the firm the more 
factual evidence antitrust authorities and the courts rely on  to infer the existence of market 
power. Additionally, since EU competition law subjects firms with low market share to its 
prohibitions and includes almost all of a firm’s privileges into the examination, its growth 
                                                          
31
 It should be noted that antitrust law may label ‘other factors’ as barriers to entry and it will be discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
32
 United States v United States Steel Corp.  
33
 United States v E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 US 377, 391-92, 76 S. Ct. 994, 1005 (1956).  
34
 Landes, W., M., & Posner, R., A., “Market Power in Antitrust Cases” 94 Harv. L. Rev. 937 1980-1981, at 
p. 937.  
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and further expansion and acquisition of various assets can lead to an assumption that such 
a firm is dominant.  If the Commission holds an antagonistic approach to large firms, then 
this strategy always leaves space for the Commission to intervene.
35
 This scenario could 
also be justified if the Commission fears size and believes that bigness provides a firm with 
an opportunity to abuse; then having flexibility in the assessment of market power 
becomes an important part of the strategy. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, 
market power is defined in a conventional way and ‘bigness’ and ‘size’ are seen as 
possible elements in the assessment of market power and, accordingly, dominance.  
 
1.3 Historical Context and Background 
US antitrust law and EU competition law have different origins. At the end of the 19
th
 
Century the US was dominated by private economic power which resulted in anti-
competitive practices leading to poor market performance and harm to consumers. Private 
economic powers, in this context, were large trusts or corporations which had considerable, 
if not total, control over markets they operated on. The size of those trusts, in that sense, 
was absolute and it had triggered serious concerns on the need to control the spread of 
monopolies in the US market.  
The EU, on the other hand, was created in order to unite countries and uphold peace after 
World War II (WWII). The political instability and damage caused by the war had required 
extreme changes in order to prevent further aggression and creation of new superpower 
nations. For the purposes of fulfilling the objectives of the new EU project, competition 
law project was tasked with promotion of market integration and protection of the internal 
market. Therefore, EU competition law was drafted with the above purposes in mind and 
with a certain influence from US antitrust law, as discussed later.  
 Significant differences behind the creation of EU competition law and US antitrust law 
have certainly influenced the way the law is applied by antitrust authorities. The US was 
significantly affected by large firms which led to the adoption of the Sherman Act, whilst 
                                                          
35
 The Commission has been criticised on various occasions for pursuing an interventionist policy “with the 
fundamental, broad objective of market integration underlying all policy considerations”-- Willimsky, S., M., 
“The Concept(s) of Competition” [1997] E.C.L.R. 54 at p. 55.  
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the EU did not have the same problem. This part of the US and EU history is just a 
foundation for further examination and it creates an important starting point for this thesis.  
US antitrust law has an extensive list of academic writings on ‘size’ and ‘bigness’ in the 
context of market power.
36
 EU competition law, on the other hand, does not.
37
 This fact 
can lead to an assumption that EU competition law has no concerns about size and bigness; 
however, this thesis argues otherwise; the thesis considers that the Commission has 
developed a certain level of distrust for dominant firms with market power and the EU 
courts fully support the Commission. The fact that EU competition law, and in particular 
Article 102, is applied very strictly may also lead to an established tendency towards large 
firms being confined once their power reaches a certain level.  
The most prominent US anti-bigness commentator was Louis Brandeis
38
 whose belief that 
bigness of corporate size or a monopoly led mostly to inefficiencies which resulted in his 
employment of the term.  
Brandeis’ position toward bigness or corporate size could be summarised by the quote 
from his famous essay The Curse of Bigness, 
“Regulation is essential to the preservation of competition […] Unlicensed 
liberty leads necessarily to despotism or oligarchy. Those who are stronger 
must to some extent be curbed. We curb the physically strong in order to 
protect those physically weaker”.39  
Brandeis wrote in support of regulation of competition and eradication of illegal trusts
40
 
which were heavily featured in The Curse of Bigness. He did not believe that mere size 
could be efficient and bring success to the US economy as he perceived bigness as a threat 
                                                          
36
 This research has revealed a considerable number of journal articles and books where the size of a firm and 
bigness were discussed in the context of Section 2. Despite the fact that this research might not cover all 
available resources, all the relevant sources are discussed throughout this research.  
37
 The research on EU competition law and its assessment of bigness and size in the context of market power 
under Article 102 has not revealed extensive list of literature. This fits with the topic of this research as terms 
‘bigness’ and ‘size’ are purely American; therefore, this research was focusing on the context and various 
sources which discussed market power.  
38
 Brandeis, L., D., The Curse of Bigness. 
39
 Ibid. at p. 110.  
40
 E.g., the Newspaper Trust, the Writing Paper Trust, the Upper Leather Trust, the Sole Leather Trust, the 
Woolen Trust, the Paper Bag Trust and the International Mercantile Marine.  
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to market liberty and prosperity. Brandeis’ opinion41 on bigness has inspired the writing of 
this thesis as The Curse of Bigness is still regarded as a powerful piece of academic work 
on the matter.
42
  
Business actions of powerful firms may be seen as being aggressive due to the level of 
influence such firms have on markets. Their dominance may become their own obstacles to 
making, for instance, lawful price decisions because the larger the firm the more limitations 
are placed by antitrust law. These firms may reach such a significant size for various 
reasons and not all those reasons are necessarily unlawful. It has been argued, for example, 
that “with every dollar we spend we decide which companies shall grow and which shall 
shrink and die […] that’s how giants are born”.43 In this observation, the consumers are 
seen to take some responsibility for the growth of certain firms. However, the observation 
is not without flaw. Sometimes consumers may purchase goods due to the lack of choice 
caused by a monopolist being present on a market. In such situations, antitrust intervention 
is very important. It will be seen that in the US, there was recognition that some firms grow 
due to their business acumen and skills and, in that case, such firms should not be punished. 
The dilemma here lies in the fact that a firm should be allowed to enjoy fruits of its labour 
without excessive intervention from government. Meantime, power indeed may be easily 
abused especially if a firm reaches the point when its size and bigness become its primary 
bargaining power by, for instance, excluding competitors or setting unfavourable terms and 
conditions in a contract with other firms. It is undeniable that it might be difficult to 
distinguish between legal and illegal growth; however, US antitrust law seems to be 
tackling this well because over-enforcement of antitrust rules might itself lead to consumer 
detriment. 
Thus, in the application of antitrust rules to firms with market power, the discussion of size 
does not appear to be relevant even though a general distrust of large firms with significant 
market power cannot go unnoticed, especially in the EU. It is submitted that there is, 
perhaps unconsciously, an assumption that the size of a firm does matter when antitrust 
rules are applied to a single firm’s behaviour.  
                                                          
41
 See, Schroeder, M., M., “The Brandeis Legacy” [2000] 37 San Diego L. Rev. 711; Burnett, Jr., D., D., L., 
“The Brandeis Vision” [1998-1999] 37 Brandeis L.J. 1.  
42
 It has been argued that Brandeis’ “approach to business size has left its mark on modern antitrust law” in 
Orbach, B., & Rebling, G., C., “The Antitrust Curse of Bigness” at p. 624. 
43
 Adams, P., Is Bigness Bad? (Republic Steel Corporation, New York: 1949) at p. 15.  
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1.4 Research Questions and Methodology 
This thesis examines the extent to which the ‘size’ and ‘bigness’ are central to the 
establishment of dominance under Article 102 and, as a comparison, of monopoly under 
Section 2. In order to pursue this examination, it is important to identify and answer 
whether EU competition law holds a hostile approach to firms with market power by 
setting out low market shares to determine firms’ size and admitting firms’ advantages 
over their competitors as evidence of their bigness. If yes, the next question is to identify 
the reasons behind the Commission’s and the European Courts’ distrust of firms in a 
dominant position. Any evidence gathered will be compared with the position of the US 
toward monopoly under Section 2. 
The thesis is therefore focused on the following research questions: 
a) Whether a firm’s size and bigness are central to the establishment of the existence 
of dominance and monopoly in the EU and US? 
b) Why the EU and US, despite having considerable similarities in the tools used for 
the assessment of market power, apply different market share thresholds for the 
finding of a dominant position and monopoly? 
c) What role do ‘other factors’ play in the finding of dominance and monopoly? 
d) Whether the Commission and the EU courts hold an interventionist and 
antagonistic approach to firms with private economic power and, if yes, what are 
the reasons for such a strict approach and general distrust toward dominant firms? 
The answers to the above questions will enable conclusions to be reached on the extent to 
which the ‘size’ and ‘bigness’ are central to the establishment of dominance under Article 
102 and the reasons behind such conclusions.   
It should be noted from the outset that this thesis is neither pro nor anti-bigness and, unless 
an analysis of every industry is conducted, it is impossible to estimate whether bigness and, 
in fact, size benefit markets.
44
  
                                                          
44
 Arguably, high technology and pharmaceutical markets may be in need of large firms with substantial 
resources available at their disposal. 
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The historical formation of EU competition law and US antitrust law is used as a starting 
point in demonstrating the approaches taken in each jurisdiction to the use of private 
economic power in markets. Both jurisdictions were formed for entirely different reasons 
which left an imprint on the way the EU and US deal with dominant firms and 
monopolists. In particular, it will be examined whether differences in the reasons behind 
the adoption of EU and US antitrust provisions provide any explanation for divergence in 
the determination of the extent of market power which must be present before Section 2 or 
Article 102 may be applied.   
The aims and objectives of antitrust law, as shaped by economics, are also going to be 
examined in order to learn how market power prevents those objectives to be satisfied. 
Since economics plays an important role in the analysis of market power, it is vital to 
examine why economics considers market power to lead to inefficiencies.  
The undertaken research is doctrinal and comparative. The comparative strategy was 
chosen due to the globalised level of trade among multinational firms because the same 
global firm can be subjected to different antitrust rules due to divergence between the EU 
and US which could lead to inconsistencies, disruption of business transactions, extra 
financial burden and, possibly, to economic inefficiencies. In addition, the comparison 
between two jurisdictions will help to identify if the EU is in fact pursuing anti-bigness 
approach by setting low market share thresholds, using all advantages in the firm’s 
possession to reinforce the finding of market power and, possibly, defining relevant 
markets narrowly.  
Relevant EU and US case law was selected based on a market share threshold for detailed 
case study on the assessment of dominance and monopoly respectively. EU cases in which 
at least a forty percent market share was present, and US cases in which a market share of 
at least seventy percent was present, provide the evidential foundation for this research. 
That this evidence skews towards older EU and US cases does not affect the accuracy of 
the findings. The chosen methodology traces the assessment of dominance and monopoly 
to its initial application in order better to demonstrate and analyse subsequent 
developments. In particular, the focal point of the analysis will be placed on a firm’s size 
and bigness in order to see how the two elements were perceived in the past and whether 
those perceptions changed over time. Notwithstanding the influence of economics on 
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antitrust law, it will be seen that the assessment of dominance and monopoly remained 
unchanged and there are no indications that change is imminent. It will be seen that the 
study of US cases stops at du Pont (1956) and EU cases at British Airways (2003). The 
focus of the present research has been on the development of the rules on the assessment of 
dominance and monopoly, with analysis starting from the earliest cases. A very thorough 
selection procedure was then applied in order to identify those cases which shaped the 
development of approaches to dominance and monopoly in the EU and US. Since this 
research’s methodology was to focus on the development of the rules on the assessment of 
dominance and monopoly, the analysis started from the earliest case. Then, a very 
thorough selective procedure had to be applied in order to identify those cases which shape 
the development of dominance and monopoly in the EU and US.
45
 A review of post-1956 
US cases and post-2003 EU cases demonstrated that their inclusion in the analysis set out 
in this thesis would not significantly contribute to the research, and that their omission 
would not detract from the validity of the research presented here.  
As discussed earlier, a noticeable gap exists between the EU and US market share 
thresholds and, for the purposes of the analysis, US antitrust law’s market share is taken as 
seventy percent whilst the EU competition law’s market share as forty percent. This 
methodology permits analysis as to whether other factors play any role in the assessment of 
dominance and monopoly in addition to a market share level which is already considered 
to be at least indicative of monopoly or dominance. This approach will reveal that the EU 
and US have different approaches to size, in respect of which market share threshold 
disparities are simply one indicator of difference. The EU and US approaches to bigness 
are less evident; therefore, the chosen methodology seeks to permit an analysis of whether 
there is also a disparity in the use of ‘other factors’ or bigness in the assessment of a firm’s 
dominant or monopolistic position. The latter assessment becomes even more acute when a 
firm’s dominant or monopolistic position is presumed based on the number of market 
shares in a relevant market. Lastly, this methodology will also show that cases the 
Commission has dealt with in the past will not become subject to Section 2, and vice versa, 
that firms with market shares above seventy percent will automatically be presumed to 
hold a dominant position in the EU. This approach will be further supported by comments 
and arguments of various economic and legal literatures for the purposes of clarification, 
discussion and criticism.  
                                                          
45
 Please not that in addition to the selected case law, this thesis also includes other EU and US cases.  
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the thesis and Chapter 8 gathers 
the findings of the preceding chapters. 
Chapter 2 of the thesis provides the historical context for the assessment of market power 
in the EU and the US and thus seeks to answer the first research question The political and 
economic situations which led to the adoption of two main antitrust legislations  is at the 
core of Chapter 2.  The chapter also highlights the original aims and objectives of antitrust 
law before the influence of economics began to be felt. It is important to learn the reasons 
behind the adoption of the TFEU and the Sherman Act in order to trace the development of 
the law on market power in the following chapters. In other words, the importance of 
history cannot be ignored as it offers the first explanation of the manner in which 
dominance and monopoly are determined and regulated in the EU and the US. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the main economic principles applied to the assessment of market 
power in order to understand why economics considers market power to be contrary to the 
main goals of antitrust law and thus provide answers to the second research question This 
chapter does not provide any economic analysis of ‘size’ or ‘bigness’; however, it  covers, 
inter alia, various types of economic efficiencies, different economic schools of thought 
and two economic models of competition in order to show how markets perform for the 
consumer benefit. However, the thesis is a legal rather than an economic-based project and 
as such economics is only discussed where necessary and for the sake of completeness. 
The following four chapters seek to answer the third research question. 
Chapter 4 provides a preliminary discussion of the identified economic and non-economic 
tools developed to   assess market power in the EU and US. The analysis is based on cases 
and academic literature and it creates a framework for the specific    case studies that 
follows in chapters 5 and 6. The delineation of a relevant market and the application of 
market shares and barriers to entry are heavily featured in Chapter 4.  
As already stated, chapters 5 and 6 discuss selected cases on market power in order to learn 
how a firm’s ‘size’ and ‘bigness’ are considered  by the Supreme Court, the European 
Commission and the EU courts  with US cases  analysed in Chapter 5 and EU cases in 
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Chapter 6. Both chapters examine only selected   cases and start with the oldest moving to 
the most recent case. After careful consideration, the following US cases were chosen for 
the purposes of this research: Standard Oil,
46
 US Steel Corporation,
47
 Swift,
48
 Alcoa,
49
 
United Shoe
50
 and du Pont.
51
 These cases are used as primary sources of the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the finding of monopoly power. Chapter 6 contains a number of 
selected EU cases
52
 which are used as a source of evidence of the way EU competition law 
addresses dominance: Continental Can,
53
 United Brands,
54
 Hoffmann-La Roche,
55
 
Michelin I,
56
 British Airways,
57
 Hilti
58
 and AKZO.
59
 The case studies are structured in the 
way which focuses on the discussion of bigness and size in the context of establishing 
market power.  
Chapter 7 gathers and reassesses some points covered in the previous chapters; for the sake 
of clarity a certain level of repetition is unavoidable. The chapter sets out arguments in 
relation to the possible benefits from having large firms operating on a market. This will be 
further linked to the discussion and to a brief analysis of the recent proceedings against 
Google Corporation (Google) which are taking place in the EU and US.   
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Chapter 2: Historical Evolution of EU and US 
Antitrust Law 
 
The historical background of antitrust law is undeniably an important starting point for this 
research with EU and US antitrust law creating a foundation for further analysis on the 
establishment of dominance and monopoly respectively. This chapter relies on the main 
events which led to the adoption of the Sherman Act and TFEU with a primary focus on 
law of monopoly and dominance in order to identify the reasons behind antitrust 
intervention with private economic power. The importance of antitrust as an effective tool 
against monopolisation and abuse of dominance is going to be highlighted along with the 
primary aims behind antitrust intervention.  
US antitrust law was heavily featured with private economic power and the approach 
antitrust authorities adopted to fight market power in the past became an important 
foundation to the way monopoly power is treated in the present.  Trusts and corporations 
were deemed to be harmful to competition in the US and several attempts were made to put 
them under governmental control.  
EU competition law did not have an issue with private economic power at first. The EU 
was created for predominantly political reasons and its competition law was created based 
on common knowledge and certain experience derived from, as argued, US antitrust law. It 
is with the growth of the EU and the expansion of markets that antitrust law took a more 
serious role in promotion of the internal market.  
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2.1. History of US Antitrust Law 
The era of US antitrust law, as a positive body of law, begun with the rapid formation of 
monopolies.
60
  Monopoly grants its holder with an exclusive privilege which becomes its 
distinguishing feature. At first, it was a legal privilege granted by the state and then 
transformed into exclusively maintained private privilege following individuals’ own 
efforts and success.
61
 In any case, despite all the changes monopoly went through, it has 
always been perceived as an obstacle to the liberty of the marketplace, to equality and to 
fairness. 
The period from 1890 to 1914 was the most crucial time in the creation of the most 
significant principles of antitrust law. Before the formation of antitrust policy as a positive 
law, there was a significant debate in Congress, “in a historical period rife with political 
and economic conflict”.62 Public outcry against the misuse of private economic power 
required a solution that would be appropriate to the market situation in the US at that time. 
There was a balance that was required to be upheld and the US policy makers turned to 
various jurisdictions to derive an example of the positive law that might address the 
public’s concerns. 
The US policy makers tried to follow a pattern of balancing the ‘public interest’ and 
‘freedom of contract’ in the law when deliberating on the future antitrust rules. The main 
concern was the fact that there was a thin line between two principles, itself creating an 
obstacle to finding the appropriate balance. This was as a result of the prevalent view in the 
US where the market was seen a place where any player was allowed to contract without 
government restrictions, the notion at the heart of laissez-faire economics. This is strongly 
related to the principle that a party should be allowed to reap the profits of its own success. 
The dilemma starts when the question arises as to whether a private party is willing to 
share success with the public, when the ‘public interest’ principle becomes of paramount 
importance. Peritz argued that “competition policy, […], has long been one way of 
                                                          
60
 The earliest definition of monopoly was provided in 1598 as “an engrossing of any merchandise into ones 
hand that no man may sell but he, or the place where such Monopolies are kept”-- John Florio’s 1611 
Italian/English Dictionary: Queen Anna’s New World of Words, p. 321. 
61
 Letwin, W., L., “Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890” [1956] 23(2) University of 
Chicago Law Review 221 at p. 226.  
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 Peritz, R., J., R., Competition Policy in America, 1888-1992: History, Rhetoric, Law (OUP, New York, 
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mediating tensions between our commitments to liberty and equality”.63 In this context, 
‘liberty’ reflects the recognition of the principle that markets should be generally free from 
government intervention, except where the government should protect the market and its 
stakeholders from the misuse of private economic power. 
Whilst the maximisation of consumer welfare is posited as being the only legitimate goal 
of US antitrust law,
64
 antitrust in fact encompasses a number of other different goals.
65
 The 
maximisation of economic efficiency through the promotion of healthy competition is also 
believed to be an important aim of antitrust.
66
 The importance of having competition on a 
market should not be underestimated as “competition provides society with the maximum 
output that can be achieved at any given time with the resources at its command [...] 
competition is desirable, therefore, because it assists in achieving a prosperous society and 
permits individual consumers to determine by their actions what goods and services they 
want most”.67 Nevertheless, it was argued that when the courts have to choose between the 
promotion of consumer welfare and maximisation of economic efficiency, the preference 
will be given to the former as it is the fundamental goal of antitrust.
68
 Therefore, these 
goals of antitrust had become the core foundation behind antitrust intervention and courts’ 
reasoning in their control of private economic power.  
2.1.1. English Common Law 
The principles and rules of the English common law on monopolies were used as a basis 
for the creation of antitrust rules in the US which focused on four different types of 
violation: the law on monopolies; the law on forestalling, engrossing, and regrating; the 
law on contracts in restraints of trade; and the law on combinations in restraint of trade.
69
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There was a general perception that common law always protected freedom of trade and 
condemned monopoly. This perception was introduced by Sir Edward Coke, who 
significantly contributed to the development of common law. It was Sir Edward who 
argued that Magna Carta outlawed monopoly, basing his argument on its 29
th
 and 30
th
 
Articles.
70
 Common law, on the other hand, had only begun to oppose monopoly at the end 
of the sixteenth century.
71
 Over time, English common law underwent a series of changes 
and adjustments in response to the economic and political situation at the time, reflecting 
the community’s desires and preferences.72 The congressmen who were involved in 
drafting the Sherman Act were also affected by the then current economic and political 
situation; thereby, interpreting the common law rules in the way which appeared to them to 
be most appropriate in the prevailing circumstances of late 19
th
 Century America. 
Initially, for example, the common law did not oppose monopolies granted by monarchs. 
Monopoly was originally an exclusive privilege granted by monarchs to merchants in the 
form of the letter-patent on the payment of generous fees. At that time, the letter-patent had 
a very broad scope,
73
 such that it was impossible to trade equally with the letter-patent 
holders. It was not until the end of the sixteenth century that the unfettered discretion of the 
monarch to grant letter-patent monopolies was controlled. By the end of the seventeenth 
century, the letter-patents were only given to those who contributed to the economic 
development. It has been argued that the shift in the tendency in granting the letter-patent 
monopoly changed mainly due to “disturbances within the monopolistic system 
administered largely by the guilds, and by objections [...] to the political power which the 
crown exercised in granting them”.74 This shows, therefore, that the common law’s 
negative attitude toward monopoly was developed over time which, in turn, shows that the 
common law had to go through various stages of social and political development in order 
to start recognising that what monopoly represented was, in fact, an offence. 
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The first case on monopoly which was recorded and subsequently cited was Davenant v 
Hurdis
75
 (‘The Merchant Tailors’ case). This case was the first example of the judicial 
examination of the monopolistic power exercised by the guilds.
76
 This case, in particular, 
was concerned with the question of whether the by-law, “An Ordinance for Nourishing and 
Relieving the Poor Members of the Merchant Tailors Company” passed in 1571 created a 
monopoly in the cloth-finishing trade. It was then decided that if the by-law did in fact 
create a monopoly then it would be void. It was argued that this decision brought an 
innovative perspective to both the relevant law and economic policy
77
 since it raised 
questions about the relationship between law and monopoly. 
The next important case, Darcy v Allen
78
 (‘The Case of Monopolies’) was the decision that 
took the development of the common law of monopolies to the next level. In this case it 
was held that if a royal grant of patent provided an exclusive privilege of monopoly then it 
would be invalid. This decision clearly attacked monopoly granted by the royal letter 
which showed the beginning of the developing recognition of the harm associated with 
grant of Royal privileges in a commercial context. The attack on the royal prerogative to 
grant patent letters was not direct; but rather, relying on the fact that the Queen Elizabeth 
was deceived in her making of the grant.
79
 It was argued that during that time, “the right to 
work was protected by giving each guild a monopoly, and Darcy’s grant was condemned 
not because it was a monopoly and therefore necessarily bad, but because it was a bad 
monopoly”.80 This shows that initially, the existence of ‘monopoly’ was generally based on 
the simplest idea of providing the public with the right to work which, in turn, was 
achieved by providing the public with monopoly. It seems as if monopoly was not 
considered as being harmful for the market operation; but rather, being the only means to 
ensure that the public was protected from outside competitors. 
The common law experience, therefore, showed the gradual formation of the law on the 
control of monopolies.
81
 Importantly, it did not stop the power and the spread of 
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monopolies as the common law remedies were insufficient to address fully the problem. It 
was still an era in which the ‘freedom of trade’ was controlled by the Crown, the discretion 
of Parliament, and the Royal Assent. For such reasons, rules on governing competition 
within the market required more solid form, i.e. statutory legislation. In 1624, the Statute 
of Monopolies was passed which stated that “all monopolies and all commissions, grants, 
licenses, charters, and letters patents, [...], are altogether contrary to the laws of this realm, 
and so are and shall be utterly void and of none effect, and in no wise to be put in use or 
execution”.82 This was the first codified attempt to tackle the monopoly situation in 
England, and has been described as “‘the ancient and fundamental law’ against 
monopolies”.83 Although, it was argued that this attempt was not based on the promotion 
and protection of competition but rather on “constitutional objections to the power which 
the Crown presumed in granting monopolies and to the arbitrary reasons for which it had 
granted them”.84 Gradually private monopolies established by Royal grant were brought 
under Parliamentary control. Therefore, the Statute of Monopolies did manage to put the 
fast-growing tendency of private monopolisation under the Parliamentary control; albeit, it 
neither outlawed nor abolished the spread of corporate monopoly which continued to 
exclude competitors. 
2.1.2. Corporations 
In the 19
th
 Century, American markets started experiencing various events which led to 
drastic changes in the manufacturing industries.
85
 This also led to the appearance of a large 
market which created the possibility for firms to greatly expand the size of their business. 
It, in turn, created the favourable conditions for the creation of private powers within the 
certain industries. 
Following English common law experience, US antitrust law heavily relied on the 
common law rules on the control of monopolies. Monopolies tend to take various forms,
86
 
being different in nature but having similar effects on a market.
87
  Monopolies are always 
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considered to mean “some sort of unjustified power, especially one that raised obstacles to 
equality of opportunity”.88 Over time growing impatience with monopolies led to a public 
outcry demanding government’s intervention. Interestingly, the public did not really 
understand the actual harm caused by monopoly; however, the general perception of 
treating monopoly as evil, a view promoted and reinforced by substantial media coverage 
led to the public’s antagonistic attitude toward monopolies. 
In the period between the founding of the US, and the enactment of the Sherman Act, the 
US government, although recognising the spread of monopolies, did not interfere 
significantly in powerful firms’ activities. A firm of a considerable size and which had 
various advantages over its competitors used to be occasionally referred as ‘big business’ 
which entailed the idea of a corporate body that took control over an entire industry; 
thereby, squeezing weaker rivals out of a market. According to Louis Brandeis, big 
business “is size attained by combination, instead of natural growth, which has contributed 
so largely to our financial concentration”.89 This argument signifies an illegality behind a 
firm’s growth which is going to be discussed by the Supreme Court in a several leading 
cases under Section 2.
90
 
The post-revolutionary political and economic situation did dictate the market 
environment; thereby allowing powerful firms to play according to their own rules. The 
establishment of two Banks of the United States
91
 in 1791 could be used as an example as 
it became prominent monopoly in the financial sector. In fact, the first Bank mostly 
consisted of private business despite the fact that it was regarded as a government bank.
92
 
One of the Bank’s charters had a non-compete or monopoly clause which required the 
Federal Government not to create rival banks. Such a clause clearly provided the Banks 
with an exclusive monopolistic position in the financial market. The attempts to delete the 
monopoly clause failed and no further attempts were made until 20 years after the 
operation of the banks was terminated. One of the reasons for their termination related to 
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Congress’ constitutional powers to create banks.93 During the renewal of the second Bank 
of the United States’ charter, President Jackson vetoed such a renewal on the grounds that 
“an exclusive privilege of banking under the authority of the General Government, a 
monopoly of its favour and support, and, as a necessary consequence, almost a monopoly 
of the foreign and domestic exchange”94 was inimical to the public interest. Therefore, 
President Jackson relied, inter alia, on a monopoly clause in the charter in order to justify 
the refusal to renew the charter.  
The economic and social situation in the US at that time required a tighter and codified 
control over the US markets as they started being affected by the accumulation of wealth 
and power in the hands of powerful corporations. The ‘corporation’ was the main example 
of a firm which possessed both elements of a monopoly power, i.e. size and bigness. They 
had always been disliked by the public due to the common belief that every corporation 
was monopolistic because it was a corporation.
95
 The development and growth of 
corporations was not spontaneous; rather, the political environment along with the 
development of earlier corporate institutions
96
 influenced the formation of the present kind 
of corporation.
 97
 The royal monopolies, for instance, could be a substantial contribution to 
the first business entity that shaped the development of corporations. Most of the large 
entities which were holding exclusive rights of trade were also considered to be 
monopolists. For such reasons, due to the fact that large firms were making up the largest 
part of the private power in the US market, the view developed that all corporations were 
monopolies.
98
 Furthermore, before the nineteenth century corporations were granted 
monopolies by special legislation which defined their rights and duties. Corporations could 
not be formed by anyone without permission; therefore, those receiving the permission to 
form a corporation were granted a pure monopoly over their business. Therefore, the 
privileges, the separate legal personality, the state’s protection and stability could be very 
appealing factors in favour of incorporation. After considering this, it is unsurprising that 
the general public was against corporations. At that time, the general public did not benefit 
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from corporations’ business and not any one could incorporate as such a business deal was 
reserved to very high-ranked and wealthy people. The public’s antagonism toward 
corporations was further supported by the argument that “a corporation may be too large to 
be the most efficient instrument of production and of distribution”99 which reflects the 
economic side of the argument. Despite the fact that at that time, corporations were 
providing the largest employment positions in the US, they were still perceived as not 
being beneficial for the both the consumer and the US market. 
2.1.3. Trusts 
After the Civil War,
100
 the public’s perception of corporations worsened; therefore, the 
public started demanding the control of monopolistic corporations by government 
regulation.
101
 The reason behind the increasing public outcry was the rapid development of 
private corporations which were believed to be entirely monopolistic. One of the most 
infamous types of monopolistic private corporations were trusts which started to be formed 
in response to a general price war and market instability. In order to maintain high prices 
and respond to the market situation, trusts were formed with the purpose of maintaining 
high prices. Eventually, this brought the US to the era of revolutionary industrialisation. 
The end consumers were hit by high prices; while small businesses were affected by anti-
competitive practices of the leading and powerful firms. For instance, farmers were largely 
affected by high prices charged on transportation of their goods by railroads. These trusts 
were, thus, taking the form of business trusts which developed into an excellent tool to take 
control over the entire industry. 
Trusts started to be formed by a major oil corporation, Standard Oil, in 1880, a move 
which was followed by other oil corporations.
102
 A board of the specialised trustees was set 
up in order to control all Standard Oil’s property. In return, stockholders were given trust 
certificates for each share of the company’s stock, while the company’s profits were given 
to trustees who in turn set the dividends. This system ensured a complete monopoly for 
Standard Oil. Despite all the concerns and public outcry about the harm created by 
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monopolistic trusts, the Sherman Act historian John Davidson Clark argued that the public 
was not ‘hysterical’, but was, rather indifferent to the trusts.103 There were various 
arguments about public’s reaction toward trusts; however, the fact that trusts did affect the 
US economy was an undisputable fact. It was argued, for example, that financial 
concentration was one of the most harmful effects of trusts as they destroyed financial 
independence by providing only a few banking entities with a privilege to undertake trusts’ 
finances.
104
 The access to the profits by the general public and the ability for others to 
compete with such large private corporations as trusts was the distinctive feature of the 
trusts’ monopolistic position within the US market.105  
The formation of trusts triggered various responses and the proposition that trusts were 
simply the results of natural growth
106
 was vigorously rejected by Louis Brandeis. The 
rejection was based on the argument that “not a single industrial monopoly exists today 
which is the result of natural growth […] competition has been suppressed either by 
ruthless practices or by an improper use of inordinate wealth and power”.107 It rested on the 
fact that trusts had proved to be detrimental to the consumer welfare by monopolising the 
markets.  
Before the government took control over trusts, there were different opinions as to the 
appropriate remedies to stop trusts abusing their power. There were supporters for two 
types of remedies: the regulation of monopoly and the regulation of competition.
108
 Some 
believed that monopoly in business of private corporations was inevitable; therefore, the 
only way left to the government was to regulate monopoly; rather than fight it. This 
remedy could be an appropriate one only if the government had enough resources to 
control the monopoly of private corporations. However, considering that trusts were also 
accused of bribing legislators and corrupting civil servants,
109
 such a remedy would pose 
risks. Others, meanwhile, thought that trusts’ monopoly was not an inevitable process; 
therefore, arguing that the most appropriate remedy would be to control the regulation of 
competition. This entails the maximum eradication of monopoly in private power; thereby, 
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promoting free-from-monopoly competition within the US market. It could be argued that 
Congress chose this remedy; although, it never prohibited monopoly altogether. It could 
also be argued that Congress preferred to play safe and chose neither of them; rather, it 
passed a legislation that regulated both monopoly and competition at the same time. 
2.1.4. The Sherman Act 1890 
On January 21, 1888 during the first session of the 50
th
 Congress, a resolution was 
suggested in order to ask the House Committee on Manufactures to start an investigation 
and to recommend legislation for the control of the trusts. Following the investigation on 
trust operations, the House Committee on Manufacture produced an interim report based 
on the information uncovered in relation to the trust. This led to John Sherman (R. Ohio) 
and other Senators putting forward antitrust bills. For 15 months after the introduction of 
the Sherman bill, the Senate was involved in serious negotiations and debates. The bill was 
later referred to the Committee on the Judiciary which returned it in an unrecognisable 
form introducing drastic changes to the statutory language of the bill. Senator George 
Edmunds stated that “without amendment it would not afford a remedy to the real parties 
injured”.110 In any case, despite all the disputes and difficulties around the bill, the 
Sherman Act was successfully passed and, up until now, its realm covers many aspects of 
anticompetitive behaviour which go beyond the formation and operation of trusts. In the 
1890s, the Sherman Act was considered to be a “dead letter”;111 therefore, it took it many 
years of development and interpretation before getting a strong hold over antitrust 
violations in the US markets.   
The Sherman Act was an innovation created with a particular purpose in mind. At the time 
of the negotiation, there was no single piece of legislation which covered various antitrust 
points. Several states already had similar rules regulating monopolistic movements which 
were only applicable to intrastate commerce. The Sherman Act, on the contrary, has a 
direct link with Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce and commerce with 
foreign nations as provided in the US Constitution.
112
 However, it was argued that “the 
Sherman law, [...], is not a law to regulate interstate commerce, but is a law to prevent 
certain private regulations of or interferences with interstate commerce which anticipate 
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the action of Congress, leaving all others untouched”.113 Therefore, some stakeholders 
perceived the Sherman Act as simply Congress’ way to obtain more control over interstate 
commerce and to create legal basis in order to punish disobedience. It could be argued that 
at the initial stage of the Sherman Act’s existence, Congress’ intentions could have been 
interpreted as aiming at tighter control over interstate commerce; rather than of trusts. In 
any case, the Sherman Act was very much needed as it did give the government a legal 
framework for a tighter and more harmonised control over antitrust violations in domestic 
and foreign markets. 
It was, therefore, argued that the Sherman Act was a necessary tool required to control the 
monopolistic tendency created by trusts and corporations. In Apex Hosiery Co,
114
 it was 
held that: 
“The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competition in 
business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, 
raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or 
consumers of goods and services, all of which had to come to be regarded 
as a special form of public injury”.115 
It was recognised early on that the Sherman Act was not created for the benefit of 
individual competitors, but rather, for the protection of the public interest as a whole.
116
 
Bork, for instance, argued that ‘consumer welfare’ was a primary legislative intent behind 
the Sherman Act and that “[...] in case of conflict, other values were to give way before 
it”.117 The fact that Congress made consumer welfare as the primary goal of the Sherman 
Act is not surprising as it was consumers and public that drew government’s attention to 
the spread of monopoly. 
Furthermore, Congress was concerned with a relationship between law and business 
efficiency. Congress was of the opinion that law should not become an obstacle to business 
efficiency. This led Congress to decide that “monopoly itself was lawful if it was gained 
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and maintained only by superior efficiency”.118 This leads to the above argument in 
relation to appropriate remedies on the control of trusts. Congress did not prohibit 
monopoly; rather it prohibited certain methods of the attainment of monopoly.  
Although the Sherman Act was passed unanimously in the Congress (save for one vote 
against in the Senate), it still left some uncertainty in relation to its interpretation. It was 
founded on the old doctrines derived from the English common law which were dealing 
with monopoly and various restraints of trade. As Senator Sherman said “it does not 
announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well-recognised principles of the 
common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal Government”.119 It 
was argued that the Sherman Act “reflects not only the uncertainty present in every general 
law because its authors cannot foresee the particular cases that will arise, but also the 
ambiguity that colours many democratic laws because the authors cannot completely 
resolve the divergent opinions and cross purposes that call it forth”.120  
Initially, the Sherman Act had been subject to many discussions due to the common law 
terminology used in drafting its antitrust provisions. The principles of the common law on 
the control of monopolies had always been diverse and contradictory; therefore “many of 
them obviously irrelevant and even hostile to the policy of fostering competition”.121 This 
however did not prevent the law makers to use the common law principles in the Sherman 
Act. The Sherman Act had its own supporters and critics, the latter arguing that antitrust 
laws “are clear enough, but they have gone beyond the purpose which brought about the 
enactment of the Sherman Law”.122 This argument stems from the fact that the scope of the 
Sherman Act extended beyond monopolistic trusts; thereby, ending up covering various 
antitrust issues.
123
 For such reasons, it is not surprising that the expanding scope of the 
Sherman Act was criticised. The Sherman Act was innovative in its sense, despite being 
entirely consistent of common law principles. Its initial plan was to cover monopolistic 
trusts; although, it would be completely unimaginable if the Sherman Law did not develop 
along with the situation. Currently, monopolistic trusts per se no longer exist; therefore, the 
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Sherman Act was meant to be abolished. However, the courts kept developing the Sherman 
Act by applying various interpretations in order to both clarify its terms and scope, and in 
order to respond to changing economic understanding, and to changing circumstances. 
When the Sherman Act was enacted, various stakeholders tried to delineate those groups 
that would benefit from the Sherman Act rules. It was, for instance, suggested that the 
small firms would be the direct beneficiaries of the rules as the Sherman Act was perceived 
as being “an anti-big business statute”.124 Frankly, such a perception of the Sherman Act 
was not to be entirely unexpected as the main target of the Sherman Act was clearly the 
most powerful market players. The monopoly problem became so acute that in 1903 a 
special division of the Department of Justice (the DOJ) was especially created to deal with 
antitrust issues. Furthermore, the antitrust system also required good appeals procedures 
which were established alongside the Department of Commerce and Labour a Bureau of 
Corporations which was assigned with investigating and gathering information regarding 
corporate enterprise. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides, 
“Every person who shall monopolise, or attempt to monopolise, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolise any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment 
not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court”. 
It is clear that section 2 is open to interpretation, i.e. it does not set out very detailed 
and precise rules on the control of monopolies. It does not dictate the rules on 
conducting business; employing rather somewhat cursory, simple, legislative language. 
Due to its broad and open-ended language, it is seen “to possess substantial elasticity, 
allowing the courts to adjust their [the key words in the Sherman Act] meanings as 
their experience grows”.125 It is also clear that it does not outlaw the condition of 
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monopoly; rather, it outlaws the process of monopolisation.
126
 It was interestingly said 
that the Sherman Act contained “a broadly written law intended to attain and protect 
certain broad and fundamental objectives—the maximum of trade and commerce with 
a minimum of regulation [...], without unnecessarily infringing on the right of 
individual persons to engage in commerce”.127 The last part of this argument is 
important as it shows that even if consumer welfare is of paramount importance; a 
person’s ability to do business without unjustified government intervention is still 
preserved by the Sherman Act.
128
 
 
2.2. History of EU Competition Law 
EU competition law has gone through many changes since its inception. It dates back to 
1948 when Western Europe was just about to experience drastic changes. From the end of 
WWII, political ideas started developing on the creation of European cooperation between 
nations. This led to a series of negotiations and subsequently to the formation of European 
institutions, each of them being assigned with a particular role. Unfortunately, those 
established European institutions lacked “the authority or political will to ensure that the 
cooperation itself develops into any kind of supranational integration”.129 The post-war 
devastation and the economic and political instability in Western Europe required more 
concrete integration between participating nations. This situation led politicians and 
participating countries to seek other measures that would create an environment beyond 
mere unilateral cooperation. 
In order to achieve such an environment, the leading post-war nations had to undertake 
various steps for creating a new and stronger Europe.
130
 Following the gruesome 
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experience of WWII, the leading nations acknowledged the necessity to create a unified 
supranational power in order to permit a recovery from the economic and social 
devastation caused by the war.
131
 
The reasons behind the creation of the EU had a considerable effect on the way EU 
competition law was drafted and, subsequently, interpreted. So far, it becomes clear that 
the EU was created for both economic and political reasons with an aim of having an 
integrated society which, in turn, had repercussions on the way EU competition law was 
enforced. It can already be contrasted with US antitrust law and its reasons behind the 
Sherman Act.  
2.2.1. European Coal and Steel Community 
The post-war devastation and the economic and political instability in Western Europe 
required more concrete integration between participating nations. This situation led 
politicians and participating countries to seek other measures that would create an 
environment beyond mere unilateral cooperation. In order to achieve such an environment, 
the leading post-war nations had to undertake various steps for creating stronger Europe.
132
  
The very first institution, established on 16 April 1948, was the Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation (OEEC). It originated from the combinations of the Marshall 
Plan
133
 and the Conference of Sixteen.
134
 Therefore, the aim of OEEC was to bring Europe 
to economic rehabilitation by capital investments and other necessary tools that would help 
Europe to recover and remained “a permanent conference of Sovereign states without any 
supranational powers”.135 
The next important step toward supranational integration of Western Europe was the 
establishment of the Council of Europe.
136
 The initial plan was to create a European 
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legislative Assembly which would be provided with some sovereign powers.
137
 However, 
British delegation opposed to such a significant transfer of power to the Assembly; 
therefore, ensuring that it would get only a consultative role. The post-war Europe 
acknowledged the necessity to create a unified supranational power which would, in turn, 
ensure that participating nations would work together on the restoration of the post-war 
economic and social devastation.  
In 1950 Robert Schuman was instructed by the British and the US delegates to create a 
plan for reintegrating Federal Germany in to the Western Europe. The problem that was 
predominant at that time was the rapid increase of the steel crisis, which led to the 
possibility of steel market becoming subject to cartelisation. Clearly, due to the poor 
economic situation in Western Europe, such an outcome could not have been allowed.  
As the society was still experiencing post-war losses, it was agreed that a careful approach 
was required as “it was too much to expect State to consent to massive transfers of 
sovereignty, which would have injured national sensitivities only a few years after the end 
of the war”.138 For such reasons, the proposal to create a common market for steel, coal 
and iron within Western Europe had transpired.
 139
 According to this plan, the common 
market would erase all quotas, trade and customs duties barriers; therefore, creating an 
integrated economic and trade environment for the participating nations. This plan raised 
much scepticism among stakeholders, appraising it as “wishful thinking”.140  
 
The steel, coal and iron industries were seen as the most common interest between France 
and Germany and the pooling of these industries together would create a strong unification 
of the European Federation.
141
 Therefore, on 18 April 1951, the Treaty Constituting the 
European Coal and Steel Community (the Treaty of Paris) was signed, thereby, creating 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which introduced a new system that “has 
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brought prices down through competition and the consequent rationalisation of 
industry”.142 
The Treaty of Paris moved certain decisions from the member states to the new institution. 
For the states therefore it was the case that “they have given up to a new entity, capable of 
making decisions with which the states themselves might not agree, most of their powers 
to control the future course of events”.143 The Treaty’s objectives included contribution to 
economic expansion, development of employment and improvement of the participating 
nations’ standard of living.144 It was not clear what actual powers the states had to give up; 
however, the most important related to prohibitions on the governments erecting import 
and export duties, qualitative restrictions on the movement of coal and steel, states’ 
charges, or engaging in any other restrictive practices that would divide the common 
market or exploit the consumer.
145
 The prohibition to creation of restrictive practices that 
would lead to the division of the common market and exploitation of the consumers is the 
direct reference to the protection of competition within the common market. Furthermore, 
the Treaty imposed a positive obligation on the signatories to ensure that they establish, 
maintain and observe normal conditions of competition.
146
 It was the High Authority
147
 
that was charged with ensuring that the objectives of the Treaty were fully satisfied,
148
 
granting an authorisation if the provisions of the Treaty were violated.
149
 The Treaty 
provided the High Authority with enforcement powers under Articles 65 and 66 of the 
Treaty. 
Article 66(7) of the Treaty empowered the High Authority to address situations in which 
public or private enterprises held a dominant position which prevented effective 
competition within the common market. Where an abuse of a dominant position took 
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place, the High Authority had a power to issue recommendations to the parties in order to 
prevent the abuse. If the recommendations were not followed, then the High Authority had 
a right to consult any interested governments and impose fines. In this provision, therefore, 
the first reference in legislation to ‘abuse of dominant position’ appears; later on, this 
reference took a more defined form.
150
 At that stage, the concept of ‘abuse’ was neither 
defined nor elaborated on; therefore, leaving vagueness as to its actual interpretation. Such 
an outcome reflected in the fact that they lacked any experience with the concept of 
abuse;
151
 for which reasons they chose the safest path by giving all the powers of control 
over public or private enterprises to the antitrust authority.  
The drafting of the first codified competition provisions of newly created ECSC is the 
process that should be briefly considered. Articles 65 and 66 of the Treaty were legal 
provisions that later had an extensive influence on EU competition law and its subsequent 
legal provisions.
152
 As was discussed above, US antitrust law is considerably older and, 
accordingly, more experienced than EU competition law. For such reasons, it will not be 
surprising to conclude that US antitrust law ideas had an important influence on the 
development of ECSC competition provisions.
153
 The main question is how much US 
antitrust law influenced the creation of ECSC which, in turn, led to the creation of current 
competition provisions. For instance, it was argued that US antitrust law did not have as 
much influence on ECSC despite the common perception that EU principles of competition 
law was Americanised after WWII.
154
  
As was discussed earlier, the very idea to create unified economic society appeared after 
WWII in order to decartelise Germany and to eradicate any possibilities for the new war to 
begin. Pooling industries and tying countries’ economic powers was a priority for 
European countries and the US. For such reasons, EU competition law project had to be 
created quickly. Jean Monnet
155
 was one of the leading European figures who was 
involved in the initial stages of the project and who was a supporter of US antitrust law. 
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Jean Monnet’s ties with France helped him to convince France that if the EEC did not 
create strong integrative goals for the new supranational society, then German firms would 
become very powerful against the will of the US.
156
 For such purposes, Jean Monnet 
invited a professor of antitrust law at Harvard and his close friend, Robert Bowie, to draft 
relevant antitrust provisions on a quick basis. The fact that Bowie was an antitrust scholar 
in the US, a close friend of Monnet and an employee of the US High Commissioner for 
Germany office implies that it would be impossible for drafting not to be drawn on US 
antitrust experience. However, fearing the European’s outrage for the US involvement in 
the drafting, the whole project was conducted in private and then given to European legal 
drafters to introduce final version which would retain the US antitrust ideas.
157
  
2.2.2. European Union 
The Treaty and the creation of the ECSC was the first step toward what is currently known 
as the European Union. While the process was not an easy task, the necessity for creating 
such a community which would unify the willing nations of Western Europe over the coal 
and steel markets was not underestimated. The transition from the simple idea in the 
Schuman Plan to the binding treaty under international law which also made an explicit 
reference to competition law provisions was extraordinary. Clearly, since the 1950s the 
system has considerably changed; however, the main principle of close cooperation among 
participating nations remains the same. Although, the next step on the agenda was how to 
strengthen the system and to give it a bigger future prospective. 
In May 1955, the foreign ministers of the ECSC held a meeting at Messina, Sicily in order 
to discuss the future expansion of the ECSC. The meeting resulted in Messina Declaration 
which was heavily influenced by the Benelux Memorandum. The Messina Declaration 
contained a series of suggestions on the establishment of a European Common Market 
without internal duties and quantitative restrictions. One of the main objectives set out in 
the Messina Declaration was “the development of rules assuring the free play of 
competition within the Common Market, particularly in such a way as to exclude all 
preferences of a national basis”.158 In this case, the objective of the Messina Declaration 
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was to tie up the development of healthy competition with the necessity to erase economic 
discrimination based on the national level. 
In 1956, after the Messina Declaration
159
, the foreign ministers of the Six held a meeting in 
Brussels, Belgium. The meeting was convened by Paul-Henri Spaak who had a group of 
senior officials to prepare the ideas contained in the Messina Declaration into a form 
suitable for treaty provisions. It led to the Spaak Report
160
 which is considered to be a 
document of a great importance as it was comprised of travaux préparatoires on which the 
Treaty of Rome
161
 was based. The final conclusion reached at Messina Conference 
provided that “its [i.e. the Treaty’s] application necessitates a study of the following 
questions...the elaboration of rules to ensure undistorted competition within the 
Community, which will in particular exclude any national discrimination”.162 
The Spaak Report provided a detailed description of the objectives of the future European 
Common Market. The reference to problem of monopoly was explicitly made in the Spaak 
Report, 
“The problem only remains because there are enterprises which, owing to 
their size or specialisation or the agreements they have concluded, enjoy a 
monopoly position. [...] More generally, the Treaty will have to provide 
means of ensuring that monopoly situations and practices do not stand in the 
way of the fundamental objectives of the Common Market”.163  
The Spaak Report also expressly provided that “the Commission may only propose the 
removal of such distortions of competition that create a real and serious threat to the 
competition relation”.164 It cannot go unnoticed that the Spaak Report mentioned size as a 
factor in a monopoly status and it was very concise as to competition objectives of the 
European Common Market. The preservation of the Common Market’s objectives was 
given the paramount consideration where the distortion of competition was regarded as 
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pure obstacle to such objectives. This was the first concrete piece of evidence where a size 
of a firm was directly linked to a monopoly.  
2.2.3. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome provided that one of the objectives of the new institution 
was to achieve “a harmonious development of economic activities”.165 Article 3166 
expanded on the objectives of the Community, providing that the activities of the 
Community shall include, inter alia, “the institution of a system ensuring that competition 
in the common market is not distorted”.167 It is worth noting that the Treaty of Paris did not 
have any explicit reference to the protection of competition in its objectives; and it is 
believed to be due to the gradual development of competition policy within the Common 
Market. The Treaty of Paris, as discussed above, not only recognised but also stressed the 
importance of undistorted competition for the fulfilment of the Community’s objectives. 
Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome provides that “Member States shall take all appropriate 
measures, [...], to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty”. This 
provision is placing an obligation on the Member States to apply all appropriate measures 
in order to protect competition within the Common Market, which is one of the 
Community’s objectives. 
The Treaty of Rome was the first to codify competition provisions.
168
 Articles 85 and 86 
were the main competition provisions, i.e. provisions which include the set of prohibitions 
the violation of which would subject the parties to punishment. Article 86 was influenced 
by Article 66 of the Treaty of Paris as both have the same legislative aims behind them. 
However, it was argued that the final wording of Article 86 allowed the Treaty of Rome to 
go beyond of so-called limited objectives of Article 66 of the Treaty of Paris.
169
 Generally, 
the comparison between the two is not very important as it will not provide a clearer 
picture as to the wording and intention of the competition provisions. This comparison is, 
however, necessary in order to show a gradual development of competition rules on abuse 
of market power in the EU. 
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Before proceeding to the text of Article 86, it is necessary to mention that on 1 December 
2009 the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force; creating a new treaty arrangement for what is 
now the EU, in which the foundation treaties are the TFEU, and the Treaty on European 
Union (‘TEU’). The TFEU re-numbered the main competition provisions in the Treaty of 
Rome. Therefore, Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome,
170
 which became Article 82 EC, is 
now Article 102.  
Article 102 TFEU provides,
 171
 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States”.172 
Therefore, according to the wording of Article 102 in order for an anticompetitive abuse to 
take place a firm must be in a dominant position. It was argued that the language of Article 
102 “was intended to regulate the conduct of dominant firms and to prevent dominant 
firms from unfairly using their power, not merely to prevent them from expanding or 
protecting their power”.173 And this argument is entirely correct; however, it is important 
to identify the extent to which the Commission and the courts follow the language of 
Article 102. The terms ‘abuse’ and ‘dominant position’ have been trusted upon to the 
courts for interpretation; however, it was argued that “both the structure of the Treaty and 
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the continental legal tradition may constrain the potential for growth and development of 
the operative meanings of these provisions”.174 
 
2.3. Final Observations 
When comparing the language of Section 2 and Article 102, it was argued that Section 2 
focuses on an empirical measurement of monopoly power
175
 and that while “‘monopoly’ is 
a status; the language of Article [102] is a prohibition of an action, of an ‘abuse’ by a 
dominant firm”.176 Clearly, both antitrust regimes had different visions on how they 
preferred their antitrust law to work. The difference between Section 2 and Article 102, as 
will be seen later in the thesis, does not lie in the way both legal provisions are drafted but 
rather it lies in the way they are interpreted and applied by antitrust authorities and the 
courts. And, it is an undeniable fact that politics had played an important role in shaping 
antitrust law, especially in the EU. In fact it was argued that “it is bad history, bad policy, 
and bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws”.177 The 
EU and the US have different political frameworks leading to differences between their 
enforcement priorities. In relation to US antitrust law, it was interestingly argued that 
“antitrust must be understood as the political judgment of a nation whose leaders had 
always shown a keen awareness of the economic foundations of politics”.178 Antitrust law, 
therefore, cannot be considered in isolation as there are many external factors which could 
influence the way antitrust law is being perceived. Whatever is important for a nation at a 
particular time is going to have repercussions on antitrust law. The influence of politics 
was even more noticeable in the EU because it, among others, needed competition law to 
break down national barriers and introduce newly created membership of different 
countries to market integration. At present, the Commission is politically independent 
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executive arm of the EU and it consists of 28 Commissioners, i.e. one representative from 
each member state. Directorate-General for Competition is assigned with a policy to 
enforce EU competition rules. It becomes very probable that each member state might 
exert its own interests on the decision making process based on its own political agenda. 
Along with market integration, therefore, each member state’s political views and values 
must be accommodated into the new EU project. The Commission enjoys a pre-eminent 
power not only to investigate an anti-competitive conduct but also to prosecute it and issue 
binding decisions with an up to ten percent fine of a firm’s turnover.179 This makes the 
Commission very powerful and, according to the Commission, its aim is to ensure that all 
EU firms have an access to the EU market “including small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs)”.180 For such reasons, it appears that the Commission’s decisional standards tend 
to protect smaller firms from the rigour of competition law. The evidence of which could 
be derived from the ease with which the Commission has established the presence of 
dominance in a number of the leading cases, i.e. “the Commission has been more 
interested in controlling large companies than with curtailing actual monopoly power”.181 
The powers of the Commission are strikingly different from the powers of the DOJ and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
182
 in the US. The DOJ, for instance, prosecutes certain 
breaches of antitrust law by filling criminal suits or initiating civil actions seeking for a 
court order to prevent and remedy any violations of US antitrust law. It has no similar 
authority to issue binding decisions.
183
  
Lastly, when comparing the EU with the US,
184
 it was argued that the Commission sees 
some aspects of competition law issues in more political terms than more economically 
focused US antitrust law.
185
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2.4. Conclusion 
The study of historical background of US antitrust law and EU competition law gives an 
invaluable insight to the origination and subsequent development of antitrust law and 
policy within two jurisdictions. This chapter focused on the relevant parts of US antitrust 
law and EU competition law history which should provide the reader with a robust 
background on the main historical and legal events leading to the law on dominance and 
monopoly. For such reasons, this part of the thesis has dealt with the appearance of the 
relevant competition laws of the US and the EU, up to the point at which the key texts – 
Section 2 and Article 102– became operative.  
The comparison between the history of two jurisdictions showed that both the US and EU 
were faced with different threats that led them to pass their respective antitrust legislations. 
It was shown that US antitrust law was passed in order to tackle the appearance and spread 
of corporations, and a trust was the worst type of them. The public was very antagonistic 
toward corporations because it was believed that all corporations were inherently 
monopolistic. Keeping that in mind, the Sherman Act was adopted to address the spread of 
a private corporate power; however, it was revealed that Congress did not prohibit 
monopolies altogether. And, Section 2, therefore, can be seen as being two-sided, i.e. it 
protects consumer welfare and allows commerce. This was explained by the fact that US 
antitrust law was influenced by the laissez-faire economics where firms were allowed to do 
business without government’s intervention. US antitrust law, therefore, has a profound 
history on the control of private economic power and it provides a good foundation for the 
further research of this thesis.  
EU competition law, on the other hand, was created to serve economic welfare, but also to 
fulfil a wider political purpose in facilitating European integration after WWII. One key 
idea behind the Treaty of Paris was to create the ECSC to observe, inter alia, normal 
conditions of competition. At the later stage, the Spaak Report linked a size of a firm with 
monopoly and, accordingly, anti-competitive conduct. This, however, seemed to be built 
on a common assumption or prejudice that monopoly power was detrimental for market 
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development because, unlike the US, the newly created union had yet to have any dealings 
with private economic power. Following this observation, the influence of US antitrust law 
experience cannot be ignored here. This led both jurisdictions to share, among others, 
similar goals behind their respective antitrust interventions, i.e. the protection of consumer 
welfare and promotion of economic efficiency and which will be discussed in the 
following chapter.  
The comparative analysis between the enforcement powers of the Commission and the 
DOJ revealed that the Commission has more power in the control of dominance than US 
antitrust authorities. In particular, the power to issue binding decisions provides the 
Commission with an opportunity to pursue its own policy. This, among others, includes the 
assurance that SMEs have an access to the EU internal market which, in turn, can reflect 
on the way bigness and size are treated by the Commission under Article 102.  
Therefore, despite different historical events leading to the formation of US antitrust law 
and EU competition law, it is concluded that both jurisdictions apply the similar pattern on 
the control of monopoly and dominance, i.e. Section 2 and Article 102 both require 
monopolistic or dominant status and the abuse of that status. This is the most obvious 
similarity. The actual assessment of dominance or monopoly will depend on the antitrust 
authorities and the courts and will be affected by the socio-political and economic 
environment, which is where the divergences between the EU and US begin.  
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Chapter 3: Economic Principles of Antitrust 
Law 
 
Antitrust is not economics and for both disciplines to co-exist, antitrust law had to become 
more flexible in accommodating certain economic principles. US antitrust law had started 
to include economics into its realm earlier than EU competition law.
186
 Economics, in this 
respect, introduced a notion of efficiency where markets are performing in a way which 
will benefit the consumers. Economics, furthermore, provided antitrust law with a perfect 
competition model and a monopoly model. Both are the examples of two extreme market 
structures which paint a picture of what a market is going to be like under either of the 
models. Economics plays an inseparable role in the analysis of dominance and monopoly 
in the EU and US. However, in spite of the influence economics has on antitrust law, both 
are two distinct disciplines. Economics provides tools for the analysis of the firms’ actions 
along with tools for the assessment of market structure. It leads to the understanding that 
maximisation of consumer welfare lies at the heart of the market performance and 
competition law. Ideally, competitors, in such a scenario, are the objects which play the 
crucial role in the satisfaction of consumer welfare and realisation of other goals of 
antitrust law. The role economics plays in antitrust law is very straightforward and, as a 
discipline, it “values competition only as a process for the production of ‘efficient’ 
outcomes”.187  
Initially, antitrust law was not prepared to deal with complexity of measuring market 
power; therefore, the assistance of economics became very important. Given that antitrust 
has as one of its aims the promotion of economic efficiency, antitrust policy is itself 
grounded in economics, which provides not only a reference for the policy framework, but 
also specific analytical tools. For such reasons, economics considerably contributed to “the 
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formation and adjudication of antitrust policy from the earliest days” 188 and a strong link 
between these disciplines cannot be ignored. Therefore, the analysis of the relevant 
economic principles and approaches is vital to understand the application of antitrust rules 
to market power.
189
  
 
3.1. The Chicago School vs The Ordoliberal School  
Antitrust law encompasses various goals although its actual objectives have always been 
under much debate.
190
 With time, the common agreement gradually led to believe that the 
promotion of economic efficiency was one of the primary goals of antitrust law. In this 
case, the economics of industrial organisation wields a heavy influence on the analysis of 
antitrust rules.  
The economics of industrial organisation can be generally defined as “the study of the 
supply side of the economy, particularly those markets in which business firms are 
sellers”.191 It is that part of the wider discipline of economics in which we find analysis of 
competitive structures and strategies, and which therefore provides economic framework 
relevant to a general discussion of antitrust and the specific tools relevant to its 
application.
192
 The application of economics of industrial organisation to the analysis of 
antitrust rules has developed gradually. This development process was, however, 
contentious leading to various opinions on the aims and objectives of antitrust in various 
markets.  
The Ordoliberal School of economic and antitrust theory, founded in the 1930s, insisted 
that the main legitimate objective of antitrust was the liberalisation of markets from big 
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business and the protection of market structure.
193
 Ordoliberals considered it necessary to 
place certain restrictions on the conduct of dominant firms or to eliminate private 
economic power, while at the same time, allowing certain commercial freedom to compete 
on a market.
194
 In order to achieve that, Ordoliberals developed the ‘performance-based 
competition’ principle195 which would identify abusive conduct. The dispersal of market 
power and the creation of a more supportive environment for small businesses, i.e. 
competitors, could enhance consumer welfare; however, it could also lead to the creation 
of “a particular market structure as a matter of principle”.196 If this is the case, then there 
will be no place for powerful and large firms. In the current society, this objective would 
not be considered as a legitimate aim of antitrust law since it is the protection of consumers 
that antitrust authorities argue to be of paramount importance.
197
  
The reliance of antitrust authorities on two different schools of thought could provide one 
explanation on the differences in treatment of market power in the EU and US. US antitrust 
law, for instance, was applying economics as introduced by the Chicago School which 
argues that antitrust law promotes allocative efficiency with the consumers and firms 
acting in a rational way. Consumer welfare was at the core of the Chicago School with the 
premise that antitrust law should not intervene “unless a challenged practice by a particular 
firm decreased aggregate consumer welfare”.198 In other words, markets have a tendency 
of self-correcting; therefore, an overly interventionist antitrust and per se illegality rules 
may stifle economic efficiency on the US market. This ‘hands off’ approach, which is 
largely based on the concerns of creating the false positive market environment, could be 
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contrasted with the post-Chicago
199
 economics which could be characterised as 
“counselling a ‘light touch’”.200 
EU competition law, on the other hand, was relying on Ordoliberal economics which 
believes that some behaviour of dominant firms should be controlled thereby denying the 
existence of a notion that markets may be self-correcting. The focus of EU competition law 
was to ensure that fairness among competitors was present on a market or, in other words, 
smaller competitors should not had been put into disadvantageous position by dominant 
firms. It was argued that the time and, partly, the pressure from the US officials on EU 
competition law to incorporate economics, had moved competition law focus from goals of 
fairness toward smaller firms to goals of economic and market efficiency.
201
 The focus of 
EU competition law on the notion of fair competition (rather than free competition) does 
promise smaller firms more protection on a market although it does not necessarily ensure 
market efficiency for the benefit of the consumers. This is so because the forces of 
competition law, in this case, turn toward the smaller firms which might not necessarily 
guarantee the delivery of satisfactory goods and services to the consumers.
202
  
In the 1930s economists began to analyse the extent of anticompetitive harm arising in 
markets. Joe S. Bain
203
 developed the Structure—Conduct—Performance paradigm (SCP) 
which was used by economists to analyse the operation of various markets. The SCP 
provides that the structure of a market influences the conduct of buyers and sellers and this 
conduct, in turn, affects the further performance of a market. The very core idea of the SCP 
was that by controlling and regulating the structure of a market, antitrust authorities, at the 
same time, were improving the performance of a market. In such cases, the regulation of a 
firm’s behaviour directly was not necessary as it was the structure of a market that dictated 
the firm’s further behaviour. This led the SCP to become both the “impetus and foundation 
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for statistical studies relating conduct or performance variables to structure”.204 ‘Statistical 
studies’, in this case, are the accounting rates of a firm’s return which are used to calculate 
profits. Therefore, the DOJ started focusing only on highly concentrated markets. 
According to Bain, economies of scale
205
 were not very important in some markets; many 
markets were extremely concentrated with high barriers to entry which, in turn, allowed 
dominant firms to raise anticompetitive prices.
206
 This resulted in the appearance of a new 
antitrust movement which decided that “a large number of small firms would yield lower 
prices than a relatively small number of larger firms”.207  
In the 1960s, the SCP was strongly criticised by the Chicago School mainly for relying on 
accounting returns to calculate the monopoly profits, for disregarding the importance of 
economies of scale in the markets and for using barriers to entry as an indication of 
monopolistic profits. It was argued, in fact, that Bain used “a possible outcome of barriers, 
high profit rates, to substitute for the actual barriers”.208 All these arguments led to the 
common opinion of the proponents of the Chicago School that antitrust regime under the 
SCP was interventionist and structuralistic.  
Despite all the criticism of the SCP, it still remains an important tool in the application of 
antitrust analysis. According to Hovenkamp, the defenders of Bain’s theory may have 
taken it too far in placing more importance on market structure rather than firms’ 
behaviour; however, “that is a question of balance, not of basic legitimacy”.209 
 
3.2. Economic Efficiency 
The Chicago School argued that economic efficiency was the exclusive objective of 
antitrust law.
210
 Economic efficiency is concerned with the optimal production and 
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distribution and is achieved when society’s resources are used and allocated in the most 
efficient and beneficial way. This leads to the minimisation of waste and economic 
inefficiency and maximisation of consumer welfare.
211
 In antitrust law, consumer welfare 
is not explicitly defined; rather, the satisfaction of the consumer and the general wealth of a 
society could be used as an indication of consumer welfare.
212
 It has been argued that 
consumer welfare “refers to the individual benefits derived from the consumption of goods 
and services and [...] in practice, applied welfare economics uses the notion of consumer 
surplus to measure consumer welfare”.213In economics, consumer welfare does not include 
the general principles of consumer interests “in preventing monopolists from extracting 
monopoly profits”.214 The consumer welfare principle is “operationalised as aggregate 
consumer surplus provided a benchmark that was a check against antitrust enforcement 
[and] that antitrust law would not be invoked unless a particular challenged practice 
decreased aggregate consumer surplus”.215  
Economic efficiency consists of three types of efficiencies which are vital for the 
achievement of consumer welfare: allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and dynamic 
efficiency.
216
 Allocative efficiency is said to be achieved when the market price equals the 
marginal cost
217
 of producing a commodity. The definition of allocative efficiency was 
provided by Vilfredo Pareto
218
 that market is efficient
219
 where no market player may be 
made better off without someone else being made worse off. According to Fox, however, 
antitrust should not be confined to efficiency objectives but instead, if it is feasible, should 
reflect “in a meaningful way all of its basic goals, including power dispersion, competitive 
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opportunity, and long-run consumer satisfaction”.220 This might provide the required 
balance for the law on monopoly as a flexibility of such an approach would ensure that 
monopoly power is not being automatically labelled unlawful without careful consideration 
of its effects on competition, in general and on consumer welfare, in particular.  
Productive efficiency, meanwhile, is achieved when products are produced at the lowest 
cost possible which may lead to the promotion of consumer welfare. In the economic 
context, productive efficiency is “a ratio between the amount of firm’s inputs and the 
amount of its output”.221 According to Bork, the main task of antitrust law is to enhance 
allocative efficiency without negatively affecting productive efficiency and this process 
should be “guided by basic economic analysis, otherwise the law acts blindly upon forces 
it does not understand and produces results it does not intend”.222 Fox, for instance, argued 
that there are three perspectives on efficiency which are more representative than 
inclusive.
223
 A business autonomy principle, the first perspective on efficiency, provides 
that any business, irrespective whether it has market power or not, should be allowed to 
choose its own way of acting on a market because businesses know better what a consumer 
needs for its demands to be satisfied. This way of treating efficiency is vulnerable
224
 
because there is no guarantee that such businesses would not put their interests first. In 
fact, it is more likely that businesses would strive to maximise their own profits as profit 
maximisation is the primary motivation which drives firms to compete on a market. 
Therefore, this would place too much freedom on firms with a possibility to jeopardise the 
goal of the maximisation of consumer welfare in antitrust law. A theory of output 
limitation is another way of looking at efficiency principle in antitrust economics. 
According to this theory, if firms are offering the required level of output which consumers 
are willing to buy at a price compensatory to the firms, then all consumer interests will be 
satisfied. It was argued that this theory does not have a place in antitrust law as it is 
“narrow and static”.225 This theory is not without flaws as it carries a very subjective idea 
by assuming that firms would be able to meet the demands of the consumers without 
taking into account the needs to produce at lower costs possible. The final perspective on 
efficiency is the protection of competition process which would invite the desire to 
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compete on the merits with consumer welfare being at the core of the competition process. 
It was argued that this perspective on efficiency is the most suitable way for antitrust 
economics.
226
 The protection of competition process theory is inclusive and flexible. It 
manages to take into account all the relevant factors of market performance meanwhile 
placing consumers at the core of its protection. Moreover, “it is the one accepted economic 
perspective that harmonises with the dominant non-efficiency values of antitrust”.227  
 
3.3. Market Power 
Antitrust puts different types of anti-competitive behaviour under control via the 
application of various antitrust legal provisions. A general rule exists that for a firm to be 
able to restrict competition, it has to have power within a defined market. Market power, in 
this case, refers to the ability of a firm, inter alia, to limit output, raise prices above the 
competitive level, exclude competitors from the market, stifle innovation and erect barriers 
to entry for new market entrants.
228
 These factors are the natural consequences flowing 
from the actions of monopolistic firms and unless they exercise such a power “they are 
unable to affect competition adversely”.229 The common agreement about market power is 
that a monopolist has an ability to raise prices above the competitive level. However, the 
ability to charge anti-competitive prices, on its own, should not be a single indication of a 
firm’s market position. The high profits of such a firm could lure new competitors by 
which they could limit the realm of the power of a monopolist. Therefore, a firm with 
market power should also be able to erect barriers to entry in order to support its 
monopolistic market status. It leads to the conclusion that market power exists when a firm 
raises prices above the competitive level without significant losses to its business.   
The determination of market definition is a vital first step in the assessment of market 
power. Market definition is a tool which is used by competition authorities in order to 
assess the competitive constraints on the firms in a properly defined relevant market. Its 
main objective, therefore, is to define both product and geographic markets and to identify 
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those competitors who could affect the firms’ behaviour and prevent them “from behaving 
independently of effective competitive pressure”.230  
The establishment of a relevant market is the first step in the assessment of market power; 
therefore, it has to be approached with an extreme care. If the relevant market is not 
defined correctly then the assessment of market power will be flawed. Economics provides 
an important contribution to the assessment of dominance and monopoly. However, it was 
argued that, despite the influence of economics, “courts continue to place [primacy] on 
market definition and market shares in the assessment of market power”.231 This could be 
explained by the fact that economics is a different discipline and, therefore, the courts 
would prefer a more theoretical legal analysis with a slight addition of econometric 
methods to their assessment of market power. A more technical assessment would be 
reserved to economists; therefore sparing the courts from making economic calculations. 
The process of identifying the boundaries of a relevant market can be a complicated 
procedure and antitrust authorities rely on certain economic tools in defining two main 
components of a relevant market, i.e. relevant product market and relevant geographic 
market.  
In the EU,
232
 a relevant product market includes all products which consumers regard as 
being substitutable or interchangeable with one another due to the products’ 
“characteristics, their prices and their intended use”.233 A relevant geographic market 
includes the area where a firm is involved in the supply and demand of goods and services. 
For the purposes of geographical market definition, the conditions of competition in this 
area have to be considerably homogenous.
234
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In the US and EU, antitrust authorities seek to identify whether a price change in a product 
would drive consumers to its potential substitutes. If so, then such products would be 
considered as being interchangeable with each other. In this case, if substitutes do exist 
then a price raise will not be profitable. The assessment of market definition could be a 
difficult task as it is not very easy to decide which products or services are close 
substitutes, or, in other words, which products or services belong to the same market. 
In order to determine what products could be regarded as substitutes, antitrust authorities 
rely on three main competitive constraints of the firm: demand substitutability, supply 
substitutability and potential competition.
235
 Demand substitution is the most widely used 
as it is the most efficient tool in the examination of market definition. It constitutes the 
strongest competitive force on the firm’s pricing decision,236 i.e. a price increase will lead 
to the loss in consumer demand if customers could turn to product substitutes.
237
  
The assessment of demand substitution involves an application of the hypothetical 
economic test of price increase which is used in order to measure the cross-price elasticity 
of consumer demand. The US antitrust authorities also apply the same hypothetical price 
increase on “a hypothetical profit maximising firm”238 in order to see the consumers’ 
response to a price increase. This hypothetical test is known as the Small but Significant 
Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test which includes a hypothetical price increase 
(5% to 10%) to products in question.
239
 If the SSNIP test shows that a small price raise is 
unprofitable and consumers switch to available substitutes, then other substitutes will be 
added in to the relevant product market.
240
 This process of including the potential product 
substitutes into the relevant market will continue until the point when the small price 
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increase becomes profitable.
241
 In the US, antitrust authorities, in considering the 
consumers’ response, take into account various factors, e.g. evidence that buyers either 
turning to the substitutes or considering to do so and evidence that producers are taking 
into account a possibility of consumers to shift to different products.
242
 It should be noted 
that the US Merger Guidelines suggest only 5% price increase for the purposes of the 
SSNIP test.
243
 However, US antitrust authorities adopted the 10% price increase in practice 
which was criticised by Robert Pitofsky for being “hard to justify”.244 This, therefore, 
already indicates a small divergence in the assessment of market power that exists between 
the US and EU antitrust laws. This, although, does not prevent the US and EU antitrust 
authorities to rely on the same economic hypothetical test in the assessment of demand 
substitutability for a product or a group of products.  
In the assessment of the relevant geographic market, the US and EU antitrust authorities 
also apply the SSNIP test.
 245
 It should be noted that a single firm can be present in the 
several markets; therefore, the careful delineation of geographic market should be 
undertaken. In this case, antitrust authorities will consider whether the hypothetical price 
increase would push consumers to switch to the suppliers of the products in different 
geographical areas.
246
 The result of the test would be the same as with the relevant product 
market, i.e. the set of geographical areas would be added until the relative price increase 
becomes unprofitable. 
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Therefore, market power is a firm’s ability to raise prices above the supply cost without 
losing its customers to the existing or new competitors.
247
 Supply cost is simply a 
minimum cost a firm would incur when producing its product. No firm would ever be able 
to retain its market power if a relevant market lacks barriers to entry for new competitors. 
The early agreement among the economists is that “if economies of scale are such that the 
minimum efficient scale of operation is large in comparison to the market, then there can 
be a barrier to entry and, hence, monopoly”.248 The Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) is 
considered to be the lowest point where a firm can produce in such a way which would 
minimise its long run average costs. It is being a useful tool in order to assess a market 
structure as it provides with the clearer picture on the state of a market and its competitors. 
That said if the MES is calculated as being small relative to the overall size of a market, 
then it could lead to a conclusion that a market in question has a large number of 
competitors. This, in turn, leads to the situation where a presence of a larger number of 
competitors would influence market players to compete fairly in the given circumstances. 
It was also argued that the proof of dominance does not lie in the definition of a relevant 
market; rather, “in a full analysis of all the factors which influence the power of a firm”.249 
 
3.4. Economic Models of Competition 
A market is a place where all buyers and sellers are involved in the exchange of goods and 
services for (typically) money. Competition among market players is very important for a 
market to be efficient. A market contains various players and their supply and demand 
relationships determine the market price. Supply and demand are economic factors, which 
are responsible for the determination of a price. In a perfectly competitive market, as will 
be discussed below, the price for a unit of production will vary until the point when the 
quantity demanded by the consumers will be equal to the quantity supplied by the 
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producers, i.e. the market will determine the satisfactory price for all market players. If this 
is the case, then the perfectly competitive market is considered to be in “equilibrium”.250  
A consumer is a rational person who demands a product and is prepared to match the 
demand with money. Therefore, a consumer plays an inseparable part in the market system 
as it gives the producers a financial incentive to produce and supply. Consumer demand is 
a key feature in the discussion of market power. For every consumer there is a highest 
amount a consumer is willing to pay which is called a “reservation price”.251 Any supplier 
of a product would be tempted to charge a consumer his reservation price; but instead they 
will have to consider the relationship between the consumer’s willingness to pay his 
reservation price and the quantity of a product demanded on a market.
252
 The reason 
behind this consideration is that if a price for a particular product drops then people with a 
lower reservation price will be able to afford it or, similarly, consumers with a high 
reservation price will be able to buy this product for a lower price. Also, if a firm decides 
to produce a larger quantity of a product; then, it will have to lower the price in order to 
include the consumers with lower reservation price into the transaction. Therefore, 
economics explains that the higher the price, the less the demand for a product because the 
price has an inverse relationship with the quantity demanded by the consumers. The 
relationship between the price for a product and its supply is shown by the demand curve.  
The elasticity of demand depends on the reaction of the consumer demand toward the price 
change. The price elasticity of demand reflects how much the quantity demanded changes 
in response to a change in price. Where demand falls less than proportionately to an 
increase in price, demand is said to be inelastic. Similarly, a demand is elastic if the price 
increase causes a big drop in consumer demand. Due to the inverse relationship between 
the price and the quantity demanded; the price elasticity of demand is necessary in order to 
explain how changes in one affect the other.  
The knowledge of these economic principles is important in order to assess the existence of 
market power. As was discussed earlier, the first step in the assessment of the existence of 
market power requires the delineation of a relevant market. The cross price elasticity of 
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demand is a key economic tool which is important for the purposes of market definition. 
The cross price elasticity of demand identifies whether the price increase for one product 
will affect the demand for another product. The purpose of this examination is to identify 
whether two different products could be considered as substitutes
253
 for the purposes of 
market definition.  
A firm is another player of the market system. It is assumed that a firm acts in a rational 
way with an aim to maximise profits.
254
 Profits, in such situations, are regarded to be a 
difference between total cost incurred on producing a product and the total revenue
255
 a 
firm earns from selling this product.
256
 In perfect competition model, for instance, firms do 
not earn any profits; rather making zero economic profits.
257
 In this case, economists use 
the relationship between costs and revenues in order to measure the profits of a firm.
258
 
Another economic tool, used to assess the business relationship between buyers and sellers, 
is a supply of goods and services model. A supply model indicates how much of 
production the producers are willing to supply at any particular price. The sellers will 
consider various factors when deciding on the output;
259
 however, the costs of production 
are the most important determinants. Cost, in a broad sense, is a value of money that has 
been used in the production of a product. This monetary value is lost as it is no longer 
available for a further use. There are various ways in analysing and categorising costs, and 
in the application of antitrust matters may turn on differences between them. For the 
purposes of industrial economics, the following costs are relevant and important. Total cost 
(TC) represents the total economic cost used in the production of a product and can be 
divided into two categories: variable and fixed costs. Variable costs (VC) are “costs that 
vary with output”,260 for instance, rental of factory. Fixed costs (FC) are the costs which do 
not change along with the production; rather, they are fixed in relation to the output of 
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production for a certain period of time, for instance, raw materials. Therefore, fixed costs 
will be incurred even if a firm is not producing any product. The importance of 
distinguishing between different costs should not be underestimated as when a firm is 
deciding on the quantity of output to be placed on a market, it will take different costs into 
account.
261
  
As was already discussed, an assumption exists that a firm’s only goal is one of profit 
maximisation. In this case, when a firm deliberates on how much output it requires to 
produce in order to maximise a profit, it will take the marginal cost into account. Marginal 
cost (MC) is the cost of producing an extra unit of a product. In some cases, MC of an 
additional unit of output may depend on how much quantity of output is already being 
produced by a firm. After a firm identifies its marginal cost on producing an extra unit of 
output, it is then when a decision could be made whether an extra unit of output should be 
introduced for the profit maximisation purposes. In this case, a firm would prefer to raise 
or lower its quantity of output to the point where marginal revenue (MR)
 262
 equals MC. 
The idea behind this formula is straightforward, i.e. if the production of an extra unit of 
output brings additional revenue that is higher than expenses incurred in producing it; then, 
it will be profitable to do so.
263
  
A properly functioning market with effective competition could lead to various benefits 
since it carries an idea that resources for the production of output will not be wasted and 
firms will produce the exact quantity of output that consumers desire and are willing to pay 
for. Free and properly functioning market has a potential to function in a way which would 
bring costs down. In order to achieve such an outcome, a strong interfirm competition 
becomes of the paramount importance.  
3.4.1. Perfect Competition Model   
Economists developed an extreme economic model, known as a perfectly competitive 
market. A market with perfect competition carries an idea of a market that functions 
efficiently with firms fiercely competing with each other. In a perfectly competitive 
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market, there is a large (formally an infinite) number of market players where each of them 
is considered to be price-takers rather than price makers. This is explained by the fact that 
the economic model of perfect competition presumes that each market player is 
insignificant to the market as a whole; therefore, each of them takes price as it is without 
them having any influence on a market price. Furthermore, in a perfectly competitive 
market, all products are homogenous, producers and consumers have free access to the 
information and there are no barriers to entry or exit out of the market. If a perfectly 
competitive market existed, then each producer would make zero profits.
264
 If a market 
allows its players to earn extra profits, then the situation may lead to new competitors into 
the market to get their own share of the profits. Due to the openness of a perfectly 
competitive market to new competitors, they will continue to entering the market until it is 
no longer possible to reap excessive economic profits. Therefore, in a perfectly competitive 
market the consumers do not pay above costs due to the free access to information and if a 
competitor attempts to price above the costs then it will be punished by losing its sales. 
In addition, in a perfectly competitive market the price has to be equal to both MC and 
Average Costs (AC), the latter being a cost which is evenly spread over all units already 
produced. If MC of a next unit of output is higher than AC of existing output, the 
production of this next unit of output will raise AC. In this case, a producer will have to 
reduce the supply if it wants to reduce the costs. In a situation where MC of a next unit of 
production is lower than AC of existing output, the production of a next unit will decrease 
AC. The producer will have to increase the supply in order to lower the costs of 
production. This will lead a perfectly competitive market to drive the producers to produce 
to the point when MC curve intersects with AC curve.  
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Figure 1: Perfect Competition Model 
 
The demand curve shows how much of the product the customers willing to buy at the 
different price. As the price falls, demand rises. Pc is the perfectly competitive price; while 
Qc is the perfectly competitive quantity of output. MC in Figure 1 cuts the demand curve 
which shows that the marginal costs in this industry equate to the market price. As was 
already discussed, the marginal cost is assumed to be equal to the average cost; therefore, 
when P=MC=AC, market players’ economic profits become zero. The shaded grey 
triangular area on Figure 1 is a consumer surplus following as the result of a perfectly 
competitive market. In general terms, consumer surplus
265
 is the gain that consumers get 
when they pay less for products than their reservation price.  
The economic model of perfect competition, however, does not and cannot ever exist. This 
ideal hypothetical market is necessary for the economists and antitrust authorities to 
measure the reality against this backdrop. The most important feature of a perfectly 
competitive market is the firms’ inability to control prices, in other words, their only 
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response to market changes would be to increase or decrease their volume of output.
266
 
Perfect competition is also known as a static model departure from which will signal “a 
breakdown and invite competition authorities to intervene”.267 It should be noted that 
antitrust authorities do not openly claim that their primary goal is to achieve perfect 
competition; however, it cannot be denied that perfect competition model has had a heavy 
influence on the policy of antitrust law.  
3.4.2. Monopoly Model 
Monopoly eliminates interfirm rivalry, as pure monopoly involves only one seller on a 
market. The most detrimental feature of monopoly is the ability of a monopolist to raise the 
market prices above the competitive level. This ability to raise the prices results from the 
lack or even absence of competition in the market. The power to raise prices above the 
competitive level, however, is not absolute. The monopolist will still be constrained by the 
consumer demand, the function of which is independent of supply structures.  
The exercise of monopoly power may give rise to profits, which do not exist in the 
perfectly competitive market, in which firms have no power to exercise.
268
 To protect its 
monopoly, and by implication its profits, a monopolist may wish to erect barriers to entry. 
Overall, a monopolist has two options to retain a total control over a monopolistic market: 
it could launch a price reduction with a purpose to exclude potential competition or to sell 
at the price below long run marginal cost which would push the actual competitors out of a 
defined market.
269
 All these techniques will lead to a monopolist reducing the competitive 
constraints it would otherwise face by engaging in exclusionary strategic behaviour. In 
reality, however, monopoly, in its pure form, is not common because most markets “do not 
have ‘one, and only one seller’”.270  
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Figure 2: Monopoly Model 
 
Figure 2 shows that the actions of the monopolist lead to inefficiencies and a failure to 
maximise consumer welfare. It also shows the way the monopolist earns profits, i.e. via 
raising price above the competitive level. Pc is the competitive price while Pm is the price 
charged by the monopolist. In the perfect competition model, it was seen that Pc was set on 
the intersection of MC curve with the demand curve. In this case, it was assumed that 
marginal cost equalled the market price; which made a perfectly competitive market viable 
and efficient. On the other hand, in the monopoly model it becomes obvious that monopoly 
price is well above the MC curve; therefore, the market price is no longer equal to the 
marginal cost. Therefore, the whole purpose of achieving market efficiency and welfare is 
lost.  
Figure 2 introduces a new curve, the Marginal Revenue (MR) curve. As was discussed 
earlier, the marginal revenue is extra revenue the producer receives from selling an extra 
unit of output. In case if a monopolist decides to sell an extra unit of production along with 
the rest of the produced units, the monopolist will receive extra revenue for supplying the 
extra product. Assuming the absence of price discrimination, in order to meet demand at an 
extra unit of production, the monopolist will have to lower its price on all the units 
produced, including the extra unit of production. The MR curve, in such cases, will always 
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be below the demand curve because the extra revenue received from the supply will be 
lower than the selling price. Therefore, in order for the expansion of output to be 
profitable, the monopolist will increase its output only until the point when the MR equals 
MC. Finally, the fact that the MR of the monopolist is lower than the selling price would 
lead to higher prices and limited output.  
The ability of the monopolist to raise prices above the competitive level is the main feature 
of monopoly. Since monopoly prices are high above the competitive prices, the monopolist 
reaps excessive profits, something it will never be able to do in a perfectly competitive 
market. This will also lead to the restriction of output; therefore, some customers who are 
willing to pay the competitive price are left without the products. Therefore, when 
comparing Figure 1 with Figure 2, it appears that a large part of consumer surplus becomes 
the extra profit of the monopolist, i.e. it is transformed into a producer surplus. According 
to Figure 2, the dark grey area is the monopolist profit; while, the light grey area is the loss 
of the consumer surplus. The latter is known as the deadweight welfare loss (DWL) which 
is a loss of economic efficiency and an indication that the market is not working 
efficiently. DWL is also known as the social cost of monopoly which is “the difference in 
social value between a monopolised market and a competitive market”.271  
3.4.3. Perfect Competition vs Monopoly 
Perfect competition and monopoly models explain the firms’ behaviour when they are 
operating in either of the market structures. A market could be described as being 
monopolistic without satisfying all the conditions of the monopoly model. Such a situation 
could occur when there is a dominant firm acting on a market and being capable of 
controlling market price and operations of competitors. For this reason, antitrust law is 
now focusing on the de facto monopoly which allows several firms to compete on a 
market; however, it still has a dominant firm that influences market operations of the 
competitors. The possible outcome of monopolistic markets could lead to inefficiencies 
since market prices and costs are not minimised and the monopolist’s major concern is the 
high profits.
272
 Typically, monopolies also lead to DWL which is a loss of efficiency.  
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Perfect competition, on the other hand, is “an abstraction, and the real world satisfies its 
conditions only imperfectly”.273 This explanation is very true since the creation of perfect 
competition model was required in order to show how firms would perform under certain 
competitive environment. For instance, the idea that a perfectly competitive market carries 
homogenous products could be highly improbable. In reality, there will always be some 
sort of product differentiation;
274
 and this makes the existence of a market with 
homogenous products highly unlikely. The same principle applies to monopolistic markets 
as any product or service might always have some degree of substitutes available on a 
market.  
A market which features perfect competition is believed to lead to efficiencies; therefore, 
creating beneficial market environment for the consumers. Such a market could lead to a 
better productive efficiency where a market utilises all of its resources in the most efficient 
way. This will lower the costs of production and, therefore, result in lower expenses for 
producers and, accordingly, lower prices for consumers. If a market player does not 
produce at the lowest possible cost, it will have to leave the market, as it will sustain 
losses. The idea of fierce competition in a perfectly competitive market confirms the 
necessity of strong rivalry among market players. Markets that feature lack or no 
competition among its market players could lead to productive inefficiency and, therefore, 
to the welfare loss. The effect flowing from lack of competition is described as X-
inefficiency and was discussed by Leibenstein in 1966
275
 who concluded that X-
inefficiency negatively affects the markets because “neither individuals nor firms work as 
hard, nor do they search for information as effectively, as they could”.276 Therefore, if 
market features perfect competition then fierce rivalry among competitors will motivate 
them to minimise costs and increase productive efficiency. Perfectly competitive market 
could also positively affect the dynamic efficiency of a market by encouraging innovation 
and investments in R&D. This form of economic efficiency is important as it is argued to 
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be the most important form of efficiency as it “provides the greatest enhancement of social 
wealth”.277  
Market efficiency and total economic welfare are clearly very important advantages of a 
properly functioning market with a strong interfirm rivalry. Since it is argued that perfectly 
competitive market per se does not exist, it seems that current antitrust rules are aimed at 
driving markets as close as possible to a market with perfect competition. It was argued, 
however, not every industry can accommodate perfect competition model, i.e. new 
economy industries would be the example of it.
278
 The market restructure, in order to 
create much smaller firms, and attempts to force those firms to price at MC could 
potentially lead to consumers being worse off.
279
 For now, perfect competition and 
monopoly models per se simply represent what they are, i.e.  hypothetical economic 
models of market structure. 
 
3.5. Final Observations 
Antitrust law had never claimed that its purpose was to protect inefficient small businesses; 
however, it was a purpose of antitrust law
280
 “to expand the range of consumer choice and 
entrepreneurial opportunity by encouraging the formation of markets […] and protecting 
participants—particularly small businessmen—against exclusionary practices”.281 This led 
to the time when the prevalent view was that a market would be better off if it had a 
number of smaller producers; therefore, placing a burden on large and powerful firms to 
disprove that their market success was evidence of actual or potential harm to the 
market.
282
  Despite all existing arguments about the purposes of antitrust law and the 
parties which are affected by its influence, the underlying point is that consumers’ interests 
are of a paramount importance, as discussed earlier. Consumers, or the public in general, 
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and their assumed dissatisfaction with powerful firms might not mean that they are ready 
actually to wipe out large firms entirely. It was argued that “in the abstract the public might 
be more ready to break them up, but when faced with the decision on a company that is 
well known (and usually well regarded), they are distinctly reluctant”.283 Following this 
argument, it appears that it is smaller competitors which might have the most interest in the 
eradication of large private economic power on a given market. It is hard to imagine that a 
firm which does not monopolise and which fulfils consumers’ needs could anger the public 
by simply because of its market size or bigness. The majority of consumers are normally 
not interested in the way a firm conducts its business as long as they receive a satisfactory 
end product. Antitrust law and all the ensuing rules are strictly for market players, i.e. the 
competitors. This is why adequate antitrust rules and their enforcement are needed to 
control markets, in general and the actions of businesses, in particular.   
The danger of having a policy which would protect competitors from the aggressive 
competition and target powerful firms to make place for their weaker rivals may bring 
short-term benefits, “but all too often the only longer-term winners are inefficient rivals 
protected from the rigours of competition”.284 This, however, will depend on a market in 
question. Small firms will normally operate on a smaller market, while bigger firms will 
most likely target a global market. Globalisation, on the other hand, has led all markets to 
become interconnected with one another, therefore leading to the conclusion that actions of 
the larger firms would have repercussions on even smaller markets. It is argued that this 
factor should be taken into account when assessing the effects of the large firms’ actions. 
This becomes even more acute because technical progress and innovation have started to 
play an important role in the furtherance of market development. For such reasons, it is 
believed that firms would “seek innovations to challenge existing companies in high profit 
markets and better respond to emerging market demands”.285 
The history of political influence on US antitrust law reached a stage where it was agreed 
that the goal of antitrust was to protect the competitive process even if it would lead to the 
reduction of small businesses on a market because the pursuit “of mythic virtues of 
smallness would themselves be inconsistent with another set of political values: 
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maintenance of conditions of equality of opportunity for all businessmen through 
limitations on the range of private discretion”.286 The principle of equality of opportunity 
to do business among all competitors should be at the core of the law on monopoly as it 
would help to strike a necessary balance in which the interests of the general public, small 
businesses and large firms would all be considered. If the true reasons behind antitrust law 
are the protection of consumer welfare and not simply weaker competitors, then the 
prohibition should only be triggered when equally able competitors
287
 start utilising their 
market power against each other to the consumers’ detriment. The EU, however, does not 
seem to be offering equality in this respect by striving to provide SMEs with an access to 
the EU internal market. And, EU competition law justifies it by the argument that 
diversity
288
  on a market provides consumers with a choice.
289
  One of the common 
arguments advanced by businesses which are being affected by excessive, in their opinion, 
government’s intervention provides that a government is attempting to take on a role which 
decides whether a large or small firm should be involved in a particular market activity, 
while, in reality, “the only appropriate judge is the consumer”.290 It could be rephrased by 
saying that it is rather the consumer reaction to the firms’ market performance which could 
determine whether a market is being efficient or not.  
Chapter 2 showed that US antitrust law was more experienced in tackling the spread of 
bigness and size in the past. Neither the Supreme Court nor antitrust authorities, however, 
had proved that large firms per se adversely affected consumer welfare. Meanwhile, no 
proof had ever been provided to show that small businesses would necessarily enhance 
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consumer welfare either. And, it was argued that “for some operations […] size is neutral 
or perhaps even a disadvantage”.291 The reason behind this argument lies in the economies 
of scale where the “economic system is simply a huge selection mechanism for picking the 
most efficient methods, and this includes the proper size, for doing a particular task at a 
particular time and place”.292 As was mentioned in Chapter 1, it is difficult to identify 
whether bigness or size would benefit or harm consumer welfare unless an individual study 
of an industry has been conducted.
293
 Irrespective of this, size and bigness should not be 
prejudiced simply because they give a firm with an opportunity to abuse or monopolise,
 294
 
especially when no concrete evidence exists that smaller businesses would necessarily 
fulfil the objectives of antitrust law.   
It was also argued that “the dynamics of economic growth will keep markets adequately 
competitive as long as government restrictions do not choke off individual initiative or 
prevent entry into different lines of business”.295 This, however, will lead to powerful firms 
acquiring more control over a market, thereby, endangering other firms’ chance to 
compete. This is so because “competition is an evolutionary process [and] evolution 
requires the extinction of some species as well as the survival of others”.296And, US 
antitrust law seems to fully recognise it by promoting free competition on a US market. 
The EU, on the other hand, is different. Such a scenario will not be acceptable for EU 
competition law since it prefers fair competition which explains why the Commission is 
believed to favour smaller market players. And this approach of the Commission aligns 
with the opinion of Louis Brandeis who believed that “competition consists in trying to do 
things better than someone else […] it is not competition to resort to methods of the prize 
ring, and simply ‘knock the other man out’”.297 The US’s position can be contrasted with 
the EU as according to the DOJ “when one firm’s vigorous competition and lower prices 
take sales from its less efficient competitors—that is competition working properly”.298 
And, this statement represents the US’ vision of what is good for the US market and its 
consumers, i.e. free competition.  
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3.6. Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter was to explain why monopolies are considered to be 
harmful for the primary aims of antitrust from the economic perspective. It was revealed 
that economics does not provide antitrust authorities with an answer as to whether a firm is 
violating antitrust rules. It rather creates a set of economic tools which are used by antitrust 
authorities to assess the degree of anti-competitive behaviour by dominant firms. The 
decision as to whether violation of antitrust rules is taking place on a market is completely 
up to antitrust law.  
Economics of industrial organisation had become an important part in the antitrust analysis 
of, among others, market power. It assisted in shaping aims and objective of antitrust law 
from an economic perspective and it had led to a common agreement that promotion of 
economic efficiency was one of the objectives of antitrust law along with the protection of 
consumer welfare.  It was submitted that “antitrust policy enunciates a distinct economic 
objective—a blending of efficiency and consumer welfare—to be achieved by a particular 
social instrumentality—interfirm rivalry”.299 Firms, in this respect, are primary partakers 
which have a potential to either promote or stifle economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare. A market, in this respect, is a playground where firms and consumers meet in 
order to exchange goods in return for financial rewards. This lies at the core of any market 
existence and operation.   
Economic models of market structure appear to be a significant part of the analysis which 
describes the level of interfirm rivalry within a defined market.  These economic models 
are examples of two extreme markets; whereby, each model provides examples of different 
effects on consumer welfare. They create two strikingly different market conditions, 
whereas, each contains individual scenario of either consumer harm or benefit. It became 
clear that there is never going to be a market where market conditions are perfect; 
similarly, with the development of antitrust law, pure monopoly, as depicted in one of the 
models, is also unlikely to exist. It is possible that these models provide an option for a 
third scenario where monopoly and competition might get on while preserving the main 
objectives of antitrust law and respecting the firms’ right of freedom to contract.  
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Despite the fact that the EU and US had been influenced by different economic schools of 
thought, both antitrust jurisdictions apply similar economic tools for the definition of 
monopoly and dominance. The distinction between two jurisdictions, therefore, does not 
subsist in the tools they apply, but rather in the final results on their definition of market 
power. It was argued, however, that differences between the EU and US “are not always 
explained by the sound economics of one jurisdiction and the unsound economics of the 
other, but often by equally credible assumptions regarding the best route to robust 
markets”.300 This provides that despite the application of similar, if not identical, economic 
tools for the assessment of market power, both jurisdictions devise their own strategy on 
tackling monopolies. And such strategies are heavily influenced by the different economic 
schools of thought.  
It transpired that the Chicago School believed in economic efficiency as being the 
exclusive objective of antitrust law. It supported the self-correcting market tendency for 
the consumer benefit. The Ordoliberal School, in contrast, was a supporter of an idea that 
the legitimate aim of antitrust law was to liberalise markets from monopolies which would 
require greater government’s intervention and control. The US applies the Chicago School, 
while the EU predominantly follows the Ordoliberal approach to antitrust law. Therefore, 
at this stage of the research, it could be preliminary concluded that the EU’s alleged 
interventionist approach to dominance is derived from the Ordoliberal School. Along this 
line of thinking, it could also be concluded that the US applies more self-correcting 
techniques and less antagonistic approach to firms with monopoly power.  
It was also revealed that the disparity between the EU and US is reflected in the approach 
two jurisdictions take toward market performance among competitors. It was argued that 
the US prefers free competition while the EU leans in favour of fair competition. This 
distinction is reflected on the way smaller competitors are treated, i.e. the interventionist 
approach to dominance may be explained by the Commission striving to keep market open 
for SMEs which access may be endangered by the presence of a dominant firm. The US, 
on the other hand, holds a more relaxed approach by accepting aggressive competition and 
weak competitors as a result of it. This distinction is very important.  
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Chapter 4: Monopoly and Dominance in a 
Nutshell 
 
This chapter is focusing on the main (non-economic) tools applied to the assessment of 
monopoly and dominance in the US and EU. The two concepts, although being subject to 
similar rules, are not identical.  
As discussed in the previous chapters, EU and US antitrust law have two main legal 
provisions which deal with the concepts of monopoly and dominance. Section 2 condemns 
monopolisation or an attempt to monopolise by firms, while Article 102 prohibits an abuse 
of a dominant position. In terms of terminology, even though both concepts are sometimes 
used interchangeably, precision requires that the term ‘monopoly’ be applied in US 
antitrust law and ‘dominance’ in EU competition law.301  
This chapter is going to focus on the concepts of a dominant position and monopoly and 
their main constituent parts. It will be seen that, on a general scale, both jurisdictions have 
the same underlying principle of what dominant position and monopoly represent. It will 
also be seen that the US and the EU apply almost identical tests when assessing the 
existence of monopoly and dominant position. However, as will be discussed, this is where 
the similarities in approaches end and differences in the results follow.  
 
4.1. US Antitrust Law: Monopoly 
A market which features monopoly
302
 as its predominant market force is only rarely 
considered as being a good market.
303
 If a firm possesses monopoly power, then it can be 
predicted that it will limit output and increase prices.
304
 Consumers, in this scenario, will 
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face scarce influx of goods and services with prices going up. Furthermore, markets in 
general will be affected as competition will be suppressed due to the lack or absence of 
competitive process. For these reasons, unlawful monopoly is not desirable and antitrust 
authorities need to ensure that markets are either free from monopolies or monopolies are 
under a tight control by the government. Neither option is entirely possible as both would 
require certain laws and resources to eradicate monopolies in their entirety. Meanwhile, 
overly interventionist governmental policies would go against the principle of market 
freedom where firms are allowed to compete freely without extensive governmental 
intervention. The middle ground is for antitrust authorities and courts to act when a firm is 
monopolising in order to prevent either the gaining of monopoly or strengthening of 
already existing monopolistic position. One of the concerns is that when monopoly is not 
unlawful then antitrust authorities should not act because “an antimonopoly law not 
predicated on bad acts will chill lawful competition by leading firms; and that dislocation 
costs and efficiency loss that may attend relief against monopoly are likely to outweigh the 
benefits of dissipation”.305  
The protection and enhancement of consumer welfare is of paramount importance in 
antitrust law and, as was argued,
306
 the maximisation of consumer welfare is now 
considered to be the main aim of the Sherman Act.
307
 A market with a small number of 
competitors and a powerful monopolist directly affects consumers as the choice in goods 
and services could considerably diminish, and income could transfer from the consumer to 
the monopolist. From this perspective, it could already be seen that Section 2 is very 
straightforward in what it protects, or rather, forbids. However, Section 2, as is the case 
with Article 102,
308
 does not offer any interpretation of illegal and harmful monopoly 
which is outlawed by antitrust authorities.
309
 This task is left to the courts. 
In the application of Section 2, the court requires the plaintiff to prove two main elements 
of the monopolisation claim as set out in Grinnell case.
310
 It was held that Section 2 
contains two main elements, 
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“(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the 
wilful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from 
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident”.311 
As was briefly discussed in the previous chapter, a firm should possess market power in 
order to satisfy the first limb of Section 2. And, market power, for the purposes of antitrust 
law analysis, could only exist in the relevant market.
312
 According to du Pont, “when a 
product is controlled by one interest, without substitutes available in the market, there is 
monopoly power”.313 And, it was argued that “monopoly power is the power to vary one’s 
price within a substantial margin—a choice of profitable alternatives—and, 
correspondingly, the power to exclude competitors entirely or to a substantial extent when 
it is desired to do so”.314 For these reasons, the court must first identify whether a 
monopolist possessed enough market power to have monopolised a relevant market and, if 
yes, to further identify if that the said monopolist was engaging in monopolistic behaviour 
contrary to Section 2.
315
 
4.1.1. Market Shares 
Market shares will be able to show a firm’s size on the relevant market especially after 
comparison with its closest competitors is conducted.  And antitrust law considers market 
shares to be the most important and accurate assessment of monopoly power.  
In the US, antitrust authorities and the courts calculate market shares based on a firm’s 
number of units produced or its revenue. The importance of market shares in the 
assessment of market power in monopolisation cases started in Alcoa
316
 where the court 
was computing Alcoa’s market share in aluminium market. In this case, the court famously 
held that market shares over ninety percent are enough to constitute a monopoly; however, 
“it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-
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three percent is not”.317 In American Tobacco,318 the court held that when a firm held over 
two-thirds of the domestic field of cigarettes, it could amount to a substantial monopoly in 
the relevant market.
319
 In du Pont, the court said that the defendants produced almost 
seventy-five percent of the cellophane sold in the US.
320
 This market share was enough to 
find the existence of monopoly power. In Grinnell,
321
 it was found that the appellant
322
 had 
control over the three firms with over eighty-seven percent of the accredited central station 
service business and it was a high enough number to constitute monopoly power.
323
 In 
Eastman Kodak,
324
 the court found that Kodak had almost hundred percent of control over 
the parts market and eighty to ninety-five percent of the service market in Kodak complex 
business machines.
325
 
Therefore, the cases above show that if a firm is in possession of over ninety percent of 
market shares in a relevant market, the court will, almost automatically, infer the existence 
of monopoly power.
326
 The numbers the court put as thresholds for the assessment of 
monopoly power stem from the numbers the judges in the Supreme Court had in front of 
them, as this is an established practice when it comes to judicial decisions. Furthermore, as 
was provided in Chapter 1, for the purposes of this research seventy percent market share 
is considered to be the threshold below which the Supreme Court will doubt the existence 
of monopoly power.
327
 The market shares, however, are criticised for being “imperfect 
surrogates of market power”,328 meaning that the overall number cannot provide the best 
picture for measuring monopoly power.  
Finding monopoly power, however, is not the end in the application of Section 2 as this is 
only the first step in the antitrust procedure. In fact, the existence of monopoly power, on 
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its own, should not be treated as a violation of Section 2. The recent case, Trinko
329
 is an 
authority for this proposition. It was held that, 
“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of 
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the 
free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices […] is what 
attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place […], the possession of 
monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an 
element of anticompetitive conduct”.330  
The Supreme Court in Trinko did not only make a mere possession of monopoly legal but 
also welcome monopoly power as the evidence of the free-market system. This reflects 
US antitrust law’s approach to a free competition and self-correcting markets.331 It 
recognises that a firm has a right to enjoy the fruits of its labour and Section 2 does not 
outlaw success and prosperity as long as there is no illegality behind monopoly.  
The position in Trinko is supported by the Supreme Court’s332 preference of a high market 
share threshold for the establishment of monopoly, i.e. seventy percent and above. The DOJ 
stated that it was “not aware […] of any court that has found that a defendant possessed 
monopoly power when its market share was less than fifty percent”.333 Although, it was 
argued that higher thresholds “shield the unilateral conduct of a larger proportion of firms, 
sometimes even ones with significant degrees of market power […] because they are based 
on the characteristics of firms rather than their conduct”.334 This is a very valid observation; 
however, it can also be argued that lower thresholds will lead to more firms becoming 
subjects to Section 2, because again, a percentage of a market does not provide any 
information on a firm’s behaviour. And in this situation, it is important to decide which 
policy US antitrust law wishes to pursue. At the time of writing, US antitrust law is very 
clear on its policy objectives, i.e., with the influence of the Chicago School,
335
 it recognises 
the self-correcting markets, vigorous competition, monopoly prices, free competition and 
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business growth to a monopoly size. Therefore, in order to uphold its policy objectives, US 
antitrust law allows firms to acquire up to seventy percent of a market as long as there is no 
illegality behind their monopolies.
336
  
It was also argued that “market share, after all, is a historical, or backwards-looking 
measure. […] but the issue of market power is dynamic”.337 The argument that market 
power is dynamic should not be underestimated as evolution of new economy markets and 
high tech industries are the best examples of such a dynamic. In technology markets, 
arguably, the most successful firms are those which have the highest market share.
338
 This 
fact is not a matter of coincidence because the success is not linked to market shares; rather, 
the more successful a firm is the more market share it eventually acquires. This, in turn, 
gives it an opportunity to invest more into, for instance, technology markets which are 
highly dependent on innovation and investments. However, market shares on their own, in 
special circumstances, could not be the only indicators of the existence of market power. 
Economists, for instance, argue that “inferences of power from share alone can be 
misleading” as regard should also be made to market demand and supply elasticity.339  
According to the DOJ, if a firm manages to maintain its market shares for a significant 
period of time and “market conditions (for example, barriers to entry) are such that the 
firm’s market share is unlikely to be eroded in the near future”,340 the DOJ will presume 
that the firm in question holds market power. If a market share is not high but antitrust 
authorities or courts want to look into a firm’s market status further, they will take into 
account the existence of other factors which they label as barriers to entry. 
4.1.2. Barriers to Entry 
The definition of barriers to entry in antitrust law is not readily available. They could be 
described as any artificial barriers erected by a firm in order to make it difficult for new 
market players to enter a relevant market.
341
 Various economists and lawyers rely on actual 
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examples; rather than on a legal or economic definition. For the purposes of antitrust law, 
barriers to entry could be seen as factors which provide a firm with an opportunity to reap 
monopolistic profits whilst preventing new or potential competitors to enter the same 
market.  
The attempts to provide a useful definition of barriers to entry for the purposes of antitrust 
law vary.
342
 In academic literature on the definition of barriers to entry, it is important to 
highlight two influential definitions of barriers to entry: Bain was the first economist who 
defined barriers to entry as “‘the extent to which, in the long run, established firms can 
elevate their selling prices above the minimal average costs production and distribution’ 
without ‘inducing potential entrants to enter the industry’”.343 This definition of barriers to 
entry focuses on the incumbent firm’s ability to earn high profits and economies of scale is 
“a qualifying barrier to entry”.344 It was argued that Bain’s definition was flawed because it 
“builds the consequences of the definition into the definition itself”.345Another definition 
of barriers to entry was later introduced by Stigler where he defined barriers to entry as 
“cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which 
seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry”.346 According 
to Stigler’s definition of barriers to entry, both the new entrants and an incumbent firm 
have to face economies of scale; therefore, both face the same costs. For such reasons, 
under Stigler’s definition of barriers to entry, economies of scale are not considered to be a 
qualifying barrier to entry. It was argued that the choice between these two definitions is 
probably more valuable in practice than in theory.
347
 In theory, barriers to entry can be 
defined to be “socially undesirable limitations of entry, which are attributable to the 
protection of resource owners already in the industry”.348 In practice, a barrier to entry is 
“literally anything that prevents an entrant that is at least as efficient as incumbent firms 
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from entering the market”349. Despite certain inconsistencies in the definition of barriers to 
entry, in antitrust law, a greater reliance is placed on Bain’s definition of barriers to 
entry.
350
  
As of to date, there are no single guidelines or notices published by the US antitrust 
authorities which speak about the concept of barriers to entry in respect to monopolisation 
offence.
351
 The Supreme Court has never provided a comprehensive analysis of those 
barriers to entry which the court would consider as being capable of creating obstacles for 
new entrants.
352
 The absence of a definition can lead to confusion where all privileges and 
advantages a firm has over its competitors can be seen as a barrier. It was interestingly 
argued that “moment by moment the big company can outbid, outspend, or outlose the 
small one; and from a series of such momentary advantages it derives an advantage in 
attaining its large aggregate results”.353 Clearly, any competitor is aware of it. The 
intimidation and fear of being prevented to do business can be a good deterrent for a 
potential entrant. Power and success are regarded to constitute a barrier since “the large 
company is in a position to hurt without being hurt”.354  
The more superior market player, of course, will always hold and control a facility which 
its smaller competitor might need in order to enter a market. This is an unfortunate reality 
of any market. For these reasons, it is not surprising that such a market player will be in a 
more privileged position than its smaller competitors. However, it is argued that not every 
resource or facility in the hands of a powerful firm should be taken as a barrier as some 
privileges are the result of the business acumen and successful investment. The reality can 
be different though and all the difficulties lie in an ambiguity which lurks in the concept, 
and “it is this ambiguity that causes the trouble”.355 There is no clear distinction between 
barriers and other factors which brings an uncertainty to the assessment of monopoly 
power.  
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US antitrust law does not seem to place too much reliance on a firm’s privileges and 
advantages over rivals; however, there are some cases which applied them in the context of 
barriers to entry. The Supreme Court’s first brief mentioning of barriers to entry was in 
American Tobacco, when the court held that “by the gradual absorption of control over all 
the elements essential to the successful manufacture of tobacco products, and placing such 
control in the hands of seemingly independent corporations serving as perpetual barriers to 
the entry of others into the tobacco trade”.356 In this case, the Supreme Court did not go 
into depth on barriers to entry allegedly present in the case; however, the fact that the court 
considered the essential elements for the manufacture of tobacco products as being a 
barrier to entry could not go unnoticed. Furthermore, it was argued that the Supreme Court 
suggested that barriers to entry in question “were created by anticompetitive conduct, 
rather than some cost or condition faced by potential entrants”.357 The anticompetitive 
conduct, in this case, involved American tobacco placing the control over the essential 
elements of the production of tobacco in the hands of independent corporations which, in 
turn, were acting as barriers to entry. In Eastman Kodak, it was held that the most common 
examples of barriers to entry could include “patents or other legal licenses, control of 
essential or superior resources, entrenched buyer preferences, high capital entry costs and 
economies of scale”.358 All these factors, in aggregate, identify a firm’s bigness and 
Eastman Kodak used them to define barriers under Section 2. It should be noted that the 
Supreme Court in American Tobacco stressed that barriers would be illegal if they were 
created by the anticompetitive conduct. This is a very important point because the presence 
of illegality can help to distinguish between factors which strengthen monopoly position 
and factors which are the result of business acumen. This will be further discussed in 
Chapter 5 in the context of a case study.   
Chapter 1 of this thesis listed the possession of IPRs as one of the most likely examples of 
a firm’s bigness and Eastman Kodak is the source for such conclusion. Any firm which 
possesses an IP over its product, facility, knowledge or resource, will have a legal right to 
prevent others from using it.
359
 This is the most plausible explanation of why antitrust law 
considers IPRs as potential barriers between a powerful firm and its potential or actual 
competitors. Obviously, antitrust law should be able to distinguish between natural 
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barriers
360
 and artificial barriers the aim of which is simply to suppress competition.
361
 The 
need for artificial barriers to entry is explained by the fact that a monopolist needs to 
protect a market it is monopolising. There are situations when some leading firms “may 
have the power to raise prices to noncompetitive level, but where, because entry is 
unrestricted, they cannot afford to exercise it”.362 The reason behind their inability to 
exercise it stems from the fact that when a monopolist starts earning high profits, the 
market will be swamped by new entrants being attracted by such profits. Therefore, having 
IP protection over a product, a firm raises its chances to both prevent and eliminate 
competition on a relevant market. And, the more IPRs a firm has, the more advantageous 
its position on a relevant market is.  
It was already provided that US antitrust law places more importance on market shares in 
the assessment of a monopoly power under Section 2. There is a general concern that 
market shares are not very reliable as the main tool in the assessment of market power. 
This concern lies in the fact that market shares, as already mentioned, are calculated based 
on economic data which, as argued, might not deliver a very accurate result. This, of 
course, might undermine the entire Section 2 analysis. It was argued that the reliance on 
barriers to entry is more justified because “barriers, if present, are relatively easy to 
identify, albeit difficult to quantify”. 363 It is very difficult not to agree with this argument 
since, as discussed above, any facility or privilege in the hands of an alleged monopolist 
can be seen as a barrier.  
Therefore, US antitrust law does not place much importance on other factors or barriers to 
entry. However, the case study in Chapter 5 is going to provide a more detailed analysis on 
the way the Supreme Court approaches all firm’s advantages and privileges in the 
assessment of monopoly power.  
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4.2. EU Competition Law: Dominance 
Article 102 protects competitors’ opportunities from “distortions of competition which are 
somehow connected or associated with the market power or dominant position enjoyed by 
a rival”.364 The assessment of a dominant position is the first step in the application of 
Article 102 to a particular antitrust case (it will not be if prima facie the conduct 
complained of could not be considered to be abusive). The Economic Advisory Group on 
Competition Policy (EAGCP) Report argued, for example, that “an effects-based approach 
needs to put less weight on a separate verification of dominance. […] If an effects-based 
approach yields a consistent and verifiable account of significant competitive harm, that in 
itself is evidence of dominance”.365 The effects-based approached is a new (more 
economic) approach toward antitrust violations.
366
 It encourages the Commission to 
consider the effects of antitrust violation; rather, than judging simply from its form. The 
EAGCP continued to argue that “the case law tradition of having separate assessments of 
dominance and of abusiveness of behaviour simplifies procedures, but this simplification 
involves a loss of precision in the implementation of the legal norm”.367The EAGCP was 
particularly concerned with the fact that the EC Treaty
368
 did not require a separate 
assessment of dominance and abuse; therefore, the argument revolved around the fact of 
following the EC Treaty procedure. The fact that the EC Treaty does not provide for this 
separate assessment does not mean that such an approach necessarily lacks legal precision. 
On the contrary, the need for antitrust authorities and courts to deal with the existence of 
dominance and its abuse separately provides a clearer picture in the future assessment. This 
is so because any actions of a dominant or monopolistic firm might potentially seem to be 
anticompetitive due to the firm’s market superiority. The actions of such firms, unless 
there is a straightforward violation of antitrust law, can be condemned because such firms 
affect the market dynamics, and consumers and competitors on a greater scale than its 
smaller rivals. Such an approach, therefore, may lead to successful firms whose dominance 
or monopoly is not in itself illegal to fall within the prohibition of Article 102 or Section 2 
because the ability of such firms to harm competition and competitors can become the 
focal point of the analysis. Therefore, it is important to have a clear separation in the 
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assessment of dominance and monopoly and abuse and monopolisation. The former 
determines the firm’s market status the assessment of which starts with its market shares. 
The latter relates to the firm’s market behaviour and the impact of that behaviour Article 
102 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by a firm within the internal market. In 
order for a firm to be in a dominant position, it has to possess market power. Market power 
is said to take place when the firm is able “to raise price above the competitive level 
without losing so many sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must be 
rescinded”.369 In other words, if the firm has power to influence market price, then such an 
influence is regarded as market power. For current antitrust purposes, the evidence of a 
mere possession of dominance is not enough. The difficulty is that many firms possess 
some sort of market power; however, this does not necessarily mean that they 
automatically fall under Article 102 prohibition. The law requires a higher threshold than 
the mere existence of market power. For such reasons, what becomes paramount is “not 
whether market power is present, but whether it is important”.370  
The classic legal definition of a dominant position was first provided in United Brands 
(UBC)
371
 where the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) defined dominance as 
a position of economic strength which allows a firm to behave independently on a relevant 
market.
372
  It was argued that the notion of independence was “the special feature of 
dominance”,373 which could be broadly defined. The Commission, for instance, defines 
‘independence’ as the competitive constraint exerted on a firm in which case “dominance 
entails that these competitive constraints are not sufficiently effective […] that the 
undertaking’s decisions are largely insensitive to the actions and reactions of competitors, 
customers and, ultimately, consumers”.374 Such a generalised interpretation of the notion of 
independence
375
 is problematic since it can lead to an uncertainty as to what degree of 
independence the Commission needs to have in order to establish the presence of a 
dominant position. In such situations, the firms could experience difficulties to conduct a 
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self-assessed analysis of whether their behaviour is independent of their competitors, 
customers and consumers. It is undeniable that the more powerful a firm is the more aware 
of its power it will be. This makes multinational corporations become first candidates to 
satisfy the notion of independence in the assessment of dominance. The notion of 
independence also relates to the ability of a dominant firm to raise prices above the 
competitive level.
376
 This could be argued as a very strong indication of the existence of a 
dominant position. As a matter of practice, a dominant firm will continue to raise its prices 
above the competitive level until “the constraints imposed on the firm by its competitors 
are binding”.377 However, with a lack of information on the required degree of 
independence, firms with less power than corporations may also be targeted. The 
Commission, unfortunately, was not very successful in clarifying legal definition of 
dominance; it rather reinstated of what was already provided by the courts. Although it was 
argued that in the Discussion Paper, the Commission attempted to tacitly move away from 
the classic definition of dominance and, instead, introduced economic language by 
equating substantial market power with dominance.
378
 It is submitted that the introduction 
of more economic language into antitrust law did not change the gist of the classic legal 
definition of dominance; it simply adjusted this definition to a more economic thinking.  
This classic definition of dominance led to various comments as to whether it provides an 
adequate explanation of a dominant position. It was argued that the last part of the 
definition of dominance
379
 was not entirely accurate since any firm (even a dominant one) 
will have to take into account the productive capacity of its competitors and product 
preferences of its consumers.
380
 It was further argued that “product differentiation in the 
market, the presence of barriers to entry and expansion on the part of rivals, and 
differences in productive efficiency”381 could ease the firm’s ability to determine prices on 
a market.  
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It is commonly agreed that dominance can be defined via direct and indirect ways. The 
direct way would be applying econometric methods in order to find out whether a firm is 
charging prices above costs. For instance, Landes and Posner
382
 argued that the Lerner 
index would provide a precise economic definition of substantial market power. The 
Lerner index measures “the proportional deviation of price at the firm’s profit-maximising 
output from the firm’s marginal cost at that output”.383 The application of the Lerner index 
was criticised by various academics and economists for not being an accurate method in 
dealings with market power and dominance.
384
 The indirect way of measuring market 
power is conducted via considering market shares of a dominant firm and its competitors; 
barriers to entry or expansion; and countervailing power of buyers. The latter approach to 
the finding of dominance is rooted in EU competition law; therefore, it is regarded as a 
more favourable approach. 
It should be noted, however, that in order for a firm to be able to distort effective 
competition, it must hold market power over a certain period of time.
 385
 There is no set 
limit of time which would be indicative of the existence of dominance but according to the 
Commission, two years of market power would normally be enough to infer the existence 
of a dominant position.
386
  
In the assessment of a dominant position, the Commission takes market shares and other 
factors into account; therefore, having a broad scale of discretion in the analysis of a firm’s 
status under Article 102. In CMB it was held that “a dominant position may be the outcome 
of a number of factors which, considered separately, would not necessarily be 
determinative”.387 This reflects the exact approach of the Commission in its assessment of 
dominance
388
 albeit it was argued that no single factor could necessarily be decisive.
389
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Like US antitrust law, the EU also prefers market shares as the most accurate tool for the 
assessment of dominance. Unlike US antitrust law, however, the EU sets out an entirely 
different threshold below which dominance is unlikely to be found.  
4.2.1. Market Shares 
When Article 102 is being applied to the abuse of a dominant position, the extra weight is 
placed on the market shares
390
 of a firm in order to find out the whether a firm is in fact 
dominant. It was argued that the Commission prefers market shares over other factors in its 
assessment of a dominant position.
391
 However, as Chapter 6 will show, other factors also 
play an important role in the Commission’s analysis. The Commission, to be more precise, 
regards market shares as a first factor which aids in revealing a firm’s market status.392 As 
a general rule, if a firm’s market share is below forty percent in a relevant market then 
dominance is not likely.
393
 However, the Commission still reserves the right to investigate 
a firm further even if its market shares are below forty percent. That is, the Commission 
can feel obliged to intervene if the existent competitors do not exert enough competitive 
constraints on a firm with less than forty percent market share.
394
 It is very unsettled 
because it keeps firms unaware of the boundaries of its market status in EU competition 
law. The only reassurance that firms do receive is that the Commission will not reach the 
final conclusion without taking all other factors into account.
395
 
The standard procedure in finding dominance involves “first defining a relevant market in 
which to compute the defendant’s market share, next computing that share, and then 
deciding whether it is large enough to support an inference of the required degree of 
market power”.396 This approach was criticised for focusing too much on the market 
definition rather than on the important question of market power.
397
 The Commission 
calculates market shares based on the sales of a firm’s relevant products in the relevant 
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area.
398
 The high expectations the Commission and the courts place on market shares are, 
of course, not without criticism. It was argued that the classic market shares approach to 
the finding of dominance carries the assessment when products are either ‘in’ or ‘out’ of 
the relevant market.
399
 This practice leads to the presumption that if products are in the 
same relevant market, then they are automatically considered to be substitutes. The reality, 
however, is different. Many products are imperfect substitutes for one another and 
substitutability is “a matter of degree, and it is artificial to force categorisation”.400 The 
established practice of categorising products based on their various features might not 
provide a good basis for measuring market shares within that relevant market. In other 
words, when relevant market is being defined the fact that substitutability among products 
varies should be taken into account.  
In Roche, it was held that “very large shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional 
circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position”.401 In AKZO, the CJEU 
held that according to Roche decision “the very large market shares” would constitute fifty 
per cent of the relevant market and “are in themselves […] evidence of the existence of a 
dominant position”.402 In Hilti, the GC confirmed the Commission’s finding of a dominant 
position holding that a market share of between seventy to eighty percent in the relevant 
market “is a clear indication of the existence of a dominant position”.403 In Tetra Pak, it 
was held that a firm which held nearly ninety percent of the relevant markets was in a 
dominant position for the purposes of Article 102.
404
 And, the GC in Microsoft concluded 
that “Microsoft impaired the effective competitive structure on the work group server 
operating systems market by acquiring a significant market share on that market”.405 
The Commission and the courts will also take into account market shares of a firm’s 
competitors in order to see how the relevant market is divided among them.
 406
 In Roche, 
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for instance, it was conceded that Roche’s market shares were forty seven per cent; while, 
the market shares of its competitors were twenty seven per cent, eighteen per cent, seven 
per cent, and one per cent. It was concluded, therefore, that “Roche’s share, which is equal 
to the aggregate of the shares of its two next largest competitors, proves that it is entirely 
free to decide what attitude to adopt when confronted by competition”.407  
Irrespective of the case law and the presumption of dominance at fifty percent, the 
Commission provided that forty per cent market shares could be regarded as an implied 
threshold below which dominance was unlikely to be inferred
408
 and this number is chosen 
to be a threshold for the purposes of this research. It should be noted, however, that unlike 
in Article 101 cases, this implied market share threshold is not a ‘safe harbour’409 which 
would protect the firms from the application of Article 102 if their market shares are below 
forty per cent. The creation of a safe harbour for the application of Article 102 could lead 
to Type II errors, i.e. leading to under-enforcement in the sense that a firm could still be 
dominant in the economic sense while holding “below the threshold” market shares.410 
Type I error, which is also known as a false positive, occurs when a competition authority 
decides that a pro-competitive behaviour is, in fact, contrary to Article 102; thereby, 
prohibiting it altogether. In such cases, the law becomes over-inclusive.
411
 Type II error, or 
a false negative, has the opposite effect, i.e. when the competition authority concludes that 
an abuse is not contrary to Article 102 thus permitting it. Therefore, the law is under-
inclusive.
412
 The argument that the Commission holds an interventionist approach to 
dominant firms can be supported by another argument that the Commission is trying to 
avoid Type I errors in its enforcement of Article 102. The Discussion Paper
413
 received 
several comments from various stakeholders urging the Commission to introduce a ‘safe 
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harbour’; 414 however, the Commission chose not to. Instead, as argued earlier, the 
Commission stopped at forty percent threshold above which an economic analysis of 
dominance will be required. The American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union 
(AmCham EU), for instance, argued that market shares of forty to fifty percent or below 
could not be a good indication of dominance, suggesting that seventy five percent would 
be a better indication.
415
 This proposition can be explained by the fact that, as provided 
earlier, US antitrust law prefers higher thresholds in the assessment of market power. More 
interestingly, it was further added that “market shares can be a good indicator of economic 
strength […], in addition, there needs to be a separate finding (and not simply a 
presumption) based on economic analysis and the specific market circumstances of each 
case, that this strength is such that it allows an undertaking to act independently”.416 The 
Commission’s decision not to follow the US approach to monopoly signals a different 
approach to firms with economic power as the Commission leaves open the possibility 
that, in some cases, even below forty percent is enough to find the existence of a dominant 
position.
417
 
This strategy has granted the Commission with enough flexibility to apply Article 102 to 
firms which market shares are at or below of the threshold.
 418
 With this scenario, the 
Commission’s strategy can be interpreted as following an over-enforcement approach in 
order to exert more control over the competitive process on the internal market.  
                                                          
414
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Therefore, EU competition law measures a firm’s size at forty percent or below which is 
significantly lower than in US antitrust law. The Commission recognises the said fact and, 
unlike US antitrust authorities, it places more importance on other factors in a firm’s 
possession in order to justify the finding of a dominant position under Article 102.   
4.2.2. Barriers to Entry 
The concept of barriers to entry is difficult to define; however, this factor does not 
minimise their importance for the Commission and the courts. As in US antitrust law, there 
is still an uncertainty as to what barriers to entry actually are. It was argued that analysis of 
barriers to entry is “the single most misunderstood topic in the analysis of competition and 
monopoly”.419 
The Commission defines barriers to entry as “legal barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, or 
[...] advantages specifically enjoyed by the dominant undertakings, such as economies of 
scale and scope, privileged access to essential inputs or natural resources, important 
technologies or an essential distribution and sales network”.420 These examples are, in 
effect, factors which, in the context of this research, constitute a firm’s bigness. These 
factors, or advantages, make a firm superior over its rivals. These factors, in combination 
with a certain number of market shares, make a firm dominant under Article 102. The 
Commission labels them as barriers to entry because technological, financial and 
commercial superiority may act as a barrier for potential market entrants.  
Despite the ambiguity surrounding the definition of barriers to entry, this concept is very 
important in the analysis of a dominant position. If this practice remains and the 
Commission and the courts continue to include all privileges and advantages into the 
assessment, then a firm may be wrongly found to possess market power and its behaviour 
may be constrained by competition law.
421
 Such a result will be against Article 102 which 
original purpose is to prohibit anti-competitive behaviour of dominant firms.  
The economic analysis of barriers to entry seems to recognise the importance to distinguish 
between factors which result from a firm’s efficiency and superiority and those which 
                                                          
419
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result from incumbency or first-mover advantages.
422
 Despite the fact that EU competition 
law claims to have only the consumer welfare at the heart of EU competition law policy, as 
was provided in Chapter 3, consumers, markets and firms are all interconnected. If a firm 
gets punished for its success, it may have a deterrent effect on other firms and which, in 
turn, will affect consumers.  For such reasons, the Commission and the courts should take 
an extreme care when taking privileges and advantages as an additional evidence of the 
existence of a dominant position. It is argued that there is a general consensus that “entry 
barriers result from asymmetry between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant and 
where the incumbent acts on the asymmetry”.423 Therefore, a firm’s competitor (or a new 
entrant) should believe that its entry is being deterred by the dominant firm, i.e. it is not 
just a mere threat but an actual possibility.
424
  
As will be seen in Chapter 6, the EU courts offer the Commission their full support in the 
application of advantages and privileges into the assessment of dominance. In UBC,
425
 for 
instance, the CJEU did not provide a list of barriers which it took into account when 
assessing UBC’s dominant position. However, the CJEU did hold that “large capital 
investments required for the creation and running of banana plantations”426 were the 
examples of barriers which were creating obstacles for new competitors.
427
 The CJEU 
concluded that “the cumulative effect of all the advantages enjoyed by UBC thus ensures 
that it has a dominant position on the relevant market”.428 
In Roche, the CJEU concluded that “the technological lead of an undertaking over its 
competitors, the existence of a highly developed sales network and the absence of potential 
competition […] represent in themselves technical and commercial advantages and […] it 
is the consequence of the existence of obstacles preventing new competitors from having 
access to the market”.429 Based on the information above, the CJEU concluded that 
“Roche’s shares of each of the relevant market, complemented by those factors which in 
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conjunction with the market shares make it possible to show that there may be a dominant 
position”.430 
Chapter 6 will provide an in-depth discussion of the UBC and Roche cases along with 
other important cases relevant for the current research. For now, what becomes clear is that 
the relevance of a firm’s bigness should not be underestimated. Both the Commission and 
the EU courts are criticised for adopting a wide definition of dominance with a narrow 
definition of entry barriers, “often focusing on mere costs of entry rather than economic 
barriers”.431 At this stage, therefore, it can be preliminary concluded that a firm’s bigness is 
considered by the Commission as being a barrier to entry and it definitely plays a vital role 
in the finding of a dominant position.  
 
4.3. Final Observations 
The main legal provisions of both jurisdictions have distinctly different wordings on the 
laws of monopoly. However, neither provision outlaws monopoly power or dominance 
without anticompetitive action on the part of the monopoly holder.
432
 It should also be 
noted that none of the legal provisions provide the definition of monopoly or dominance 
leaving it to antitrust authorities or the courts to deal with. This leads to an earlier 
argument that EU and US antitrust authorities and the courts are left with too much 
freedom of legal interpretation; which could influence both sides, in negative and positive 
ways. This responsibility, in combination with other factors discussed throughout this 
research paper, has led to differences in the definition of monopoly and dominance in the 
EU and US, despite the application of similar economic and non-economic tools. It was 
argued, for instance, unlike the US definition of monopoly power, the EU’s general 
definition of dominance is “less rooted in price theory analysis”.433 The evidence of this is 
drawn from the classic definition of dominance as introduced in Hoffman La-Roche
434
 and 
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expanded on in UBC.
435
 The notion of ‘independence’ seems to include a vast variety of 
economic and non-economic factors
436
 which could identify the existence of a dominant 
position. Alternatively, as it was submitted that “the proof of dominance lies not in the 
definition of the ‘relevant market’ but, rather, in a full analysis of all the factors which 
influence the power of a firm”.437  In the US, on the other hand, the definition of monopoly 
power entails the ability of a monopoly holder to control prices or exclude competition as 
discussed by the Supreme Court in the du Pont case.
438
 Such a straightforward definition of 
monopoly power directs to a more economic analysis based on pricing decisions of a 
monopolist. Such differences could be attributed to the political and policy preferences of 
each jurisdiction, one result of which is that the EU takes a more interventionist approach 
than the US.  
As was argued in Chapter 3, the protection of consumer welfare and the promotion of 
economic efficiencies are the main goals of antitrust law both in the EU and US. This 
provides that any decision behind the enforcement policy of the antitrust authorities should 
focus on these aims.  In the EU, the Commission is sceptical about dominant firms being 
able to deliver market efficiencies, especially when the said firm is a quasi-monopolist.
439
 
According to the Commission, “exclusionary conduct which maintains, creates or 
strengthen a market position approaching that of a monopoly can normally not be justified 
on the grounds that it also creates efficiency gains”.440 The Commission even sets out a list 
of cumulative requirements which a dominant firm needs to satisfy in order to show that its 
dominance leads to market efficiencies.
441
 Irrespective of the Commission’s acceptance of 
a certain level of dominance, the Commission is also of an opinion that quasi-monopoly 
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achieved via abusive practices can never rely on the efficiency justification.
442
 This slightly 
resembles the position in US antitrust law where the Supreme Court believes that Section 2 
applies only to those monopolists which growth is not natural or normal.
443
 This similarity 
between the EU and US is insignificant in a sense that, as argued earlier, monopoly status 
in the US is different from a monopoly status in the EU. The reason why the Commission 
prefers a lower threshold for dominance can be explained by the fact that EU competition 
law is hesitating
444
  between ‘false positives’ or ‘false negatives’. The fact that the 
Commission considers that quasi-monopolist can never claim efficiency as a justification 
for its behaviour supports an argument that EU competition law is leaning toward false 
positives.
445
 It appears to be a safe strategy to become over-inclusive and prohibit 
behaviour of a dominant firm disregarding any potential positive contribution to consumer 
welfare. This thesis does not suggest that size and bigness of a dominant firm lead only to 
efficiencies, especially when they provide a firm with an opportunity to abuse. Meanwhile, 
no evidence exists that dominance is always harmful and EU competition law itself 
recognises it by not prohibiting dominance per se.
446
 The Commission, therefore, appears 
to have a secure position by covering all firms with market shares at or above forty 
percent, rather than allowing monopolists to claim that their actions lead to efficiencies.     
 The US, on the other hand, had moved away from an overly interventionist approach 
which resulted in a certain level of acceptance of monopoly. One of the influential 
explanations of such a move was advanced by Kovacic. It was argued that 
Chicago/Harvard double helix
447
 assumed, among others, that “overinclusive applications 
of antitrust law to control dominant firm conduct pose greater hazards to economic 
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performance than underinclusive applications”.448 Under these circumstances, the efforts of 
monopolists to exercise their market power would not be borne by the competitors, 
suppliers and customers.
449
 The recognition of potential benefits of monopoly or, rather, its 
neutrality could be the example of the US moving away from focusing on false negatives. 
It is preferable to permit conduct which has anticompetitive effects because competitive 
market forces would naturally destroy monopoly, while “Type 2 errors become entrenched 
in the law”.450Therefore, the fast moving development of technology, globalisation and 
innovation, i.e. all factors which are pushing antitrust law toward adjustment to the new 
economic and market realities, could be seen as a contributing factor to the maximisation 
of consumer welfare. For such reasons, the under-enforcement of antitrust law, while 
relying on market forces, could be the possible solution to include globalisation and new 
market realities until a right balance in the law on monopoly is found. Furthermore, when 
comparing the EU and US approaches to dominance and monopoly, the practice in the EU 
has shown that “‘dominance’ in Europe has often led to various kinds of quasi-regulatory 
control, severely constraining a firm’s pursuit of profit in a way that contrasts with 
American practice”.451 This is because the Commission is trying to avoid Type II errors.  
As was discussed earlier, the time factor is very important for dominance and monopoly to 
be detrimental. In fact, the economists remind the EU courts that dominance “is a concept 
related to time [i.e.] dominance is a position of power over time”.452 The Commission does 
not deny the application of time to this matter by providing that a firm which can profitably 
increase prices above the competitive level for a significant period of time could be 
regarded as dominant for the purposes of Article 102.
453
 This position is similar to the US 
where monopoly might only trigger the application of Section 2 if it was sustained for a 
considerable amount of time.
454
 Only in those situations, dominance and monopoly might 
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have detrimental effects on a market, i.e. if a monopolist manages to keep his market 
foreclosed from new entrants for a prolonged period of time.   
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to introduce the main tools used in the assessment of dominance and 
monopoly in the EU and US. Despite being rather brief, this chapter was used to create a 
foundation for the case study in Chapters 5 and 6. 
It was revealed that both the EU and US apply the same tools in the establishment of 
dominance and monopoly, respectively. Furthermore, it was revealed that both 
jurisdictions are influenced by economics which, arguably, leads to a more coherent and 
accurate analysis of economic power.  
The EU and US apply market shares as the foremost indication of dominance and 
monopoly and, despite the arguments that market share is not a good enough tool to 
measure a firm’s status, both jurisdictions continue to place importance on market shares. 
This is where the similarities between the EU and US end. It was discussed that US 
antitrust law requires seventy percent and above to trigger the presumption of monopoly 
and that it is very unlikely that a firm would be found to be a monopolist with market 
shares below fifty percent. EU competition law, on the other hand, keeps its market share 
threshold at a much lower rate by presuming the existence of a dominant position at or 
above forty percent. The Commission, however, has explicitly provided that it reserves a 
right to investigate a firm even with market shares being below forty percent. Such a 
disparity between two jurisdictions is intriguing. 
In addition, EU competition law is also very clear that it will take other factors into 
account in case if a firm’s market shares are low. The Commission labels such factors as 
barriers to entry and defines them very broadly; the official definition contained all factors 
which a firm might use against its competitors, leading to a preliminary conclusion that 
any privilege and advantage a firm had over its competitor would be taken against it during 
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investigation, decision making and, possibly, a court hearing.
455
 It was argued that such an 
approach would lead to firms getting punished for a success and have a potential 
deterrence effect on other firms. This, in turn, might negatively affect consumer welfare.  
US antitrust law also lists ‘barriers to entry’ as another factor it can take into account in the 
assessment of monopoly power but there is no official definition of barriers in US antitrust 
law.  Two of the Supreme Court’s cases did provide a discussion, albeit a brief one, of the 
possible factors which would be considered as a barrier under Section 2. None of the cases 
were very detailed;
456
 however, the possession of IPRs and access to capital were 
highlighted by Eastman Kodak. Nonetheless, US antitrust law does not place as much 
reliance on a firm’s advantages and privileges as EU competition law. It was argued that 
this could be explained by the fact that, with the presence of a high market share threshold, 
the presumption of monopoly occurs with no doubt; therefore, the need to turn to 
additional factors becomes unnecessary.  
The view of this research is that the Commission holds an interventionist approach toward 
dominant firms and this chapter supports this argument by demonstrating that the 
Commission is trying to avoid Type II errors by keeping flexibility in its assessment of 
dominance. This flexibility applies to both low market share threshold and all factors used 
to find dominance under Article 102 which allows the Commission to investigate any firm 
without being restrained by, for instance, a safe harbour or a narrow definition of barriers. 
US antitrust law, on the other hand, promotes free competition and self-correcting markets 
which is supported by the Supreme Court in Trinko. It recognises the importance to allow 
firms to enjoy fruits of their labour as long as there is no illegality behind their business 
actions, which explains the presence of a higher market share threshold for the finding of 
monopoly.  
In EU competition law, the legal definition of dominance, as it is portrayed by the courts, 
might not be entirely consistent with the practice developed by antitrust authorities when 
approaching dominance. It has been thirty five years since the courts introduced this 
definition which has been cited and applied in every case law on the abuse of a dominant 
position.
457
 Since then, however, the time changed as antitrust law and its challenges have 
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been developing since UBC and Roche. The possible danger, therefore, is that the classic 
legal definition of dominance may not be able to keep up with the development of markets 
and globalisation. On the contrary, it might even create obstacles to the effective finding of 
a dominant position.  
Therefore, at this stage of the research, it can be preliminarily concluded that US antitrust 
law not only permits size but it also actively encourages it via high market share thresholds 
and the recognition that mere monopoly and monopoly prices are important examples of 
the free competition. Additionally, it does not have many concerns with firms’ bigness via 
placing almost no importance on firm’s various advantages and privileges as long as there 
is no illegality or anti-competitive intent behind those factors. This, however, will be 
discussed in more details in Chapter 5. In relation to the Commission, it can be 
preliminarily concluded that its interventionist approach leads it to distrust large firms in a 
dominant position. Chapter 6 will consider this point further.  
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Chapter 5: The Application of Section 2 to 
Monopoly: The US Case Study 
 
The previous chapter provided a brief discussion of the main tools used in the assessment 
of a dominant position and monopoly in the EU and US where it was revealed that the EU 
and US apply almost identical economic tools to assess dominance and monopoly. The 
next step would be to see how the Supreme Court in the US has been dealing with the 
establishment of monopoly power in practice.
458
  
This chapter includes a number of the Supreme Court’s cases under Section 2 which were 
selected based on the number of market shares, i.e. above seventy percent threshold. In 
addition, the selected cases were chosen due to their importance in shaping the law on 
monopoly and their relevance for the current research. Unlike EU competition law,
459
 US 
antitrust law has several important rulings which have a direct discussion of the 
applicability of a firm’s size to the analysis of monopoly under Section 2. The analysis of 
those cases will be provided in this chapter. 
In order to identify whether US antitrust law places any importance on other factors to 
support the finding of monopoly, the selected cases will be assessed to highlight the 
discussion, if any, on the Supreme Court’s application of commercial and technological 
advantages to a firm under consideration. This approach will test if bigness is part of the 
analysis on the establishment of monopoly.  
This chapter will attempt to determine whether there is an antagonistic approach to the 
firms’ size and bigness under Section 2.  
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5.1. Background 
As was shown in Chapter 2, monopoly used to be defined as “an institution, or allowance 
by the king by his grant, commission, or otherwise to any person or persons, bodies politic 
or corporate, of or for the sole buying, selling, making, or using of anything, whereby any 
person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, are sought to be restrained of any freedom or 
liberty that they had before, or hindered in their lawful trade.”460 The understanding of the 
original
461
 definition of monopoly is very important in order to grasp the reasons behind 
the Supreme Court’s judgements in the earlier cases on Section 2. It will be seen that that 
initially the Supreme Court’s position toward monopoly was very straightforward as it only 
focused on the original aims of the Sherman Act.  With the introduction of economics into 
antitrust law, the Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of Section 2 has changed 
over time,
462
 as will be shown by a study of the selected leading cases.  
It was argued that antitrust law partially rests on a principle that “economic control must be 
exercised either by a freely competitive market or by a public agency, and never by private 
parties”.463 This argument is no doubt directed at those firms which economic power 
dictates the way markets operate; thereby, influencing prices and, possibly, stifling 
competition. Economics is important for the assessment of monopoly and various 
economic reasons are normally cited in order to explain the harm ensuing from monopoly 
power and monopolisation.
464
 In relation to the former, the Supreme Court held that 
monopoly was also forbidden “based upon the belief that great industrial consolidations 
[were] inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results”.465 This reflects the 
common belief that firms with monopoly power bring no benefits whatsoever and it also 
ties up with a highly influential opinion of Louis Brandeis,
466
 discussed in Chapter 1.  
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For the purposes of this research, seventy percent market share was decided to be a 
threshold below which US antitrust authorities and the Supreme Court would unlikely find 
the existence of monopoly power.  
5.1.1. Standard Oil 467 
Standard Oil was the first US case under Section 2 which became a foundation for further 
cases on the control of the behaviour of firms with monopoly power. It this case, Standard 
Oil was a monopolist involved in an aggressive monopolisation on a relevant market. The 
importance of this case lies in the fact that the Supreme Court, due to the absence of 
economic analysis, provides a clear discussion of the original aims behind the adoption of 
the Sherman Act. The clear understanding of such aims should not be underestimated 
because they can contribute to the study of whether there is an interventionist approach to 
firms with monopoly power.  
Standard Oil
468
 involved a business in the refinement of crude oil. John D. Rockefeller and 
William Rockefeller, along with several companies, established a corporation under the 
name Standard Oil Company of Ohio (Standard) which received the business of the 
partnerships. All the Standard’s owners became the stockholders. By 1872, Standard had 
acquired a substantial number of oil refineries in Cleveland, Ohio by employing strong-
arm tactics, such as forcing its competitors “either to become members of the combination 
or [to be] driven out of business”.469 
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According to the Supreme Court, the main idea behind the adoption of the Sherman Act 
and Section 2
470
 was to control “the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of 
corporations and individuals, the enormous development of corporate organisations, […], 
and that combinations known as trusts were being exerted to oppress individuals and injure 
the public generally”.471 The poor economic environment and the sudden spread of 
powerful businesses had created a pressure to control the behaviour of corporations which 
inevitably led to the passage of the Sherman Act. In other words, the Supreme Court’s 
decision as to the interpretation of the Sherman Act “was based, not on the authority of 
previous cases on the statute, but on a practically de novo consideration of the Act in light 
of its intent and of general legal principles”.472  
It should be remembered that Standard Oil is a 1911 case; therefore, the Court’s discussion 
of monopoly is highly tied up with the obsolete English common law principles 
‘forestalling, regrating and engrossing.’473 The Court also held that “the words ‘to 
monopolise’ and ‘monopolise’ as used in the section, reach every act bringing about the 
prohibited results”.474  
Despite the fact that this research does not discuss monopolisation,
475
 it is still important to 
highlight the Supreme Court’s definition of monopolisation under Section 2,   
“The freedom of the individual right to contract, when not unduly or 
improperly exercised, was the most efficient means for the prevention of 
monopoly, since the operation of the centrifugal and centripetal forces 
resulting from the right to freely contract was the means by which 
monopoly would be inevitably prevented […] In other words, that freedom 
to contract was the essence of freedom from undue restraint on the right to 
contract”.476 
It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not make a distinction between monopoly 
and monopolisation which could lead to the confusion that the terms were synonymous. 
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This could be explained by simple use of language or, by implication, that the Supreme 
Court did in fact consider both terms as being interchangeable. The Supreme Court seemed 
to believe that if an individual was given an opportunity to contract with no obstacles, then 
monopoly would not survive on such a market. In other words, the Supreme Court 
advocated that monopoly power was inherently illegal.  Breyer interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s opinion by arguing that, “a monopoly achieved through luck or business skill 
won’t last long. The ‘centrifugal and centripetal’ forces of the market place will, before 
long, destroy it”.477 The reason why the Supreme Court saw monopoly as being illegal 
could be explained by the fact that the Sherman Act was adopted owing to Standard Oil’s 
monopolisation and, more importantly, the illegality behind the formation of the trust.   
The Supreme Court’s opinion that monopoly was inherently illegal478 liberated it from 
defining monopoly and, instead, the Supreme Court focused on monopolisation.
479
 It was 
with the development of US antitrust law when it became settled that monopoly was a 
position of a firm on a market and it did not imply “anything about the lawfulness of the 
monopoly possessed.”480 Therefore, a firm could be a monopolist without unlawfully 
monopolising a market. At that stage, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to 
recognise that which could be justified by the fact that Standard Oil gained and secured its 
monopoly via predatory price discrimination
481
 every time its competitors tried to enter the 
oil refining market.
482
  It was argued that the offence of monopolisation is the most 
equivocal as “it might be taken to forbid mere possession of monopoly power, and hence to 
outlaw a market situation rather than a course of conduct.”483 This stems from the fact that 
Section 2 does not speak about monopoly power as an offence and this omission, although 
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deliberate,
484
 in the language of Section 2 can be the reason for the initial attempts to 
punish the mere possession of monopoly. It is at the later stage of the development of 
antitrust law when it becomes clear that “the prohibitions of the Sherman Act are directed 
at business conduct from which anticompetitive consequences have already resulted or are 
clearly intended”.485 These anticompetitive consequences would detrimentally affect 
competition which places much attention on “the nature of the option actually open to the 
buyer”.486 
The Supreme Court also stated
487
 that in order to ascertain whether a violation of Section 2 
was committed the appropriate criteria lies in the rule of reason.
488
 In other words, 
according to the Supreme Court “in every case where it is claimed that an act or acts are in 
violation of the statute, the rule of reason, in the light of the principles of law and the 
public policy which the act embodies, must be applied”.489 It has been argued that the rule 
of reason has become very important in the application of law to monopolists because the 
principle of the rule of reason focuses on the ways a firm operates on a market.
490
 Further 
argument was provided that rule of reason “places a heavy responsibility upon the 
members of the judiciary who find few guidelines and many pitfalls in applying the law 
fairly to the involved operations of large corporations”.491 
When the first trusts started to appear in the US market, Louis Brandeis was very critical of 
the belief that they would provide efficiency to the general public and the argument that 
trusts were the products of natural monopolies, concluding that “without the aid of criminal 
rebating, of bribery and corruption, the Standard Oil would never have acquired the vast 
wealth and power which enabled it to destroy its small competitors by price-cutting and 
similar practices”.492 Criminal rebating, bribery and corruption were not used by the 
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Supreme Court as the evidence of Standard Oil’s anticompetitive behaviour; however, the 
antagonistic approach toward Standard Oil and the way it was doing its business could not 
be ignored. It was submitted that the perspective of Louis Brandeis “toward large corporate 
size exerted a powerful influence on future deconcentration cycles”.493 Undoubtedly, Louis 
Brandeis was a very severe critic of powerful corporations dominating the US market and 
he “found the Sherman Act deficient in that it tolerated large aggregations of capital so 
long as they did not achieve monopoly power”.494 
Standard Oil is often known as the abuse theory case,
495
 with the Supreme Court making 
the illegality of monopolisation the centre of the deliberations. It was argued that the 
decision in Standard Oil retarded “the advance of economic concentration”496 because the 
Supreme Court did not place any focus on the furtherance of economic development in the 
oil refinery market. Such an outcome is understandable as the Sherman Act was still in its 
infancy; therefore, the Supreme Court interpreted it as closely to its objectives as possible. 
For such reasons, the judgment in Standard Oil is “a landmark in the development of 
antitrust law […] it created a legend”.497  
The judgment in Standard Oil did not contain any reference to market shares or other 
factors; and there was no economic analysis of the assessment of monopoly. In fact, 
Standard Oil’s size and bigness were obvious even without the discussion of market shares 
and other factors. The Supreme Court seemed to assess Standard Oil’s monopoly via the 
large scale of the firm’s predatory pricing and the damage it caused to the oil refinery 
market. It was argued that the Supreme Court “framed doctrine about size that rested upon 
monopolistic combination, bad intent, and predatory practices, in order that size gained by 
efficiency would not be hampered”.498 The fact that size and overall bigness of a firm may 
also be gained via efficiency is an important point and the following cases will recognise it.  
                                                          
493
 Kovacic, W., E. “Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a 
Tool for Deconcentration”, at p.1131.  
494
 Handler, M. “Introductory—The Brandeis Conception of the Relationship of Small Business to Antitrust” 
[1960] 16 Section of Antitrust Law, Proceedings at the Spring Meeting, Washington DC, April 7 & 8, 00. 13-
17.  
495
Joilet, R., Monopolisation and Abuse of Dominant Position: A Comparative Study of the American and 
European Approaches to the Control of Economic Power (Faculte de Droit, Liege, MartinusNijhoff, La 
Haye: 1970) at p. 42.  
496
 The Notes, “The Industrial Reorganisation Act: An Antitrust Proposal to Restructure the American 
Economy” [1973] 73(3) Columbia Law Review 635 at p. 636.  
497
 McGee, J., S., “Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case”, at p.137.  
498
 Bork, R., H., The Antitrust Paradox: a policy at war with itself, at p. 165.  
 
 
 
104 
 
5.1.2. US Steel Corporation499  
US Steel was the first case where the Supreme Court had deliberated, among others, on the 
per se illegality of a firm’s size under Section 2. This case500 was against the Steel 
Corporation (Steel), a holding firm, and its operating firms on the grounds of illegality and 
monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act. According to the Supreme Court, the 
government contended that the size of the corporation in question had resulted from a 
combination of powerful and able competitors which eventually substantially dominated a 
market.
501
 Steel, denying the government’s accusation, argued that its superiority was due 
to the market’s demand to introduce integration; therefore, the corporation was formed 
with an aim being “salvage, not monopoly”.502 In other words, the steel industry required a 
new flow of investments, innovations to boost the production and minimise the waste. 
Furthermore, Steel argued that the government’s contention was based on “the size and 
asserted dominance of the corporation—alleged power for evil, not the exertion of the 
power in evil”.503 
The Supreme Court did not provide an explanation on how it measured Steel’s size;504 
rather, relying on a fact that Steel was a conglomerate with a greater size and productive 
power than any of its competitors.
505
 Furthermore, there was not any direct reference to 
Steel’s individual market shares; however, it was submitted that Steel (along with other 
180 firms forming a merger) controlled almost ninety percent of the market.
506
 The 
Supreme Court did not apply any economic reasoning in this case which shows that all 
economic assumptions were still in their infancy. It could not be ignored, however, that 
unlike in Standard Oil case, the Supreme Court in US Steel delivered a more constructive 
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opinion by focusing on Steel’s size and productive capacity. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that Steel’s size was almost ninety percent market shares and its bigness was further 
evidenced by its greater productive power over its rivals; therefore, Steel could potentially 
be considered a monopolist under Section 2. The Supreme Court, however, denied that 
Steel had achieved monopoly power by holding that “the corporation did not achieve 
monopoly, […] and it is against monopoly that the statute is directed, not against an 
expectation of it, but against its realisation, and it is certain that it was not realised”.507 It 
introduced a different angle to the perception of monopoly power, i.e. all factors in the case 
pointed at Steel holding a monopoly power; however, “its power over prices was not and is 
not commensurate with its power to produce”.508  
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that, 
“The corporation is undoubtedly of impressive size, and it takes an effort of 
resolution not to be affected by it or to exaggerate its influence. But we 
must adhere to the law, and the law does not make mere size an offence, or 
the existence of unexerted power an offence. It, we repeat, requires overt 
acts, and trusts to its prohibition of them and its power to repress or punish 
them. It does not compel competition, nor require all that is possible”.509 
It was argued that this paragraph was “one of the most often quoted and one of the most 
misinterpreted principles of antitrust law”510 and it was so liberally interpreted “as to 
nullify the effectiveness of the Sherman Act in dealing with close-knit combinations”.511 
Despite this argument, it was submitted that the Supreme Court provided a legal view on 
the definition of monopoly
512
 which delivered a very clear message, i.e. a size per se was 
not covered by Section 2 because the law required an act of monopolisation. It has been 
argued that “neither mere size nor the virtual absence of competition is illegal or prohibited 
in itself”.513 This is further supported by the Congressional Research Report where it is 
argued that “absent a finding by a court of ‘guilty behaviour,’ therefore, there can be no 
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automatic finding of ‘monopolisation’ based merely on a finding of monopoly power: a 
finding of ‘monopoly power’ does not, by itself, necessarily equate to a finding of the 
monopolisation prohibited by […] section 2 of the Sherman Act”.514 The situation might be 
different if, like in Standard Oil, a firm gained monopoly via anticompetitive means.
515
 In 
this scenario, the size and bigness will indicate the existence of a monopolist on the 
relevant market.  
Another important point highlighted by the Supreme Court relates to one of the 
government’s contentions, i.e. “the power is ‘unlawful regardless of purpose’ […] it seems 
to us that it has for its ultimate principle and justification that strength in any producer or 
seller is a menace to the public interest, and illegal, because there is potency in it for 
mischief”.516 The Supreme Court continued “the fallacy it conveys is manifest”.517 This is 
another clear message from the Supreme Court, i.e. the fact that monopoly power provides 
a firm with an opportunity to violate antitrust law does not make such power automatically 
illegal under Section 2.  
Posner criticised the Supreme Court’s decision in US Steel arguing that it failed to 
recognise firm’s monopolistic behaviour by relying on the fact that Steel’s market shares 
considerably declined after the corporation was formed.
518
According to Posner, when 
monopoly attracts new entrants, the monopolist would either do nothing or would reduce 
its output; however, in both cases, the market shares of the monopolist would decline.
519
 
After considering the Supreme Court’s ruling, it is difficult to judge why the Supreme 
Court did not take economics into account. It is possible that due to the considerable 
infancy of US antitrust law, the Supreme Court might not have been equipped to include 
economics into its legal interpretation of the Sherman Act.  The US antitrust policy is 
following the general presumption, it is argued, that no party “is qualified to judge what is 
good for the economy.”520 This will, however, change.  
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The distinction between the mere size of a firm and its actions should be very clear in order 
to avoid the suppression of the economic and technological progress. It was pointed out, 
among other things, that if a society desires healthy economic growth, then healthy growth 
of businesses should not be prevented.
521
 This point is very important for this thesis, 
especially in the context of EU competition law. It is well recognised that with power 
comes certain responsibilities and antitrust law should be objective in order to reflect that 
point. The objectivity here, however, could be blinded by the fear of an uncontrollable 
spread of powerful businesses. This could become even more acute for smaller 
competitors
522
 which have to face, in addition to its competitors’ high  market shares, 
aggressive advertising campaigns, the ownership of IPRs and other factors which, 
according to this thesis, signify the firm’s bigness.  It was argued that “when bigness 
reaches the point at which it impairs the vigour of competition, it also reaches the point at 
which it is recognised as a problem in a competitive public policy.”523 The impairment of 
competition, in this scenario, is a deciding factor in the assessment of the effects of the 
firm’s market behaviour. Lastly, if the firm “means concentration”524 then it will be 
regarded as harmful per se due to its intent behind its monopoly power.  
According to Louis Brandeis, “it may be true that as a legal proposition mere size is not a 
crime, but mere size may become an industrial and social menace, because it frequently 
creates […] conditions of such gross inequality, as to imperil the welfare of the employees 
and of the industry.”525 It should not be ignored that this argument took place in the 
thirties, i.e. at the time of the largest stock market collapse in the history of the US and the 
Great Depression. The society was weakened leading to the businesses not abiding the 
rules. The times have changed and with the adequate economically driven antitrust rules, 
mere size can be controlled to ensure it does not become an industrial and social menace.  
5.1.3. Swift & Co526 
Swift was a case which continued and, to a certain extent, clarified the position of Section 2 
toward size and its relevance to the finding of unlawful monopoly.  
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In 1920, the government filed a bill under the Sherman Act asking for the dissolution of 
the combination of several leading meat packers.
527
 The main concern of the government 
was that the combination, by concert of action, were suppressing competition in the 
purchase of livestock and in the sale of dressed meat,
528
 and were successful in leveraging 
their monopoly into the other parts of trade. This is another example of a case
529
 where a 
combination of several firms could cause concerns that a size could become a tool for 
monopolisation.  
All firms involved in the combination had various advantages
530
 over their rivals “through 
their ownership of refrigerator cars and branch houses, as well as other facilities, they were 
in a position to distribute ‘substitute foods and other unrelated commodities’ with 
substantially no increase of overhead”.531 According to the Supreme Court “their low 
overhead and their gigantic size, even when they are viewed as separate units, would still 
put them in a position to starve out weaker rivals”.532 This is the first case, in the context of 
this research, where the Supreme Court took into account, albeit briefly, the advantages of 
a firm over its competitors.
533
 There was no mentioning of the combination’s market 
shares; rather, the Supreme Court described its size as being gigantic. It is also important to 
stress that the combination’s facilities and low overhead signify its bigness which will 
allow it to supress its competitors.  
The Supreme Court held that
534
 “mere size […] is not an offence against the Sherman Act 
unless magnified to the point at which it amounts to a monopoly […], but size carries with 
it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to have 
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been utilised in the past”.535 The fact that the combination was involved in an anti-
competitive behaviour, abusing its size and privileged position, in the past could not be 
ignored and factored into the Supreme Court’s holding. It still remains clear that mere size 
does not amount to monopoly power under Section 2 as long as it can be shown that a firm 
or a combination have never been involved in the anti-competitive practices in the past and 
there is no illegality behind its size.  
The judgment in Swift was very well summed up by Levi who argued that “the restrictions 
were imposed presumably to prevent the abuse of size otherwise lawful, and a significant 
abuse would have been low prices [and] size, efficiency, fear of past aggression, and the 
diffusion of responsibility which comes with size, are the predominant themes of the 
opinion”.536 Despite not being a long and complicated case, the Supreme Court’s judgment 
in Swift has left an important imprint on the per se illegality of size under Section 2.  
5.1.4. Alcoa537 
In 1938, the trial against Aluminium Co of America (Alcoa) started on the grounds of 
Alcoa illegally monopolising the virgin aluminium ingot market. The government 
demanded that Alcoa be dissolved but lost and later appealed to the Supreme Court which, 
under s 229 of the USCA,
538
 referred the case back to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit.
539
  
Alcoa was a corporation which was established to undertake the production and sale of 
ingot aluminium and, later on, fabricate the metal into finished articles. Alcoa was assigned 
with a patent which allowed it to manufacture pure aluminium; therefore, holding a legal 
monopoly over the production. This led Alcoa to having both “a monopoly of the 
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manufacture of ‘virgin’ aluminium ingot” and “the monopoly of a process which 
eliminated all competition”.540 
The government put forward an argument that throughout their entire existence Alcoa 
remained the only producer of virgin ingot in the United States and it was enough to infer a 
possession of unlawful monopoly.
541
 Alcoa, on the contrary, argued that being the single 
producer of virgin ingot did not make it an unlawful monopolist as Alcoa was facing 
competition from imported virgin ingot (secondary ingot). Even if competitive constraints 
from secondary ingot were not enough, then Alcoa argued that it did not keep its monopoly 
via anticompetitive means; rather, it was a natural growth which was not prohibited by the 
Sherman Act.
542
 
The calculation of market shares in the relevant market (virgin ingot aluminium market) 
was one of the most distinguished parts of the judgment: The delineation of the relevant 
market and the separation of the production of the ingot aluminium from other stages of its 
development were carefully approached by the court, where it was found that Alcoa had 
nearly ninety percent of all virgin aluminium available in the US in 1912.
543
 The 
calculation of ninety percent market share included all production by Alcoa without adding 
secondary ingot into calculation.  
Following this, it was famously held that, 
“That percentage is enough to constitute monopoly; it is doubtful whether 
sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three 
percent is not”.544 
It is very interesting to see how specific the Supreme Court is in its separation of market 
share thresholds. It becomes clear that ninety percent market share is enough to become 
subject to Section 2 or, in other words, it will signal the presence of a possibly unlawful 
monopolist on a relevant market; meanwhile, thirty three percent market share is not 
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enough to trigger the application of Section 2.
545
 This, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
reflects an entirely different approach from EU competition law. Despite rather generous 
approach to market share thresholds, the Supreme Court was criticised because “the 
illegality per se of size is difficult because the automaticity of the percentage is illusory 
[as] the percentage test by itself requires an evaluation of market conditions”.546 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s application of market shares to Alcoa represents a more 
economic approach than any of the cases discussed earlier in this chapter. It was argued 
that it is possible that the basis for the court’s attitude is “the old idea that monopoly and 
competition are mutually exclusive and that markets must therefore be either purely 
monopolistic or purely competitive, whereas it is now recognised that monopoly is a matter 
of degree and that actually the vast majority of all markets involve both monopolistic and 
competitive elements mixed in varying degrees”.547 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not consider any other factors apart from Alcoa’s 
market shares and its behaviour, i.e. the entire analysis was carried out by relying on 
Alcoa’s size and its market behaviour as a leading producer of ingot aluminium. The 
Supreme Court, however, continued that “the origin of a monopoly may be critical in 
determining its legality”.548 This reflects Brandeis’ criticism mentioned above that trusts 
were not “natural monopolies”549 but rather the examples of criminal behaviour of the 
large firms. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, 
 “Size does not determine guilt; that there must be some ‘exclusion’ of 
competitors; that the growth must be something else than ‘natural’ or 
‘normal’; that there must be a ‘wrongful intent,’ or some other specific 
intent; or that some ‘unduly’ coercive means must be used”.550 
There is another affirmation that Section 2 does not consider a size to be an indication of 
unlawful monopoly.
551
 Instead, the courts require an act of exclusion or a wrongful intent. 
The court opined that a firm may also become a monopolist “by force of accident” and 
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since monopolising is a crime, making such a firm a subject to Section 2 would be against 
Congress’ intent.552 If this is the case, then such a firm is believed not to be having a 
wrongful intent to eliminate competition. Citing the U.S. Steel case,
553
 the Supreme Court 
said that “the successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned 
upon when he wins”.554The Supreme Court, however, did consider Alcoa’s conduct to be 
illegal by arguing that it was doubling and redoubling its capacity before other competitors, 
while grabbing any new chance that opened to it to face all the new entrants.
555
 It was 
argued that by this reasoning, the court turned an actively competitive firm into an illegal 
monopolist under Section 2 disregarding the possibility that Alcoa’s behaviour “deemed 
desirable by efficiency-based economics”.556 Despite this criticism of the court’s ruling on 
Alcoa’s market behaviour, the court’s attempt to clarify the dilemma on whether a mere 
possession of monopoly contravenes Section 2 is a welcome step towards the recognition 
that some powerful businesses retain a right to be competitively active.  
Finally, before turning to Alcoa’s monopolisation, the Supreme Court concluded557 that 
“Alcoa’s size was ‘magnified’ to make it a ‘monopoly’; indeed, it has never been anything 
else; and its size, not only offered it an ‘opportunity to abuse,’ but it ‘utilised’ its size for 
‘abuse’”.558Unlike the situation in US Steel case, this case can be distinguished because 
Alcoa was found to use its size to create a monopoly which in turn was used to monopolise 
the relevant market. The Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between the time when 
Alcoa was still in possession of lawful monopoly and when it started to apply unlawful 
practices in order to strengthen its monopolistic position.
559
 The Supreme Court 
specifically pointed out on the facts that Alcoa (in order to strengthen its monopolistic 
position and, therefore, by default retain its size) was embracing any market opportunity it 
had to face a new competitor “with new capacity already geared into a great organization, 
having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel”.560 In 
other words, Alcoa, unlike US Steel, triggered the second requirement of Section 2, i.e. the 
act of monopolisation. The Supreme Court did not explicitly say that Alcoa’s reasons 
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behind such behaviour were to uphold its size; however, it seemed that the Supreme Court 
did believe that it was the expected result from Alcoa’s market behaviour.561  
It was argued that the decision in Alcoa led to government’s burden of proof to diminish 
when dealing with Section 2 liabilities.
562
Alcoa’s decision did not manage to avoid being 
called a bad law though
563
 due to the general consensus that Alcoa, in fact, did not commit 
any economic wrongdoing.
564
 It was finally argued that the decision in Alcoa lost its 
viability to remain a strong precedent on Section 2 monopoly and monopolisation and 
became “nothing more than historic interest”.565 
It was also said, quoting Professor Levy,
566
 that the Supreme Court in Alcoa might “have 
passed from the abuse theory to a recognition that size and power are themselves the abuse. 
[…] as a result of an increased awareness of the monopoly problem […] we appear to have 
a new interpretation of the Act closer probably to its original intention”.567 It can be seen 
that the decision in Alcoa raised various debates as to the adequacy of the judgment in 
relation to both the possession of monopoly and the abuse theory under the Sherman Act. 
The decision in Alcoa has created, nevertheless, the theory of the illegality of monopoly 
without abuse
568
 or, in other words, per se illegality of monopoly versus the abuse theory.  
Despite an attempt to introduce per se illegality of monopoly, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the already existed position that size per se was not a violation of Section 2 and 
recognised that having a monopolist on a relevant market does not necessarily entail that 
the monopolist is unlawfully monopolising a market. Alcoa, however, did not fall within 
the definition of a possible ‘lawful’ monopolist. The Supreme Court agreed that the 
supplier of an important product (or raw material) will have a large market share, but, once 
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said supplier starts expanding its output in order to maintain its market share, Section 2 can 
be deemed to be violated.
569
 It should not be ignored that the facts in Alcoa are very 
straightforward, i.e. the Supreme Court had a firm which was almost a de facto monopolist. 
Alcoa’s market position in terms of percentage of market control spoke for itself. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alcoa is known as a 
decision which introduced the per se illegality of monopoly principle into the application 
of Section 2.  
In 1965, it was argued that the post-Alcoa cases in the US showed the tendency where it 
was impossible for a defendant to be convicted of illegal monopolisation “without proof of 
both monopoly power and legally or economically abusive conduct in the acquisition or 
maintenance of that power”.570 This indicates that the abuse theory became more acute in 
the monopolisation analysis which could be due to the fact that not all monopoly cases 
involved an almost de facto monopolist. If the courts and antitrust authorities were relying 
only on the high percentage of market control then smaller firms would avoid any antitrust 
responsibility. At the time Alcoa case was decided, US antitrust law was still not sure 
about the position smaller firms were holding under Section 2. The Supreme Court 
provided that the common assumption of one of the purposes of the Sherman Act “was to 
perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible costs, an organisation of 
industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other”.571 In other words, 
Section 2 was indeed granting certain protection to smaller firms
572
 from the actions of the 
monopolists.
573
 This part of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Alcoa was heavily criticised 
because “it is a position which is questionable as a description of congressional intent, 
dubious as social policy, and impossible as antitrust doctrine [...] there was [...] no clear 
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indication that antitrust should create shelters for the inefficient”.574 This point will be 
discussed further in Chapter 7 of this thesis.  
5.1.5 United Shoe575 
United Shoe is the first case in this thesis
576
 which, in addition to relying on market shares, 
considered other factors which contributed to United Shoe Machinery Corporation’s 
(United Shoe) monopoly of the production of all essential machinery used in the major 
processes of shoemaking. The market itself did have a few number of manufactures 
involved in shoemaking but they were not posing severe competitive constraints on United 
Shoe.  
In the complaint lodged by the Government, the argument was that the relevant market 
consisted of all shoe machinery industry including various sub-markets.
577
 The District 
Court agreed concluding that for the purposes of the antitrust rules, the relevant market is 
to be defined as a shoe machinery market. As for the market shares, the District Court 
found that United Shoe supplied seventy five to ninety five percent of the market; 
however, to be more precise, the District Court concluded that it would be more accurate to 
say that United Shoe supplied about eighty five percent of the American shoe machinery 
market.
578
 United Shoe was a very progressive corporation involved in the manufacture of 
various types of machines which would cover every major process in shoemaking. 
Furthermore, it was involved in the research with patent protection attributable to the ideas 
of its own employees.  
The District Court had to decide whether United Shoe violated Section 2
579
 relying on the 
opinion of the earlier decisions from the Supreme Court.
580
 In particular, the District Court 
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heavily relied on the doctrine from the Alcoa case that a mere possession of monopoly 
power did not automatically violate Section 2 if the monopoly was achieved by the 
superior skill, superior product or foresight.
581
 The District Court found that in order to be 
able to compete with United Shoe, its competitors had to be very well prepared as United 
Shoe was holding a strong market position.  
It became undisputable that United Shoe was a corporation of a considerable size by 
holding eighty five percent of the market. This, however, was not enough for the District 
Court which decided to assess United Shoe’s market position even further and considered 
all other factors which strengthened the corporation’s monopoly.   
According to the District Court,   
“The three principal sources of United’s power have been the original 
constitution of the company, the superiority of United’s products and 
services, and the leasing system. […] But United’s control does not rest 
solely on its original constitution, its ability, its research, or its economies of 
scale. There are other barriers to competition, and these barriers were 
erected by United’s own business policies”.582 
It should be noted from the outset that the District Court considered United Shoe’s 
privileges as barriers to competition
583
 which resulted from the corporation’s own business 
policies. The District Court took it further and provided that United Shoe had a network of 
long-term leases which were created to strengthen the corporation’s power and eliminate 
its competitors;
584
 it offered a long line of machine types whilst its competitors offered a 
short line which provided United Shoe with a power to discriminate;
585
 “being by far the 
largest company in the field, with by far the largest resources in dollars, in patents, in 
facilities, and in knowledge, United has marked capacity to attract offers of inventions, 
inventors’ services, and shoe machinery businesses”.586 The District Court was very 
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specific in defining United Shoe’s bigness by relying on other factors which put a firm into 
a privilege position. The District Court then continued that the practices United Shoe was 
involved in did not result from “the consequences of ability, natural forces, or law” rather, 
“They are contracts, arrangements, and policies which, instead of 
encouraging competition based on pure merit, further the dominance of a 
particular firm. In this sense, they are unnatural barriers; they unnecessarily 
exclude actual or potential competition; they restrict a free market”.587 
This paragraph of the District Court’s judgment implies the anti-competitive intent behind 
United Shoe’s business strategy, i.e. the restriction of competition. It follows that if 
privileges are the result of business skill and acumen then a firm should not be condemned. 
In any other case, there is a possibility that such advantages over rivals will be held against 
a firm under consideration. The challenge of distinguishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
privileges, however, remains.  
United Shoe attempted to defend its superiority over its rivals by arguing that some 
monopoly power was necessary in order to develop shoe machinery market and “achieve 
maximum economies of production and distribution”.588 The District Court rejected it and 
held that “the law does not allow an enterprise that maintains a control of a market through 
practices not economically inevitable, to justify that control because of its supposed social 
advantage […] it is for the Congress, not for private parties, to determine whether a 
monopoly, not compelled by circumstances, is advantageous”.589  
The summary of the Court’s position towards the main elements of Section 2 was 
summarised in Grinell
590
 where the Court held that Section 2 contains two elements: “(1) 
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the wilful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence 
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”.591 This summary provides 
that monopoly power has to be either wilfully acquired or maintained unless it results from 
a successful business strategy. In other words, the element of wilfulness is an important 
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part of the unlawful monopoly under Section 2. It was argued that there is little or no 
agreement about the meaning of wilfulness with judicial decisions agreeing that 
‘wilfulness’ could stretch from “mere aggressive operation of the monopoly firm to illegal 
use of monopoly power”.592  
5.1.6. Du Pont593 
Du Pont is an important US case which deals with the definition of a relevant market and 
which, as provided earlier, gives a good example of how a firm’s monopoly may depend 
on the way a relevant market is delineated.  
Du Pont was a leading firm in the field of synthetics and manufacture of plain cellophane 
with patent protection in the US. Government charged du Pont with monopolisation or 
attempt to monopolise under Section 2. During the period in question, du Pont 
manufactured almost seventy five percent of cellophane and this number constituted less 
than twenty percent of all “flexible packaging material” sales in the US.594 The main 
concern of the government was the fact that the relevant market was the cellophane market 
in which case du Pont’s seventy five percent of the cellophane production granted it with 
significant market power. Du Pont, on the other hand, argued that the relevant market 
consisted of all flexible packaging material where du Pont’s market position was only 
twenty percent.  
According to the Supreme Court,
595
 “monopoly power is the power to control prices or 
exclude competition”596 and the Supreme Court had, therefore, to determine whether du 
Pont held monopoly over cellophane, i.e. whether du Pont had any control over the 
cellophane’s price in competition with other flexible packaging materials.597 In this 
situation, the determination of the relevant market should involve a careful analysis.  
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The Supreme Court held that “when a product is controlled by one interest, without 
substitutes available in the market, there is monopoly power”.598 The Supreme Court 
concluded that “in considering what is the relevant market for determining the control of 
price and competition, […] commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the 
same purposes make up that ‘part of the trade or commerce,’ monopolisation of which may 
be illegal”.599 While conducting a more technical analysis of cellophane, the Supreme 
Court compared it with all other flexible packaging commodities and concluded that 
“cellophane combines the desirable elements of transparency, strength and cheapness more 
definitely than any of the others”.600 The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that 
“cellophane’s interchangeability with other materials […] suffices to make it a part of this 
flexible packaging material market”.601 
Du Pont is an important case in the battle between market power and wide definition of the 
relevant market.
602
  As was already briefly mentioned,
603
 the narrower the market the 
higher the monopoly power of a firm is, ceteris paribus. Neither antitrust authorities nor 
the courts actually admit this inclination in dealing with market definition,
604
 therefore, 
there is no evidence on this matter; however, the case law sets a good example of such a 
gradually developed tendency.  It was argued that market definition was the most litigated 
issue in the field;
605
 thereby, making it an important part of the market power analysis. 
The Supreme Court provided an interesting insight on the interpretation of the Sherman 
Act, citing Standard Oil
606
 as an authority for the proposition that the Sherman Act was 
passed due to the fears of the fast accumulations of power in the hands of individuals and 
corporate wealth.
607
 More interestingly, the Supreme Court provided that with all the 
concerns over the rapid shift of power towards private individuals, mergers, larger 
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aggregations of private capital and various industries having only a few production 
organisations, “a considerable size is often essential for efficient operation in research, 
manufacture and distribution”.608 The Supreme Court could not have been any clearer on 
this point; for the research, manufacture and distribution to be efficient, a firm should be of 
a considerable size. This will be further discussed in Chapter 7. Or, as was interestingly 
provided by Robert Bork, “any firm that has grown to large size without the employment 
of predatory practices has demonstrated its superior efficiency […] that it is better at 
pleasing consumers than its rivals are”.609 
The Supreme Court’s judgment shows the importance of the careful delineation of the 
relevant market. The majority of the judges did agree with the fact that despite du Pont’s 
market position in the cellophane market, there was a great level of interchangeability of 
du Pont’s cellophane with other flexible wrapping packages. It was argued that after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in du Pont, “we are therefore left with a definition of market 
which is necessarily broad and which encompasses a refinement of cost-price relationship 
in applicable situations which defy standardisation”.610 
The decision of the Supreme Court in du Pont highlights the core of the tension between 
the assessment of market power and market definition. At the time the decision in du Pont, 
the Supreme Courts’ perception that size was a per se violation of Section 2 had 
considerably changed. It was rather an unlawful monopoly or an illegality behind the 
firm’s size which had materialised to pose bigger problems for competition on US markets. 
It was argued that a firm’s bigness is a relative term and “it must be considered in the 
context of the relevant product and geographic market to which a particular fact situation 
relates”.611 The Supreme Court did not mention any other factors which, for the purposes 
of this research, represent a firm’s bigness. Therefore, du Pont’s seventy five percent 
market share was the most important factor, in addition to the fact that du Pont was indeed 
in control over the majority of the cellophane market. However, once the trial court and the 
Supreme Court decided that the cellophane was part of the flexible packaging market, du 
Pont’s market power became negligible. Had the Supreme Court narrowed the relevant 
market to the cellophane market, du Pont’s monopoly power would have been exaggerated. 
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Therefore, a firm’s bigness and size directly depend on the way a relevant market is 
delineated. 
The government tried to argue before the District Court that “once power to control prices 
has been established, it is immaterial how that power may be used”.612 In other words, the 
government insisted that the mere existence of market power is enough to trigger the 
violation of Section 2. Alcoa was heavily referenced in du Pont and “the government was 
consciously pushing the Alcoa doctrine to its furthermost limits”.613 However, it was 
argued that “the mainstream of anti-trust doctrine has never condemned the mere economic 
fact of monopoly”.614 By the time du Pont was decided, it had already become an 
established law in the US.  
Du Pont has shown the transition in applying more economic analysis to the assessment of 
market power although it was argued that “economics can be useful in reaching some 
decisions, but it should not be determinative in making legal decisions”.615 
The application of antitrust rules to monopolies has shown the separation between two 
different scenarios where “a court could either say that the proper market includes all of 
the producers, and twenty-five per cent of the market is not a monopoly, or that the firm is 
a monopoly, but not an illegal one within the meaning of the act”.616 In this case, the 
illegality of monopoly power is determined through the assessment of the acts of the firm 
in question. In other words, whether a monopolist is using its power to control prices and 
exclude competition or, as Robert Bork said “the existence of power is best shown by the 
fact that it has been exercised”.617 
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5.2. Final Observations 
The above case study revealed a gradual development of Section 2 where there were 
attempts to make size per se illegal under Section 2 which later, with the application of a 
more economic analysis, were discarded by the Supreme Court.  United Steel
618
 and 
International Harvester
619
 further clarified the law in that mere size was not an offence 
under the Sherman Act which, by implication, welcomed the abuse theory into the 
application of Section 2. However, it was argued that it did not eradicate all the problems 
and inconsistencies affiliated with size as certain acts “which might otherwise constitute 
abuses in the presence of great size or percentage of control might appear more innocuous 
without size or a high percentage”.620  This also relates to a firm’s bigness because only a 
firm of a large size will have access to various advantages and privileges. The Supreme 
Court’s authority in United Steel and International Harvester, as argued, indicated that 
“bigness may carry with it penalties in the form of restrictions on the activities in which it 
may engage”.621 This argument is true; however, neither of those cases actually prohibited 
bigness and size per se, rather making it clear that firms of a large size which are in a 
privileged position will carry certain responsibilities to ensure they do not monopolise.   
The assessment of the firm’s monopoly power is not an easy task especially when 
intertwined with the initial confusion as to the importance of the size to the monopolisation 
offence. Economics played an undeniable role in reaching the more or less unified 
conclusion that size per se is not an offence unless used in order to restrain competition or 
establish a control over a relevant product or geographical market. The term monopoly, on 
its own, does not provide any information on whether the relevant market is monopolised 
which is what Section 2 clearly forbids. The transition of lawful monopoly into unlawful 
takes place when market power is being used anti-competitively when, for instance, a firm 
is involved in a predatory pricing and until the action or intent is proved, monopoly should 
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not be prohibited. US antitrust law seems to be clear on this point, but the general 
perception exists though that in the majority of cases on monopoly, “if the court has a mind 
to do so, it can find abuses”622 and this equally applies to the EU courts. This can be 
explained by the fact that a powerful and large firm which possesses and uses its 
advantages and privileges can be suspected in anti-competitive behaviour just because it 
runs business better and on a greater scale than its rivals. A firm which has, for instance, 
access to capital will be able to offer better quality products via aggressive and innovative 
advertising to the detriment of its weaker rivals’ business. Depending from which 
perspective to look, such practices can constitute an abuse of a monopoly power. 
Furthermore, privileged position opens many doors and, moreover, it can grant its holder 
with an opportunity to dictate the rules which, in some situations, can also amount to an 
abuse of the power. However, it all depends on how a firm uses its advantages over its 
competitors and it is very difficult to identify when such a position leads to an unlawful 
monopoly. This was clearly highlighted by the Supreme Court in United Shoe.  
Alcoa could undoubtedly be regarded as the most important and relevant decision which 
attempted to introduce the per se illegality of monopoly.
623
 The decision in Alcoa was 
reinforced by the Supreme Court in American Tobacco
624
 where the Supreme Court applied 
Alcoa to conclude that the petitioners had conspired to establish and maintain monopoly 
power.
625
 In American Tobacco,
 626
 the Supreme Court had to deal with the combination of 
firms
627
 accused of violation of Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, where it was found 
that they were accountable for eighty percent of the total domestic cigarette production 
within the US.
628
 The combination was named ‘The Big Three’ and their comparative size 
provided them with an increased power to dominate all stages of the tobacco industry.
629
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The Supreme Court then reiterated its proposition in Swift case that when size was used as a 
tool for an abuse in the past then it should not be ignored.
630
  
The case study has also revealed that if a firm’s market power is of ninety percent or more, 
then it automatically leads to the conclusion that such a monopoly is unlawful and, 
therefore, contrary to Section 2. It was argued that if the percentage of control is not as high 
as in Alcoa, then the evidence of the specific intent to monopolise might become important 
for the Section 2 analysis.
631
 This is strikingly different from the position in EU 
competition law where intent plays no role in the assessment of a firm’s conduct under 
Article 102 and the Commission places more weight on other factors in order to strengthen 
the finding of a dominant position.
632
  
The term monopoly, on its own, as used in law “is not a tool of analysis but a standard of 
evaluation”.633 It becomes a standard which is applied by antitrust authorities and the 
courts in order to identify whether the relevant market is being anticompetitive to the 
detriment of public policy, in general, and consumers, in particular. Economic tools are 
now an inseparable part of such an evaluation. It was also argued that the antithesis of the 
concept of monopoly in law is free competition while in economics it is pure competition 
and “restriction of competition is the legal content of monopoly; control of the market is its 
economic substance […] these realities are by no means equivalent”.634 The importance of 
knowing the distinction between two different concepts of monopoly lies in the fact that 
monopoly in economic sense offers more technical approach towards the application of 
Section 2 to monopolies where a firm is utilising its size and power in order to control the 
market. Pure competition is therefore distorted as it requires a homogenous market with 
various numbers of buyers and sellers where there are no entry barriers and no control over 
the relevant market whatsoever.
635
 
Abuse theory, on the contrary, requires an act which would point at the firm’s 
anticompetitive behaviour. It was argued, however, that Alcoa did not end the usage of 
abuse theory, albeit changing it, “by setting an upper limit for monopoly power, or by 
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making it necessary to recognise that, contrary to implications of Alcoa, in some areas 
monopoly power is lawful as long as it is properly used [and] where there is size, there 
may be restrictions on its use”.636 The last part of this argument resembles the position in 
the EU
637
 where the CJEU agreed
638
 that dominance per se is not a violation of Article 
102; rather, it provides its holder with a special responsibility not to utilise it in an 
anticompetitive way.  
As argued earlier, the boundaries of a relevant market play an important role in the 
determination of a firm’s monopoly as evidenced in du Pont case where the Supreme Court 
established a very broad market definition leading to the general concerns that all future 
cases would be affected by the Supreme Court’s definition of the relevant market.639 In 
addition, it was interestingly argued that “a law which uneasily permits great relative size 
and bigness, but with a lack of assurance as to where monopoly power is to be found 
moves naturally to a restriction on the use of permitted power”.640 It is impossible not to 
agree with this argument because if US antitrust law allows firms to grow in size and 
acquire bigness on a relevant market, then it should ensure it has an adequate set of rules 
which distinguish between lawful and unlawful monopoly. At this stage of the research, 
US antitrust law seems to find the required balance which condemns an unlawful 
monopoly but permits firms to acquire market size and bigness as long as it is for efficient 
purposes only with the Supreme Court making it clear in 1927 that “the fact the 
competitors may see proper, in the exercise of their own judgment, to follow the prices of 
another manufacturer, does not establish any suppression of competition or show any 
sinister domination”.641  
It has become clear that US antitrust law made a great step away from condemning 
monopoly per se to recognising that monopoly is not always illegal. Such a move away 
from the common prejudice toward bigness would have been welcomed by Lilienthal who 
once stated that “the doctrine that Bigness is an evil, in and of itself, and against the 
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Sherman Act even though there are no specific acts against competition, is a thoroughly 
unsound development of our governmental policy toward Bigness; it is a policy that 
cripples our country”.642 However, the future of big business on a US market highly rests 
on Congress, the courts and administrative agencies
643
 as it is in their power to decide how 
bigness would be treated by antitrust law.  
Lastly, as a matter of brief comparison,
644
 mergers are well known to be literally associated 
with size, i.e. when several firms merge to create a single business entity, their market 
predominance becomes undeniable. This leads to smaller competitors fearing the 
domination of a market by such newly created entity. The response of US antitrust law is 
clear in this respect that “antitrust analysis focuses on the specific competitive harms that 
may be associated with a particular merger, not on its size in the abstract […] The key for 
our review is whether the merger will harm consumers, not the sheer size of the corporate 
entities involved”.645 The importance in mentioning mergers lies in the fact that bigness of 
a concentration is not a concern for antitrust authorities, i.e. bigness does not seem to pose 
a danger on its own if it lacks anti-competitive harm.   
 
5.3. Conclusion 
The US case study paints a clear picture on the development of Section 2 toward monopoly 
power. Initially, it had all started with Congress’ aims and objectives behind the Sherman 
Act which were strictly followed by the Supreme Court. Then, the Supreme Court was 
challenged to identify whether a size per se was enough to find the violation of Section 2 
where the case study revealed that size per se was not a violation of Section 2 as the act of 
monopolisation or attempted monopolisation was required by the law. The Supreme 
Court’s deliberations on the application of size to the assessment of monopoly power under 
Section 2 had led it to distinguish between lawful and unlawful monopoly and to recognise 
                                                          
642
 Lilienthal, D., E., Big Business: A New Era, at p. 34.  
643
 Fuller, F., E., “Problems Ahead For ‘Big Business’”, at p. 76.  
644
 Current research is not attempting to include the discussion of mergers into current analysis. However, it 
appears to be important to briefly mention the approach antitrust authorities take toward size when dealing 
with new mergers.  
645
 Statement of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division US Department before the 
Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate. Concerning Mergers and Corporate Consolidation. 
(Washington, DC, June 16, 1998) at pp. 3-4.  
 
 
 
127 
 
that size could be achieved via business skill and acumen. In such situation, size would 
only represent a firm’s market success, unless it had already utilised its size for an abuse in 
the past. If it were the case, then the Supreme Court was clear that such size would 
contribute to the finding of an unlawful monopoly under Section 2.  
Meanwhile, the US case study did not reveal the Supreme Court’s reliance on other factors 
which, in this research, define a firm’s bigness. United Shoe, among the selected cases, 
was the only example where the District Court had some discussion of privileges and 
advantages United Shoe had over its rivals. However, the District Court was very clear that 
all the advantages derived from a well-structured business policy which was aimed at the 
restriction of competition meaning those advantages were not natural consequences of a 
successful business strategy and that there was an undeniable illegality behind their 
adoption and application. Therefore, the case study revealed that US antitrust law has a 
relative disregard of other factors in a firm’s possession. This could be explained by the 
fact that Section 2 demands very high market share to be present before it can be triggered 
and if a firm has over seventy percent market share then the presence of various privileges 
and advantages over competitors will not matter as its monopoly position will be highly 
likely.  
Furthermore, it was revealed that, initially, the Supreme Court held an antagonistic 
approach to powerful firms, however soon recognising the importance to focus on 
economic harm and economic contributions of powerful businesses in order to avoid 
passivity on a market.
646
 It is unclear whether a firm’s size and bigness could be quantified 
with respect to success or efficiency, what is clear, however, is that they could significantly 
attribute to market development via influx of more job opportunities, investments and 
technology development. In addition, the development of US antitrust law has witnessed a 
shift in the burden of proof placed on plaintiffs who are required to show the proof of 
wilfulness on the part of the monopolist. That new tendency was welcomed by the 
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monopolists as the spotlight had shifted from their monopoly status.
647
 The fact that the US 
courts started to demand the plaintiffs to prove the presence of wilfulness on the part of the 
monopolist also signifies the recognition that per se monopoly was no longer enough to 
establish the violation of Section 2.  
US antitrust law, following the case law on monopoly, has witnessed a slow transition 
from more to less interventionist approach from antitrust authorities. Such a transition also 
had a reflection on the way the US courts started to perceive monopoly and its effects on a 
US market. It could be seen that during Alcoa period,
648
 cases on Section 2 still required a 
presence of certain anticompetitive acts. It was argued, however, that the courts still 
“defined the concept of wrongful behaviour so broadly that a wide range of conduct 
sufficed to create liability for dominant firms”.649 The broad interpretation of 
anticompetitive behaviour would lead to monopolists falling within the realm of Section 2 
even if their business actions do not have any anticompetitive effects. This could be 
explained by the fact that a monopolist would already satisfy the first limb of Section 2, i.e. 
the presence of monopoly power. 
Therefore, it is concluded that US antitrust law, due to its rich history on the development 
of Section 2, does not consider size and bigness as being per se illegal under Section 2. 
There might be exceptions to this rule in the future; however, US antitrust law policy does 
not object to firms’ growing on a market and competing aggressively as long as their 
actions do not supress competition.  
  
 
 
                                                          
647
 Fox, E., M., “Monopoly and Competition: Tilting the Law Towards a More Competitive Economy”, at p. 
54.  
648
 This period includes such important cases as United States v Aluminium Co of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2
nd
 Cir. 
1945); Am. Tobacco Co. v United States, 328 US 781 (1946); United States v Griffith, 334 US 100 (1948).  
649
 Kovacic, W., E., “The Intellectual DNA of Modern US Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: 
The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix”, at p. 17.  
 
 
 
129 
 
Chapter 6: The Application of Article 102 to 
Dominance: The EU Case Study 
 
The analysis of US case law has revealed that attempts were made to include a size of a 
firm into the assessment of monopoly power under the Sherman Act. ‘Bigness’, on the 
other hand, did not play a significant role in the assessment of monopoly power.  The next 
step which is required for the purposes of the current analysis is to study the major EU case 
law on dominance. The assessment of dominance, as has already been discussed, can be a 
very intricate process and it is filled with ambiguities and uncertainties: There is no “clear 
demarcation between the application of these concepts and their outer boundaries”;650 
therefore, giving an impression that being dominant can be a crime in EU competition law. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to analyse how the courts and the Commission 
apply the well-known set of rules on the assessment of dominance in practice. 
This chapter contains a number of EU cases which were selected based on the number of 
market shares of a firm under consideration.
651
 Despite the fact that market share is the 
starting point in the analysis of market power, the selected cases are going to also discuss 
other factors the courts take into account in establishing dominance. It is hoped that the 
case study clarifies whether the EU holds an antagonistic approach to large firms, 
especially in situations where market shares are below seventy percent.
652
 In order to 
support the finding of dominance under seventy percent market share threshold, the 
Commission and the courts rely on other factors which, for the purposes of this research, 
constitute firm’s bigness in antitrust law. It will be seen that the said factors are nothing 
more than all commercial, financial and technical advantages a firm has due to its market 
position.  It will also be seen that none of the selected cases had illegality behind the 
formation of their businesses unlike, for instance, Standard Oil case. Therefore, the case 
study aims to identify how EU competition law decides a firm’s dominance based on low 
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market shares and other factors many successful businesses have owing to their business 
decisions.  
 
6.1. Background 
The years of applying Article 102 have proved that the EU courts insist that evidence of 
the existence of a dominant position should first be provided.
653
 As was already discussed, 
Article 102 cannot be triggered if a firm is not in a dominant position. Errors in subjecting 
non-dominant firms to Article 102 are possible and, if this is a case, EU competition law 
can simply become a tool for weaker firms to use in order to supress its stronger 
competitors.  
The EU holds a position that damage to the competitive process would lead to consumer 
harm and “the best way to protect consumers as well as incentives for producers is to rely 
on open markets unimpeded by private firm obstruction”.654 The principle that competitors 
should be competing on the merits only is an important part of the Commission’s thinking 
when applying competition law to dominant firms. Consumer welfare, as was discussed, is 
of paramount importance and the following cases have the protection of consumer welfare 
at the core of the courts’ judgments.  
There are various arguments on the way the EU treats dominant firms, for instance, that 
“the European antitrust authorities are prepared to accept ‘dominance’; but draw the line at 
conduct which can cause economic harm if that dominance is abused […] economic harm 
does not arise simply because of dominance, nor should dominance be proscribed”.655 This 
argument is a succinct summary of the way Article 102 is described by the Commission 
and the EU courts, but whether it reflects a reality is a completely different issue. The most 
important tool in the assessment of dominance is very well set, i.e. market shares in a 
relevant market whilst the second tool, on the other hand, is a non-exhaustive list of various 
factors which are used by the Commission to strengthen the finding of a dominant position.  
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In both instances, flexibility is featured in their application to a firm under investigation 
which makes the assessment of dominance vague and the case study below is aimed at 
addressing the flexibility in the analysis of a dominant position.   
6.1.1 Continental Can656  
Continental Can is the first EU case on the application of Article 102 to the abuse of 
dominant position.
657
 The case concerns the Commission decision (Continental Can 
Decision)
658
 against Continental Can Company Inc. (Continental) of New York (USA), a 
firm producing different types of metal containers for food packaging. The Commission 
found that Continental abused its dominant position which it held through its subsidiary 
Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke AG of Brunswick (SLW) in a market for light metal 
containers for meat, meat products, fish and crustacean as well as in a market for metal 
closures for glass jars. The Commission further argued that Continental abused its 
dominant position by acquiring about eighty per cent of market shares
659
 (through its 
subsidiary Europemballage) of Thomassen & Drijver-Verblifa N.V. (TDV). 
Continental appealed,
660
 arguing that the Commission’s findings of a dominant position 
were purely based on theoretical evidence. The only concrete evidence supplied by the 
Commission, as argued by the defendants, was based on Continental’s market share which 
does not “suffice to prove the existence of a dominant position, since it gives no indication 
of the effective margin of action available to the undertaking”.661 This highlights two main 
important issues: First, due to being the first case on the assessment of dominance, 
Continental had thought that eighty percent market share did not provide concrete evidence 
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of a dominant position, and, second, the heavy reliance of the Commission on market 
shares dated back to 1971.  
The way Continental Can is structured is similar to Standard Oil as, in both cases, the 
courts deal with the application of antitrust law on the control of market power for the first 
time. Unlike other EU cases, Continental Can did not have any discussion of other factors 
apart from a brief mentioning of market shares and, like Standard Oil, it had a brief 
discussion of the main antitrust legal provisions. This case, however, remains important 
because it gives an insight of the first steps in the development of law on the assessment of 
market power.  
The CJEU made it clear that a link of causality between dominance and abuse should be 
present for the correct application of Article 102, which Continental denied.
662
 The court’s 
response was that “the condition imposed by [Article 102] is to be interpreted whereby in 
order to come within the prohibition a dominant position must have been abused”.663 This 
is the first statement made by the CJEU confirming that for Article 102 to be triggered 
there must be an abuse of a dominant position. The CJEU then continued that “abuse may 
therefore occur if an undertaking in a dominant position strengthens such position in such a 
way that the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition, i.e. that only 
undertakings remain in the market whose behaviour depends on the dominant one”.664 The 
link of causality, in the CJEU’s opinion, does exist between the dominant position and 
abuse “regardless of the means and procedure by which it is achieved”.665  
In assessing the existence of dominance, the Commission saw Continental strengthening its 
market power through the acquisition of the majority of holding in a competing firm.
666
 
The Commission, in particular, argued that following a careful investigation, it based its 
decision on “the vary high market share already held by SLW in metal containers, on the 
weak competitive position of the competitors remaining in the market, on the economic 
weakness of most of the consumers in relation to that of the new unit and on the numerous 
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legal and factual links between Continental and potential competitors”.667 This is the first 
example when the Commission considered Continental’s superiority over its competitors, 
weakness of the consumers and other connections between Continental and its rivals as an 
additional evidence of market power. Korah, for instance, argued that the Commission 
defined the concept of dominance “in much the same terms as would an economist […] it 
focused on the discretionary power of the monopolist to set its prices and make other 
market decisions without being tightly constrained by competitive pressures”.668 
As was discussed in Chapter 4, the definition of a relevant market is the first step in the 
assessment of market power. The importance of Continental Can lies in the fact that the 
CJEU disagreed with the Commission’s delineation of the relevant market, in particular, 
the CJEU pointed out that the Commission considered several separate markets for light 
metal containers, namely a market for light containers for meat products, a market for light 
containers for canned seafood and a market for metal closures for the food packing 
industry. The Commission failed, according to the CJEU, to explain how these three 
markets differ from a market for light metal containers, i.e. a larger market. For such 
reasons, the CJEU held that “to be regarded as constituting a distinct market, the products 
in question must be individualised, not only by the mere fact that they are used for packing 
mere products, but by particular characteristics of production which make them specially 
suitable for this purpose”.669 The CJEU, therefore, required products to be individualised in 
order to be able to distinguish them from a more generic market.  As was discussed in 
Chapter 4, the boundaries of a relevant market have effects on the definition of dominance 
because the narrower the market the more dominant a firm becomes. The Commission 
prefers a narrow definition of a relevant market as evidenced in the Continental case. This 
can also be applied to a firm’s size (i.e. market shares) and bigness (i.e. other factors) 
because in a narrow relevant market a firm’s size and bigness will be exaggerated.  The 
opinion of the CJEU does not show whether the court preferred a narrow or wide definition 
of the relevant market. It does show, however, that the Commission has to be very 
thorough in its analysis of dominance. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Commission 
used the weak competitors as one of the factors it considered in addition to Continental’s 
market shares, it did not measure the competitive force of other rivals in those markets. 
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The CJEU was not entirely satisfied with that fact and concluded that the Commission 
decision should be annulled.
670
 
This case is interesting for the reasons that the CJEU did not agree with the Commission 
which, at the time of writing, has not happened in any of other EU high-profile cases. 
Continental Can was the first firm to be subjected to the abuse of dominance test under 
Article 102. Keeping this fact in mind, it is not surprising that Continental tried to argue 
that dominance and abuse have to exist in the same market for Article 102 to apply. At a 
later stage of the development of law on dominance, it will become clear that Article 102 
will also be violated when firm’s anticompetitive actions go beyond its primary market.671 
The CJEU, in Continental, made a very important point, i.e. “the provision is not only 
aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which 
are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure, such as 
is mentioned in [Article 3(b) of the TFEU]”672 which provides for “the establishing of the 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market”. This shows that the 
CJEU, from the very first judicial interpretation of Article 102, held that dominance test 
has to be assessed in a way which would be in conformity with the main goals of the 
TFEU. In other words, the functioning of the internal market should not be fettered by the 
abuse of a dominant position. 
6.1.2. United Brands673 
United Brands was the most famous EU case which significantly shaped EU 
competition law on dominance. United Brands Company (UBC) was a US 
corporation and the largest producer of bananas in the world market accounting for 
almost thirty five per cent of world exports.
674
 On 19 March 1975, the Commission 
initiated proceedings against UBC on the grounds of alleged abuse of a dominant 
position (Chiquita Decision). 
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The Commission defined dominance as, 
“The power to behave independently without taking into account, to any 
substantial extent, their competitors, purchasers and suppliers. Such is the 
case where undertaking’s market share, either in itself or when combined 
with its knowhow, access to raw materials, capital or other major advantage 
such as trademark ownership, enables it to determine the prices or to control 
the production or distribution of a significant part of the relevant goods. It is 
not necessary for the undertaking to have total dominance such as would 
deprive all other market participants of their commercial freedom, as long 
as it is strong enough in general terms to devise its own strategy as it 
wishes, even if there are differences in the extent to which it dominates 
individual submarkets”.675 
The Commission’s interpretation of dominance provides that for a firm to fall within the 
first part of Article 102 prohibition,
676
 its market power should not be absolute; rather, it 
should be ‘strong enough in general terms’ to satisfy the first requirement of Article 102.  
The Commission definition of dominance appears to be unclear, for instance, by using 
UBC’s ability to devise its own strategy as one of the factors. Technically, any firm has an 
ability to devise its own strategy and usually, this is how it is done. Whether its strategy is 
going to be successful does not entirely depend on the firm in question; it will always 
depend on the competitive constraints which are in place on a particular market. If there 
are no competitive constraints and the firm can do whatever it wishes, then it seems like 
such dominant position is going to be absolute, although it was argued that any firm, 
including a dominant one, is always going to be constrained, to a different extent, by 
competitors. The very presence of competitors on a market is going to affect firm’s 
demand curve since “all firms, including those that are held to be dominant, will increase 
prices to the point at which further price increases would be unprofitable”.677 That part of 
the Commission decision dated back to 1975 and, even at that stage, it was obvious that the 
Commission preferred a wide definition of dominance. By not requiring absolute 
dominance and by reserving a right to use any advantage of a firm to support the existence 
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of dominance, the Commission creates an environment where any firm of a considerable 
size has a potential to be investigated. Therefore, this part of the decision supports an 
earlier preliminary conclusion that the Commission prefers to keep its options open and 
have enough freedom to interfere when it deems to be right. Furthermore, the Commission 
had explicitly included UBC’s advantages and privileges into a definition of dominance 
which supports an earlier argument that, in EU competition law, bigness can play a 
decisive role in the finding of a dominant position.    
Furthermore, the Commission concluded that UBC’s marketing policy was concentrating 
on the sale of bananas under the Chiquita brand
678
. UBC, in particular, was involved in an 
extensive advertising campaign of the Chiquita brand and in the development of the 
production, ripening facilities and carriage and sale of Chiquita bananas which the 
Commission considered to be UBC’s advantage over its competitors who had to adjust to a 
new marketing policy. This led UBC, according to the Commission, to be able to make 
their advertising and marketing campaigns much more effective. The Commission, 
therefore, concluded that UBC, being the only firm in the banana market with such 
advantages, “is in a position thereby to obstruct the effective competition of its existing 
competitors to a substantial degree; potential competitors wishing to establish themselves 
in the banana market must overcome the barriers to entry […] UBC therefore enjoys a 
degree of overall independence in its behaviour on the market […] UBC must, therefore, 
be considered to be in a dominant position”.679 Therefore, as mentioned earlier, based on 
the factors the Commission took into account, UBC’s bigness could not be denied.  
The last sentence of the Commission decision on the existence of a dominant position can 
simply be summed up to the point that UBC enjoyed “a degree of overall independence in 
its behaviour”.680 Independence should not be the only criterion in the assessment of a 
dominant position as independence has various degrees. If independence is linked with the 
requirement that dominance should not be absolute then it leads to one conclusion, i.e. 
some degree of independence accompanied by some degree of dominance is enough to 
satisfy the first part of Article 102. If this is the case, then the test, as perceived by the 
Commission, is very loose. 
                                                          
678
 UBC set up a requirement that only high quality bananas of uniform size and colour could bear the 
Chiquita brand sign. It was very strict with distributors/ripeners as to which bananas could be sold under this 
brand. The rest of the UBC bananas were sold without the brand sticker.  
679
 Chiquita Decision, para.2.  
680
 Ibid. para.2.  
 
 
 
137 
 
The CJEU defined dominance as, 
“A position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables 
it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market 
by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers”.681 
This definition of dominant position, since the judgment, has become the most cited 
definition of dominance
682
 which both the Commission and the courts apply in Article 102 
cases. A dominant firm is a business entity which is so powerful (in economic terms) that it 
could act considerably independently
683
 from any competitive forces on a relevant 
market.
684
  It was argued that the EU concept of dominance “includes (though is not 
exhausted by) the idea that a firm can profitably increase its price without losing its 
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customers. It does not, however, imply that the firm actually does increase its price”.685 
This supports the proposition that the ability of a firm to raise prices above the competitive 
level lies at the core of the definition of dominance while the actual action (i.e. whether a 
firm actually raised prices to the detriment of the consumers, competition or competitors) 
will fall under the assessment of the abuse of dominant position.  
The boundaries of a relevant market play an important role in the assessment of dominance 
and UBC’s structure played an important role in the establishment of its dominant position. 
The CJEU gave a careful consideration to the fact that UBC was vertically integrated to a 
high degree,
686
 i.e. UBC was involved in every stage of production, ripening, handling and 
price setting of its bananas at every level. The fact that UBC was involved in an extensive 
research on the improving the productivity of its plantations was used by the CJEU as an 
example of UBC’s privileged market position since UBC’s competitors could not keep up 
with the research and development. The CJEU, for the reasons above, concluded that UBC 
“attained a privileged position by making Chiquita the premier banana brand name on the 
relevant market with the result that the distributor cannot afford not to offer it to the 
consumer”.687 These facts show the primary position of UBC as a leading banana supplier 
in the EU market and become the evidence of UBC’s superiority over its rivals.   
When it came to market shares, UBC held nearly forty five per cent
688
 of the banana 
market and that number did not lead to an automatic conclusion that UBC was 
dominant;
689
 the CJEU considered it necessary to assess the strength and number of UBC’s 
competitors.
690
 This shows, without any direct reference, that even for the CJEU forty five 
percent was not a high enough number to infer that UBC controlled the market.
691
 In fact, 
the case study showed that the CJEU paid more attention to other factors in UBC’s profile, 
rather than its market shares. This leads to only one conclusion that, technically, the 
Commission and the CJEU had to turn to every possible advantage UBC had over its 
competitors in order to prove the existence of a dominant position. In a narrowly defined 
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relevant market (i.e. banana market), UBC was, without any doubt, large; it was vertically 
integrated in almost every level of production; had access to capital and research; involved 
in advertising; possessed a strong brand name; and had the largest market share amongst its 
competitors. This conforms with the CJEU holding that “an undertaking does not have to 
have eliminated all opportunity for competition in order to be in a dominant position”.692 
This confirms the Commission’s assertion that for the purposes of Article 102 prohibition, 
dominance does not have to be absolute. At this stage, therefore, it becomes clear that tools 
for finding dominance appear to be broad and flexible and with the slight adjustment of the 
law to the facts, a firm like UBC with only forty five percent market share is found to be 
dominant with the help of other factors which put UBC into a superior position over its 
competitors.   
Despite the fact that UBC did not prevent its competitors from using the same methods of 
production and distribution, the CJEU has found that UBC’s competitors would “come up 
against almost insuperable practical and financial obstacles”693 and it was concluded that 
that factor was “another factor peculiar to a dominant position”.694 The CJEU is entirely 
correct on the point that smaller competitors will face large obstacles before, if ever, they 
reach the level of UBC. This reflects a different angle of the aims of EU competition law, 
i.e. the protection of smaller and weaker competitors reaffirming that the argument in 
Chapter 3 that SMEs are protected from the aggressive competition of large firms in spite 
of the Commission’s assertions that EU competition law is only concerned with the 
promotion of economic efficiency and protection of consumer welfare. If the protection of 
smaller competitors is also included into the aims of EU competition law then this practice 
can be equalled to punishing larger firms for their success irrespective of any efficiency 
considerations.
695
  
UBC’s bigness on the banana market was also evidenced by the fact that it had become a 
standard setting firm. Since it had more financial and physical capabilities to invest more 
in the production of bananas, competing with UBC became practically impossible. 
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However, most of the obstacles
696
 UBC’s competitors would have faced were derived from 
the considerable investment and business skills and acumen. The study of UBC did not 
show any evidence that there was an illegality behind the formation of the corporation 
which, once again, supports the proposition that its success was indeed achieved through 
its business decisions. There was no direct evidence that the Commission and the CJEU 
were protecting UBC’s competitors; however, it was difficult not to assume that UBC was 
punished for being a superior market player before it got even larger or, before UBC 
became an absolute monopolist. As it was interestingly pointed out that “punishing 
dominant firms for their success, and handicapping them to protect their rivals, may have 
some appeal and may even produce short-term gains, but all too often the only longer-term 
winners are inefficient rivals protected from the rigours of competition”.697  
6.1.3. Hoffmann-La Roche698 
The case
699
 reached the CJEU on the application lodged by Hoffmann-La Roche (Roche) 
against the Commission decision
700
 (Vitamins Decision) dated 9 June 1976.
701
 The 
                                                          
696
 E.g. large capital investments for the creation and running banana plantations, the ability to increase the 
sources of supply in case of banana diseases and weather conditions, the ability to set up delivery and 
distribution of bananas which are regarded as highly perishable type of goods, costly advertising campaign 
and commercial networks and so on.  
697
 Kolasky, W., J., “What is Competition? A Comparison of US and European Perspectives”, at p. 41.  
698
 Commission Decision of 9 June 1976 relating to the proceeding under Article 86 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (IV/29.020—Vitamins) 76/642/EEC (hereinafter, Vitamins 
Decision)—[1976] OJ L223/27; Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG. v Commission. Related case: F Hoffmann-La 
Roche & Co AG v Commission of the European Communities (85/76) [1979] ECR 461-- AGO.  
699
 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG. v Commission.  
700
 Vitamins Decision.  
701
 Key cases citing Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission: C-109/10 P, Solvay SA v European Commission 
[2011] ECR I-10329; T-321/05, AstraZeneca AB v European Commission [2010] ECR II-2805; C-202/07 P, 
France telecom SA v Commission of the European Communities [2009] ECR I-2369; T-53/03, BPB Plc v 
Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR II-1333; T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom Ag v 
Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR II-3601; T-125/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v 
Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-3523; T-170/06, Alrosa Co Ltd v Commission of 
the European Communities [2007] ECR II-2601; C-95/04 P, British Airways Plc v Commission of the 
European Communities [2007] ECR I-2331; T-15/02, BASF AG v Commission of the European Communities 
[2006] ECR II-497; T-120/01, General Electric Co v Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR 
II-5575; T-201/04 R2, Microsoft Corp v Commission of the European Communities [2005] 4 CMLR 5; T-
219/99, British Airways Plc v Commission of the European Communities [2003] II-5917; T-191/98, Atlantic 
Container Line AB v Commission of the European Communities [2003] ECR II-3275; T-395/94, Atlantic 
Container Line AB v Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR II-875; T-62/98, Volkswagen 
AG v Commission of the European Communities [2000] ECR II-2707; C-395/96 P, Compagnie Maritime 
Belge Transports SA v Commission of the European Communities [2000] ECR I-1365; T-25/95, Cimenteries 
CBR SA v Commission of the European Communities [2000] ECR II-491; T-228/97, Irish Sugar Plc v 
Commission of the European Communities [1999] ECR II-2669; T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v Commission of the 
European Communities [1999] ECR II-753; C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the 
European Communities [1996] ECR I-5951; C-241/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission of the 
European Communities [1995] ECR I-743; C-53/92 P, Hilti AG v Commission of the European Communities 
[1994] ECR I-667; T-65/89, BPB Indistries Plc v Commission of the European Communities [1993] ECR I-
 
 
 
141 
 
Vitamins Decision is concerned with several agreements concluded by Roche with various 
firms all being involved in the production and sale of vitamins
702
 within the internal 
market. The vitamins were primarily used for therapeutic use (twenty five per cent), food 
(fifteen per cent) and animal feed (sixty per cent). According to the Commission’s 
findings, each of the vitamins had a very specific metabolic function and, for such reasons, 
they were not interchangeable with other groups.
703
 In order to be able to supply such a 
large market, the pharmaceutical firms should possess a large capacity for the investment 
and distribution networks. Roche, among those pharmaceutical firms, was the world’s 
largest vitamin manufacturer.
704
 The Commission reached that conclusion based on 
Roche’s approximate market share for the various groups of vitamins—Vitamin A (forty 
per cent),
705
 Vitamin B1 (fifty per cent),
706
 Vitamin B2 (eighty six per cent),
707
 Vitamin B6 
(ninety five per cent),
708
 Vitamin C (sixty eight per cent),
709
 Vitamin E (seventy per 
cent),
710
 Biotin H (ninety five per cent)
711
 and Pantothenic acid (sixty four per cent). The 
Commission found that each vitamin constituted a separate relevant market as each vitamin 
had a special feature and were not substantially interchangeable with other vitamins.
712
 The 
Commission argued that Roche enjoyed “a complete freedom of action in the relevant 
markets enabling it to impede effective competition within the common market that it has a 
dominant position in such markets”.713 The existence of dominance, in particular, was 
derived from Roche’s market shares which ranged from forty seven to ninety five per cent. 
Furthermore, the Commission also took into account the fact that Roche was the world’s 
largest producer of all vitamins and that it was more technologically and commercially 
advanced than its competitors. In such cases, the Commission continued, the entry to the 
relevant markets by new competitors would not significantly affect Roche’s position as 
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vitamins markets require high technological development and investment.
714
 The 
Commission, therefore, found Roche to be in a dominant position in the number of relevant 
markets making Roche’s power undeniable. Unlike UBC, it had higher market shares in 
several vitamin markets and, like UBC, it was more technologically and commercially 
privileged than its rivals.  
Roche appealed against the Commission decision citing, among others,
715
 the infringement 
of Article 102, arguing that the Commission incorrectly and inaccurately applied and 
interpreted the concept of dominant position under Article 102; thereby, erroneously 
concluding that Roche was a dominant firm and that Roche abused the said dominant 
position. In particular, Roche argued that the Commission based its analysis of the 
existence of a dominant position solely on Roche’s market shares and the structures of the 
market. Roche criticised the following findings of the Commission: Roche argued that its 
market shares were not much larger than that of its competitors, Roche disagreed that it 
produced wider range of vitamins than all its competitors and that it was the world’s 
largest producer of vitamins; that Roche was more technologically advanced than its 
competitors.
716
 Furthermore, Roche argued that when the Commission was assigning 
market shares it made a mistake in market delimitation, i.e. that the Commission did not 
take into account the fact that the market in vitamins was an expanding market.
717
 The 
Commission argued that “where an undertaking holds large market shares whilst its 
competitors have appreciably smaller shares and do not offer a range of products which is 
as large by comparison, this can generally be considered as an indication of a dominant 
position”.718 
The CJEU confirmed the Commission’s market delimitation, concluding that the very 
purpose of the relevant market is to ensure that “there is a sufficient degree of 
interchangeability between all the products forming part of the same market”.719 The CJEU 
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concluded that a necessary interchangeability was absent at any rate during the period 
under consideration. 
The CJEU reinstated the UBC definition of dominance
720
 and continued that,  
“Such a position does not preclude some competition, […], but enables the 
undertaking which profits by it, if not to determine, at least to have an 
appreciable influence on the conditions under which that competition will 
develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such 
conduct does not operate to its detriment”.721 
Considering that the CJEU reinstated the UBC definition of dominance, the second part of 
the definition is an elaboration; it provides that, generally, competition should not be 
precluded altogether; rather, a dominant firm should have an appreciable influence on 
competition and market structure. In other words, it was submitted that “on the one hand, 
this qualification implicates that [Art.102] is not concerned with the minimal amount of 
market power that most business entities enjoy. On the other hand, it is clear that not all 
competition has to be eliminated for an undertaking to be in a dominant position”.722 It is 
correct that many firms enjoy some level of market power and competition law is not 
interested in them. Once again, the CJEU preferred to keep the definition of dominance 
open-ended with only setting certain boundaries for its application under Article 102. At 
the stage of this interpretation, it is clear that, once again, dominance was interpreted 
loosely.  
The word ‘appreciable’ was used twice in, both, the UBC and Roche definitions of 
dominance. This adds a slightly more coherent approach toward definition of dominance as 
it aims to reject those cases where the influence on competition is insignificant; however, 
what remains unclear is the required level of influence on competition by dominant 
firms.
723
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According to the CJEU, a substantial market share is a good evidence of the dominant 
position; however, it is not a constant factor and it could vary from market to market,
724
 i.e. 
it should be assessed on an individual basis. In this case, all seven vitamin markets were 
given the same market share criteria as the CEJU believed that these markets had enough 
features in common not to be distinguished. However, the CJEU continued that “very large 
market shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the 
existence of a dominant position”.725 
According to the CJEU, 
“An undertaking which has very large market share and holds it for some 
time […] is by virtue of that share in a position of strength which makes it 
an unavoidable trading partner and which, already because of this secures 
for it, at the very least during relatively long periods, that freedom of action 
which is the special feature of a dominant position”.726 
The fact that large market shares should be held for some time was highlighted by the 
CJEU. The time factor could serve as an important piece of evidence on the strength of a 
firm under consideration.
727
 The Commission’s reliance on market shares was criticised 
because it was believed that the Commission “should focus more on industry dynamics, 
including the behaviour of rival firms”.728 This could go back to what the CJEU said in the 
Roche case, i.e. market shares could vary from market to market as every market and 
industry has its own features and characteristics, e.g. technological markets are driven by 
innovation; therefore, their competition is more dynamic and progressive. Market share is a 
number which, if calculated correctly, can provide a more solid picture of a firm’s size and 
market status; however, a number does not reflect any characteristics and features of a 
particular industry. This is where market shares become subjects to criticism.   
Therefore, following the CJEU judgment high market shares are a good indication of a 
dominant position. So, in theory, low market shares should automatically signalise the 
                                                          
724
 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG. v Commission, para.40, at p. 520.  
725
 Ibid. para.41, at p. 521.  
726
 Ibid. para. 41, at p. 521.  
727
 See Chapter 4.  
728
 Dethmers, F., & Dodoo, M., “The Abuse of Hoffmann-La Roche: The Meaning of Dominance under EC 
Competition Law” [2006] ECLR 537 at p.549.  
 
 
 
145 
 
absence of the firm’s ability to raise prices above the competitive level. The practice is 
different: the lower the firm’s market shares, the more other factors the Commission and 
the courts take into account when assessing the existence of a dominant position.
729
 The 
Commission, as already provided, took additional factors
730
 into account when assessing 
Roche’s dominance in each market. For the purposes of this research, the discussion is 
only going to be made in relation to the vitamin A market where Roche held forty seven 
percent of a market. The CJEU upheld the Commission’s finding of dominance731 by 
concluding that Roche was the largest among its competitors (based on its market share) 
and, therefore, had a complete freedom to decide how to respond to the rivals’ attacks with 
its technical lead was caused by several patents, with Roche remaining dominant even after 
they expired.
732
 Frankly, Roche’s bigness and power in all vitamin markets is beyond 
doubt; hence the narrow definition of a relevant market. The CJEU, like in UBC, took 
commercial and technological privileges as an additional piece of evidence in support of 
finding dominance. Therefore, the CJEU had set a strong precedence where everything a 
firm possessed could potentially be used against it as long as it had a large number of 
market shares which, in the vitamin A market and UBC’s banana market, were between 
forty and fifty percent.  
6.1.4. Michelin I733  
The importance of market shares and other factors in the assessment of dominant position, 
as highlighted above, is undeniable. It was seen that a market share threshold appeared 
after the UBC and Roche rulings, albeit an approximate one. Other factors were also used 
in both cases, thereby, creating a strong precedence that any commercial and technological 
advantage over rivals would be used in the assessment of a dominant position. Article 102, 
however, does not prohibit dominance per se as it requires an abuse of the said dominance. 
The next case makes this point clear.   
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In 1977, the Commission received a complaint against NV Nederlandsche Banden 
Industrie Michelin (Michelin), asking to apply Article 102 prohibition to Michelin’s 
actions as, allegedly, it was abusing its dominant position.
734
 One of the reasons of the 
complaint was Michelin’s bonuses and discounts it was granting to certain tyre dealers. 
The Commission found that Michelin’s business practice of this kind was in contravention 
with Article 102 which amounted to the abuse of a dominant position.
735
  
The existence of a dominant position was partly derived from Michelin’s fifty seven to 
sixty five percent market shares in the market for new replacement tyre for lorries, buses 
and similar vehicles.
736
 When dealing with other factors the Commission took into account 
to reinforce the finding of dominance, the CJEU provided that Michelin had various 
advantages over its competitors like “investment and research and the special extent of its 
range of products”.737 Michelin’s network of commercial representatives was also 
highlighted by the CJEU because it gave Michelin a direct access to tyre users and enabled 
it to strengthen its dominant position.
738
 Lastly, before re-affirming the Commission’s 
finding of dominance,
739
 the CJEU rejected Michelin’s argument that it had experienced 
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temporary losses as being inconsistent with the assessment of a dominant position.
740
 The 
combination of ‘above forty percent’ market share and ‘other advantages’ led to the 
establishment of dominance. It is very difficult to disprove the Commission’s and the 
CJEU’s finding of dominance because Michelin did have a considerably, in EU 
competition law context, high market share. The way the CJEU selects ‘other factors’ 
remains a mystery as, once again, any privileges a firm has are held against it. Michelin, in 
a narrowly defined relevant market, was incontrovertibly large by virtue of its market share 
and access to investment, research and network of commercial representatives. The fact 
that Michelin had developed a reputation among its customers was also stressed by the 
CJEU on several occasions.
741
  
In the assessment of dominance, the CJEU relied on the Hoffman La-Roche definition of 
dominance
742
 which led to an observation that the CJEU “has further confirmed that the 
ability to behave independently of competitors and customers will depend on whether 
competition is ‘effective’, so that the two concepts can be taken as equivalent”.743 
Michelin I is famous for the next ruling of the CJEU which held that “a finding that an 
undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination but simply means that, 
irrespective of the reasons for which it has a dominant position, the undertaking concerned 
has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition on the common market”.744 It was argued that some commentators opined that 
“the ‘special responsibility’ of a dominant firm is an unhelpful and unclear concept that at 
worst chills competition […] or at best is a trite reminder to dominant firms that they 
should not break the law”.745 The ‘special responsibility’ concept could be regarded as a 
polite reminder to any firm to behave in a way which would respect both competition law 
rules and all market players. This proposition can also be interpreted as if EU competition 
law perceives dominant position as always being legal unlike US antitrust law and its 
notion of ‘unlawful monopoly’.746 If this is the case that it can, in fact, disprove this 
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research’s hypothesis that the Commission and the courts have an antagonistic and 
interventionist approach to dominant firms. However, there is not a single case, available 
for the purposes of this research, where the Commission or the courts establishes 
dominance but closes the case due to the absence of any evidence of an abuse. In any case, 
it was argued that this concept of special responsibility has created a broader and more 
inclusive standard of illegality by a dominant firm than “anything that has ever been 
present in antitrust law in the US”.747  
Michelin I, therefore, is an important case where the CJEU provides a considerably 
detailed description of ‘other factors’ and makes dominant position generally legal. 
Michelin’s reputation and network of commercial representatives are further examples of 
what EU competition law considers as firm’s privileges over its competitors.  
6.1.5. British Airways748 
This case is an example of a flexibility the Commission applies to the assessment of a 
dominant position in EU competition law. British Airways (BA) was held to be a purchaser 
in a dominant position on the UK market for air travel agency services.
749
 The GC held 
that due to the fact that the air travel agencies “represent an economic activity for which 
[…] airlines could not substitute another form of distribution of their tickets, and that they 
therefore constitute a market for services distinct from the air transport market”.750 BA’s 
dominance was drawn from its 39.7 percent market share in air travel agency services 
market. The GC concluded that BA’s market share constituted a multiple “of the market 
shares of each of its five main competitors […] for air travel agency services”.751 This is 
the only EU competition law case, at the time of the writing, where market shares below 
forty per cent were accepted as an indication of a dominant position.
752
 Therefore, due to 
such a low number of market share, the GC had to justify the existence of dominance by 
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relying on various factors. The GC supported the Commission’s finding of economic 
strength based on the number of seats BA was offering on all its routes to and from UK 
airports as that number represented the capacity of BA’s tickets being sold by travel 
agents.
753
 In particular, the GC reinforced the finding of BA’s economic strength by “the 
world rank it occupies in terms of international scheduled passenger-kilometres flown, the 
extent of the range of its transport services and its hub network” and, in comparison with 
its rivals, BA offered “a wider choice of routes and more frequent flights”.754 For such 
reasons, according to the GC, BA’s dominance was undisputable.755 Unfortunately, the GC 
did not go into much detail when including other factors into conclusion; rather, referring 
to the Commission decision. According to the Commission, BA’s dominant position was 
derived from its market share where “as well as being large in absolute terms, this share is 
a multiple of that of any other airline”.756 This evidence of dominance was reinforced by 
the Commission by the substantial proportion of slots BA held in the relevant airports 
which created the obstacles for new entrants and strengthened BA’s market power.757 The 
Commission’s assessment of BA’s market share and other factors reinforcing the finding 
of dominance is brief.  It would be preferable if the Commission distinguished between 
factors which are the results of the firm’s success from those factors which not only arise 
out of dominance but also which provide a firm with an opportunity to abuse the said 
dominance. Here, however, the Commission, with the full support from the GC, combined 
low market shares with other factors in BA’s possession in order to establish dominance.  
BA tried to contest the finding of dominance by arguing, among others, that a close nexus 
should exist between separate markets in order to give rise to Article 102 prohibition. BA, 
especially, was concerned with the fact that it was not dominant in the air transport market, 
albeit it was held to be dominant in the market for air travel agency services. In order to 
address this argument, the GC relied on the Commercial Solvents case where it was held 
that “it is in fact possible to distinguish the market in raw materials necessary for the 
manufacture of a product from the market on which the product is sold. An abuse of a 
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dominant position on the market in raw materials may thus have effects restricting 
competition in the market on which the derivatives of the raw material are sold […], even 
if the market for the derivative does not constitute a self-contained market”.758 This part of 
the decision in Commercial Solvents clearly demands the existence of a link between two 
markets, in which case the abuse of dominance in the upstream market affects competition 
in the downstream market. If this is the case, then a firm would be leveraging its upstream 
dominance into the downstream market. The GC interpreted the Commercial Solvents part 
of the decision by holding that “an abuse of a dominant position committed on the 
dominated product market, but the effect of which are felt in a separate market on which 
the undertaking concerned does not hold a dominant position may fall within [Article 102] 
provided that separate market is sufficiently closely connected to the first”.759 This 
interpretation is very broad because it omits the very core of the Commercial Solvents 
problem, i.e. that there was a raw material owned by the dominant firm in the upstream 
market without which competitors in the downstream market could not operate at all. This 
raw material was the necessary link between two markets. In the British Airways case, 
however, there is no obvious trace of such a strong link as in Commercial Solvents. BA 
was indeed very successful in its business; however, it was not dominant. The GC pointed 
out that air travel agents carry a function of a retailor in a way as almost eighty five per 
cent of BA tickets are sold via their services and that without the agents, BA would incur 
an absolute loss of business.
760
 In this case, BA was purchasing the air travel agency’s 
services; thereby, becoming a dominant purchaser. This leads only to one conclusion that 
the dominant component in this situation was the air travel agency as BA was in need of its 
services without which, again, it would lose most of its business. What remains unclear is 
how does the Commercial Solvents’ link between two markets rule fit in here? It was 
argued that one of the important facts about Commercial Solvents case was that “the 
dominant company was the only source of the raw materials in question in the EU and [the 
CJEU] specifically rejected claims that other nascent technologies in the trial stage were a 
substitute for Commercial Solvents’ raw materials”.761 There was no similar situation in 
the British Airways case. The inconsistencies in the British Airways case show that the GC 
aimed at establishing a link between two separate markets; thereby, finding BA dominant 
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and expanding the principle of the required link for two separate markets. The 
readjustment of the Commercial Solvents facts to prove the link between two markets, 
which otherwise are not as strongly connected as in the Commercial Solvents case, 
represents the flexibility used by the Commission and the courts in the application of 
Article 102. The Commercial Solvents judgement, itself, was criticised for being an 
example when “Article 102 being applied to protect the situation of the ‘small’ competitor 
with no consideration whatsoever of consumer welfare”.762 
British Airways is an example of a case where other factors were vital due to the low 
number of market shares. The flexibility in the assessment of a dominant position,
763
 the 
point mentioned earlier, is evidenced by the decision in the British Airways case. Despite 
the fact that dominance was not found in the primary market, the arguments the GC used to 
establish the connection between two markets are remarkable in the sense at they show that 
if the Commission and the courts set their minds to make a firm subject to Article 102, they 
will do so.  
6.1.6. Hilti764 
In this thesis, it was mentioned on several occasions that the size of a firm and its bigness 
would be exaggerated if a relevant market were narrowly delineated. In other words, a 
firm’s market status will stand out among its rivals and this especially applies to ‘other 
factors’ used for the analysis. Hilti is the best example of a very narrow, and if not specific, 
definition of a relevant market in addition to the importance the possession of IPRs have in 
the establishment of a dominant position.   
This case came before the GC on the application from Hilti AG (Hilti)
765
 against the Hilti 
Decision
766
 on 22 December 1987.
767
 The Commission found that Hilti abused its 
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dominant position in the market for nail guns and for the nails and cartridges stripes for 
those guns. Hilti was the largest producer of ‘powder-actuated fastening’ (PAF) nail guns, 
nails and cartridges stripes. The complaint was lodged before the Commission by Eurofix 
claiming that Hilti was pursuing a commercial strategy by refusing to supply independent 
dealers and distributors of Hilti products; thereby, excluding Eurofix from the market. The 
Commission found Hilti’s behaviour to be an abuse of its dominant position contrary to 
Article 102. 
Hilti argued that the Commission erred in concluding that the relevant market consisted of 
three markets, namely the markets in nail guns, cartridges strips (and cartridges) and nails. 
In Hilti’s opinion all these three markets should be a part of one (wider) market. The GC 
responded that “since cartridge strips and nails are specifically manufactured, and 
purchased by users, for a single brand of gun, it must be concluded that there are three 
separate markets for Hilti-compatible cartridge strips and nails”.768 This case raised the 
question of the substitutability of different products in the determination of the relevant 
market. It was argued that “it is a question of law whether (and to what extent) the 
substitutability of products is relevant to the determination of the relevant market, but 
measuring that substitutability in a particular case is a question in respect of which the 
[CJEU] will be very reluctant to intervene”.769 The substitutability of products analysis is 
the most important part in this respect; therefore, many cases have a thorough discussion of 
whether the products of the dominant firm can be substituted with its rivals’ products. The 
Commission is responsible for the economic analysis relevant to the products 
substitutability and it is up to the parties to argue that the analysis is incorrect. Hilti 
appealed to the CJEU against the GC’s upholding the Commission’s findings770 on the 
grounds that the GC erred in its economic assessment of the substitutability of the PAF 
system with other fastening products. The CJEU upheld the GC’s judgment without 
challenging its economic analysis of product substitutability. It was argued that “although 
[the CJEU] upheld [the GC’s] reasoning, this readiness to review the reasoning of [the GC] 
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indicates that [the CJEU] has not entirely abdicated responsibility for economic analysis to 
[the GC]”.771 
Based on the data and information collected, the Commission established that Hilti held a 
market share of about seventy to eighty per cent in the relevant market for nails. As was 
seen from the case-law discussed earlier, this market share is enough to establish dominant 
position in the relevant market. Normally, when a firm is found to hold seventy per cent of 
the market shares, neither the Commission nor the courts go into great details about other 
factors pertinent to dominant position. However, the GC decided to proceed further (in 
order to reinforce the finding of a dominant position) and held that the fact that Hilti held a 
patent and copyright
772
 over cartridge strips confirms the existence of Hilti’s dominant 
position. The GC continued and held that “it is highly improbable in practice that a non-
dominant supplier will act as Hilti did, since effective competition will normally ensure 
that the adverse consequences of such behaviour outweigh any benefits”.773 It was argued 
that Hilti “turned as a matter of law upon well-settled principles of product substitutability 
and as a matter of fact upon a factually unconvincing assertion of an objective justification 
for the applicant’s conduct”.774 
These are the main arguments as to why the Commission and the GC considered Hilti to be 
in a dominant position. The fact that the relevant market consisted of three different 
markets is an indication of the established practice of a narrow definition of the relevant 
market. The fact that Hilti’s patent and copyright were taken as additional factors in 
establishing dominance reflects on the long lasting debate on whether IPRs should be used 
as an indication of a dominant position.
775
 The importance of the GC’s comparison of 
Hilti’s behaviour with a non-dominant firm tells a lot about the position the GC took in this 
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case, showing the reliance of the court on the ability of effective competition to remedy the 
anti-competitive behaviour of a non-dominant firm. 
6.1.7. AKZO776 
AKZO UK (AKZO) was an economic entity which produced organic peroxides used in a 
plastic industry in the UK. The Commission found that AKZO had violated Article 102 by 
damaging its rival’s business and securing its withdrawal from the organic peroxides 
market.
777
   
In AKZO,
778
 the CJEU confirmed the Roche’s proposition of high market shares being a 
good indication of dominant position and held that AKZO was in a dominant position in 
the organic peroxides market with fifty per cent market shares.
779
 It was argued that fifty 
percent market shares, in an unsegmented industry, would not necessarily lead to 
dominance, as they may be “too small a share to affect the market price by independent 
action without immediate loss of market share”.780  The CJEU also took into account the 
fact that this figure did not decrease or fluctuate for many years.
781
 The market shares in 
AKZO were not extremely high; however, as it was argued that “in general, the more 
serious the abuse, the lower the required market share threshold”.782 In other words, if the 
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Commission decides that an abuse is of a very serious nature, then it would try to ensure 
that the first limb of Article 102 (dominance) is satisfied.  
In addition to market shares, the Commission relied on other various factors in support of 
its finding of a dominant position
783
 and the CJEU accepted those factors as being relevant 
in the assessment of AKZO’s dominant position. According to the CJEU, AKZO offered a 
wider range of products than its rivals; it was a world leader in the peroxides market; and 
AKZO had “the most highly developed marketing organization, both commercially and 
technically, and wider knowledge than that of their competitors with regard to safety and 
toxicology”.784 Therefore, for the purposes of Article 102, these factors, direct to the 
conclusion that AKZO was indeed a large firm. The combination of AKZO’s size of fifty 
percent market shares and its market status of a large firm led to AKZO being found to be 
in a dominant position by both the Commission and the CJEU. It was also argued that 
AKZO created a principle of the presumption of dominance in cases when a firm has 
market shares of fifty percent or more.
785
  
Therefore, fifty percent market share, which is a negligible number in US antitrust law, 
together with AKZO’s various advantages over its competitors ensured that the first limb 
of Article 102 was satisfied. The need to find and prove the existence of dominance was 
even more important due to the evidence of AKZO being involved in a predatory pricing 
which was a serious violation of Article 102.  Furthermore, as argued earlier, the flexibility 
in the definition of a dominant position allowed the Commission to declare AKZO 
dominant. For such reasons, AKZO becomes an example when the seriousness of the abuse 
leads to the necessity to establish dominance. What needs to be ensured is to avoid an 
adoption of a system of pre-emptive attacks on large firms with a size of above forty 
percent in order to eradicate any future violations of Article 102 and, possibly, to control 
an unrestrained growth of businesses in the EU internal market. 
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6.2. Final Observations 
From the cases discussed, it follows that the EU perceives dominance as an intangible 
property which could be used by its owner in a way which would go against the very core 
of the TFEU. The classic definition of dominance was crafted to fit in the image of the said 
property; however, disregarding the fact that, in reality, dominance varies. This is why this 
thesis believes that the definition of dominance is flexible, thereby, permitting the 
Commission and the courts to adjust the notion of dominance to an individual case for a 
tighter control of firms with economic power. The law which is in Article 102 cannot be 
amended, and it “remains permanently relevant and the best and indeed only direct 
statement of the law”.786 Indeed, the text of Article 102 covers all the necessary aspects 
relevant to find an abuse of a dominant position; however, leaving to the Commission and 
the courts to define dominance.  
The case study has revealed that despite the fact that the law is very clear on the primary 
tools used in the assessment of dominance, the way such tools are applied appears to be 
worrisome: The application of low market share threshold and a non-exhaustive list of 
privileges and advantages lead to a conclusion that EU competition law does, in fact, hold 
an antagonistic approach to firms in a dominant position. It was argued that the definition 
of a dominant position “does not take place within a consistent framework and therefore 
the approach provides no benchmark against which competing claims can be assessed”.787 
It should be kept in mind that this argument comes from the economists who always pro-
economic analysis of competition law. Yet, this argument reflects the uninformative nature 
of the definition of dominance.  
The antagonistic approach to dominance might have a deterrent effect which carries both 
positive and negative impact. The former is obvious, firms will take a considerable care not 
to violate EU competition in a fear of sanctions. The latter is reflected in the Commission’s 
enforcement strategy itself stifling competition in the internal market by preventing firms 
from making lawful business decisions in a fear of falling under Article 102 prohibition.  
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This will lead to consumers being deprived of new products, services, innovation and 
technological progress. In other words, competition will be stalled.      
Meanwhile, the CJEU in UBC did provide that,  
“The fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position cannot disentitle it 
from protecting its own commercial interests if they are attacked, and that 
such an undertaking must be conceded the right to take such reasonable 
steps as it deems appropriate to protect its said interests, such behaviour 
cannot be countenanced if its actual purpose is to strengthen this dominant 
position and abuse it”.788 
It is very important that the CJEU recognised the fact that any firm should be allowed to 
protect its commercial and financial interests. The burden is on the Commission to prove 
that the actual purpose of the firm’s actions is more than protection of its business 
interests; and there is a very fine line between the two. In UBC, the CJEU continued that 
“even if the possibility of a counter-attack is acceptable that attack must still be 
proportionate to the threat taking into account the economic strength of the undertakings 
confronting each other”.789 In this case, the burden is placed on a dominant firm to ensure 
that it knows its competitors and, therefore, plays accordingly. In other words, when 
competitors protect their market interests, there has to be equality in this game. However, 
this approach does not solve a problem or, in other words, does not tell either dominant or 
non-dominant firms how to abide the rules and avoid disproportionate commercial attacks 
on each other. It is unlikely that a dominant firm is going to assess the economic strength 
of its business opponent and, even if it is, almost any decision of a dominant firm could 
outweigh the decisions of a non-dominant firm. Therefore, although the CJEU’s approach 
is welcomed, it does not provide guidance on how a firm should use its dominant position. 
Furthermore, the case study did not reveal any discussion on the point that any firm was 
allowed to protect its commercial interests. Despite the CJEU’s holding above, the firm’s 
bigness is only seen as being another weapon against its competitors. For instance, the 
study of UBC had revealed that advertising campaign was one of the factors contributing to 
UBC’s bigness on a banana market. Successful advertising is one of the ways to respond to 
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competitors’ attacks and it is unfortunate that the CJEU did not take that into account. 
Despite the fact that advertising campaign was only briefly mentioned by the CJEU, the 
very presence of it in the ‘advantages over competitors’ list signifies the flexibility in the 
assessment of dominance.
790
  
There is no argument that the law on Article 102 is wrong; there is an argument, however, 
that the law does not offer much certainty and clarity on the application of the first limb of 
Article 102. The constant expansion of the rules and freedom the Commission enjoys in 
the application of the law on dominance signals a worrisome situation when successful 
firms might be punished for being pro-active and more successful on a relevant market. As 
it was argued that “the antitrust laws should intervene only when one combatant employs 
methods that would deny victory to the most efficient firm or create barricades to entry by 
equally or more efficient new entrants”791 and this point will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7. This statement applies to abuses of dominant position and, although both are 
assessed separately, they are clearly linked with each other.  
As for the terminology which was provided in Chapter 1, the EU case study has revealed 
that the word ‘size’ was mentioned albeit differently from the way it is used in US antitrust 
law. In Continental Can, the CJEU mentioned the size of a firm in the context of structural 
measures where the CJEU submitted that “structural measure may influence market 
conditions, it is increases the size and the economic power of the undertaking”.792 In UBC, 
the CJEU used the size of a firm in the context of the appropriate sanctions, i.e. the gravity 
and duration of an infringement and the size of a firm would be taken into account when 
setting out a fine for the violation of competition law rules.
793
  In Michelin I, the CJEU 
held that the gravity of an infringement would depend on a large number of factors which 
“may include in particular the size and economic strength of the undertaking, which may 
be indicated by the total turnover of the undertaking and the proportion of that turnover 
accounted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed”.794 In 
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British Airways, the Commission maintained that in order to find BA’s dominant position, 
it took into account various factors including “the size of BA, the range of its air transport 
services and its network”.795 The Commission then focused on market share of BA and its 
closest competitors.
796
  
Economists, at the meantime, want the EU courts to remember that dominance “is a 
concept related to time [i.e.] dominance is a position of power over time”.797 The 
Commission does not deny the application of time to this matter by providing that a firm 
which can profitably increase prices above the competitive level for a significant period of 
time could be regarded as dominant for the purposes of Article 102.
798
 This position is 
similar to the US where monopoly might only trigger the application of Section 2 if it was 
sustained for a considerable amount of time.
799
 Only in those situations, dominance and 
monopoly might have detrimental effects on a market, i.e. if a monopolist manages to keep 
his market foreclosed from new entrants for a long period of time.   
 
6.3. Conclusion 
The EU case study has significantly clarified the ambiguity in relation to whether a firm’s 
size and bigness play any role in the assessment of a dominant position. It was revealed 
that, for the purposes of Article 102, a firm’s size is measured by a market share threshold 
of forty percent and above which is enough for the Commission to assume that dominance 
exists. All technological and commercial advantages a firm has over its competitors are 
factors which point at the firm’s bigness on a relevant market. Or, in other words, such a 
firm is large which provides it with an opportunity to suppress its competitors. From the 
evidence gathered in Chapter 6, it is impossible to identify whether firms’ first attract the 
Commission’s attention due to the suspected involvement in anti-competitive practices; or, 
whether, they first attract the Commission’s attention by being dominant in a relevant 
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market. In either case, however, it becomes clear the firm’s size and bigness play a major 
role in the assessment of dominance. It is also impossible to identify whether, as provided 
at the beginning of this chapter, the Commission and the EU courts are willing to accept 
dominance as long as it is not being abused. However, the only conclusion which can be 
made is that a firm with market share below thirty nine percent and which has negligible 
advantages over its competitors is most likely to be accepted by the Commission and the 
EU courts. Or, in other words, such a firm is not dominant. There is no evidence, at the 
time of writing, if the Commission has ever dropped an investigation due to a firm not 
holding a dominant position. This is not surprising due to the low market share threshold 
and other factors, i.e. any firm which operates on a multinational level will be caught by 
Article 102. There is also no evidence of cases when, despite the existence of dominance, 
the Commission ends an investigation because it does not find an abuse. This, however, is 
only possible if the Commission has acted following a complaint. In any other case, with 
the Commission’s power to open an own-initiative investigation, there is a high probability 
that a firm may be targeted due to its dominant position.  
At this stage, it was also revealed that the Commission together with the EU courts hold an 
interventionist approach to firms in a dominant position. This conclusion was reached by 
the apparent flexibility in the way dominance is being assessed. The current formula for 
the assessment of dominance does not accommodate the possibility that if a firm’s bigness 
was achieved via legal means, then this fact should be taken into account and should not be 
held against such a firm. It is undisputable that all firms discussed in this chapter were 
involved in violations of antitrust rules; however, not every dominant firm is an abuser and 
the current interventionist approach will lead to a paranoid environment where dominant 
firms would abstain from making sensible business decisions in order to protect themselves 
from the application of EU competition rules. This, in turn, can set off a chain reaction that 
will lead firms to being afraid to grow on a market and, more importantly, to develop their 
products or services.  
Lastly, the ruling in Michelin I has revealed an interesting point: It transpired that 
dominance per se is not illegal; rather, a firm has a special responsibility not to abuse its 
dominant position. This resembles the position in US antitrust law where a monopoly per 
se is not unlawful unless there is an illegality or a wrongful intent. This is however, where 
the similarities end. In US antitrust law, a firm with market shares below seventy percent is 
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perceived as a potential legal monopolist and, frankly, a firm of such size is indisputably 
large. In other words, the monopolistic position of such firms is beyond any doubts. Under 
EU competition law, there seems to be no distinction between lawful and unlawful 
dominance, i.e. dominance either exists and it might be caught by Article 102 or it simply 
does not. Despite the special responsibility principle in Michelin I, the cases in Chapter 6 
did not provide any evidence to the contrary.  
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Chapter 7: The Case Against Google 
 
This is the penultimate chapter of this thesis which sums up the previous arguments and 
provides the final comparative analysis on the relevance of bigness and size in the 
assessment of dominance and monopoly.  
Previous chapters have focused on the role bigness and size play in EU competition law 
and US antitrust law. Both elements, as defined in Chapter 1, constitute dominance and 
monopoly for the purposes of Article 102 and Section 2. Market shares and a firm’s 
privileged position take a central role in EU competition law; whilst, US antitrust law does 
not include bigness into the assessment of the monopoly power.  
It has been repeated on many occasions that monopoly provides a firm with an opportunity 
to take a superior position on a relevant market which, if misused, will lead to consumer 
detriment. For such reasons, monopoly has a bad reputation. This research believes that 
monopoly and dominance per se should not be condemned as no evidence has been put 
forward to prove that dominance and monopoly are always detrimental to consumer 
welfare and economic efficiencies. In the modern days, bigness and size become 
representatives of a firm’s prosperity and not necessarily of an anti-competitive behaviour. 
Despite the fact that it was made clear in Chapter 1 that this research was neither pro- nor 
anti-bigness, this chapter does offer some discussion on the potential benefits of having 
large firms in a market. It was provided earlier that it was difficult to decide whether 
bigness and size would benefit a market unless a separate study of each industry was 
carried out.
800
 Therefore, this part of the chapter is rather neutral; however, it will be linked 
with the current proceedings against Google.  
The important part about the case against Google, which contributed to the decision to 
include it into this thesis, lies in the fact that the same corporation was investigated in the 
EU and US on the same facts, albeit with a different end results. Since this chapter has a 
comparative angle, the proceedings against Google are hoped to reflect further the 
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disparity between the system behind the application of Article 102 and Section 2 to firms 
with market power.  
 
7.1. Bigness and Size Revisited 
As was defined in Chapter 1, bigness and size are the important elements of dominance. It 
was concluded that in EU competition law, size and bigness matter in the assessment of a 
dominant position, whilst in US antitrust law, size remains the focal indication of 
monopoly and market power. Bigness, on the other hand, does not play a considerable role 
in the establishment of monopoly albeit not in the cases selected for the purposes of this 
research.
801
 More importantly, it was revealed
802
 that US antitrust law distinguishes 
between legal and illegal monopoly where the latter is being a subject of prohibition under 
Section 2. EU competition law, on the other hand, does not differentiate between legal and 
illegal dominance; therefore, all dominant firms are potential subjects to Article 102.
803
  
EU competition law and US antitrust law both have different bases for dominance and 
monopoly. The Commission, for instance, sees dominance as “physical facilities-based 
monopolies originally derived from public franchise […], while the US authorities have 
been largely ignoring these old-fashioned monopolists and focused instead on new-idea 
created monopolies (Microsoft, Google, etc)”.804 
Despite the difficulty in defining bigness,
805
 this research concluded that, in the context of 
antitrust law, bigness is all privileges and advantages a firm has over its rivals. It can also 
be described as “repositories of power, the biggest centres of nongovernmental power in 
our society”806 and, as was evidenced by the case law in Chapters 5 and 6, bigness relates 
to private economic power which can have a devastating impact on markets, consumers, 
economics, technological progress, inter-firm rivalry and a society unlike their smaller and 
less powerful competitors.  If such a firm decides to abuse or monopolise, then the 
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magnitude of the economic and anti-competitive harm will be much higher and more 
damaging to consumer welfare. This is so because bigness
807
 strengthens a firm’s market 
power which, in turn, transforms into economic, political and social power.
808
 Such an 
undesirable level of power has a potential to become an obstacle to the promotion of 
economic efficiency and protection of consumer welfare which are the core aims of 
antitrust law.
809
 Furthermore, bigness has an adverse reputation because it used to be 
employed by some private firms
810
 to stifle competition leading to bigness and monopoly 
becoming almost synonyms.
811
  
It transpires that bigness and size used to concern US antitrust law in the past,
812
 
 
whilst, 
EU competition law appears to be concerned about bigness and size in the present.
 813
 
Lilienthal provided that the reason why bigness carried a negative meaning was in the fact 
that it could lead to an increased concentration of economic power as it became “too big to 
handle”.814 Therefore, Theodore Roosevelt believed that with the passage of the Sherman 
Act, he found a solution to the big business problem by accepting it “as a part of the 
modern industrial and social order” and to subject it “to administrative control under full 
publicity”.815 The idea of having powerful monopolists being publicly tried and their 
businesses dismantled is still in place nowadays albeit under a different façade.
816
 In any 
case, US antitrust authorities have developed a presumption that “what a dominant firm 
does (if it acts alone and not with competitors) is almost always good for the market […] 
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EU law, on the other hand, places a special responsibility on dominant firms, and values 
contestability of markets by entrants’ and mavericks’ competition on the merits”.817 
Multinational corporations are the best examples of the modern day dominant firms which 
include both bigness and size. However, it was argued that “the conception of monopolistic 
industry as a kind of gigantic, swelling leech on the body of an increasingly deprived and 
impoverished society has largely disappeared”.818 Such firms, however, remain a potential 
threat to the very aims of antitrust law because larger and wealthier firms normally have 
more means at their disposal to engage in anticompetitive practices but “the violation of 
law lies not in their size and wealth, but in the improper use which has been made 
thereof”.819 
The application of economics to the assessment of dominance and monopoly had a 
considerable effect on the evolution of antitrust law: It was argued that “the consciously 
evolutionary quality of the US antitrust statutes, with their implicit recognition of the need 
to adjust doctrine over time in light of experience and new learning, gives economists 
considerable power to influence competition law and policy”.820 It is, partly, due to 
economics that US antitrust law stopped perceiving monopoly as a menace. The 
acknowledgment of the importance economics plays in antitrust law along with the 
development of US antitrust authorities’ and courts’ understanding of current economic 
and market realities, had delinked antitrust from its history.
821
 Lilienthal, however, is of the 
opinion that the economic success of the US rests upon big businesses and “size is our 
greatest single functional asset”.822 Lilienthal considered big corporations as being at the 
core of market and technological development; therefore, urging both the government and 
the society to recognise the benefits of big business.  
Despite the recognition, at least in US antitrust law, that monopoly per se does not violate 
antitrust law, EU competition law is still circumspect when it comes to dominant firms. 
The question asked in Chapter 1 remains open, i.e. what are the reasons behind the 
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Commission’s antagonistic approach to firms with economic power? One of the 
explanations is that the EU was created from several countries with various internal 
barriers. As a result of this, local and government-owned monopolies were the 
predominant features of a newly created entity; therefore, “there may be more undertakings 
with dominant positions that are not the natural result of market dynamics that exist in the 
US”.823 It is understandable that trade barriers in a newly created internal market had to be 
demolished in order to fulfil the purpose of European competition law project.
824
 The EU 
Treaty (and all its previous versions) aimed at establishing an economic environment 
where all firms were allowed to compete on the merits and where the EU internal market 
was free from power, privilege, or favouritism.
825
 It is interesting how ‘favouritism’ is 
considered to be one of the features of the EU internal market. The Commission’s 
enforcement priorities reflect the protection of SMEs from the aggressive competition of 
dominant firms, i.e. favouritism is present, at least in EU competition law. Furthermore, 
historically, the economy of the EU had always been more monopolised than that of the 
US, therefore, leading to the EU’s “competitive self-righting mechanisms [being] less 
robust”.826 This is why the Commission retains flexibility in its assessment of a dominant 
position since it appears that the EU internal market is more diverse and complex in 
comparison with the US market. 
As was shown in the previous chapters, US antitrust law’s market share thresholds can 
only be described as generous albeit it was argued that in the US there is no fixed market 
share required for finding monopoly as the percentage of a market share varies with the 
market in question.
827
 When it comes to their application to the alleged monopolist, it was 
argued that “on economic as well as legal grounds, monopoly power should not be deemed 
to exist unless the exclusionary conduct contributes to the acquisition or maintenance of 
not only a power to raise marketwide prices or produce marketwide foreclosure but also a 
defendant market share of over 50%”.828 This is the evidence that the connection between 
the status and an anti-competitive action is of paramount importance in US antitrust law. 
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Therefore, a monopoly power will be held to be illegal if a firm strengthens its 
monopolistic position and, subsequently, increases its market shares
829
 by illegal and 
abusive behaviour. 
In EU competition law the situation is similar, i.e. a possession of a considerably high 
percentage of market shares will signal the presence of a firm with market power.
830
 It was 
argued that in the EU “a true monopolist is a dominant firm but most dominant firms aren’t 
monopolists”.831 This argument is correct; however, it depends on what the Commission 
perceives as a true monopolist. It should be noted that EU competition law does not require 
a firm to be a true monopolist; rather, a certain level of dominance would suffice
832
 for 
Article 102 to be triggered. It was discussed in the previous chapters that forty percent 
market share threshold is not a very high percentage to define dominance, for which reason 
the Commission and the courts turn to privileges and advantages of a firm to support the 
existence of a dominant position. The decision of whether a firm is a true monopolist or 
not will depend, to a certain extent, on the boundaries of a relevant market
833
  and, the 
Commission is required to conduct a separate and independent analysis of a relevant 
market every time it applies Article 102.
834
 This will bring novelty to the assessment of 
dominance every time the Commission delineates the relevant market. The EU is argued to 
be less tolerant toward certain conduct because “aggressive acts toward competitors are 
looked upon with suspicion, and so are any dealings with suppliers and customers that 
enhance the firm’s competitive position”.835 The Commission’s distrust of aggressive 
competition
836
 can be contrasted with the position in the US where, as concluded in 
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Chapter 3, antitrust authorities and the Supreme Court permit and even encourage firms to 
compete aggressively.  Aggression toward competitors might be the evidence of a vigorous 
competitive process or aggression might also be the result of a firm’s powerful market 
position which is utilised in order to suppress competition. This thesis believes that 
aggressive competition per se has never been unlawful and should never be automatically 
considered as being harmful as long as it does not affect consumer welfare. In fact, the first 
parties which get affected by aggressive competition are smaller (and less powerful) rivals 
because of “an implicit assumption that any practice that is undertaken by a dominant firm 
and that is not a ‘normal’ competitive action has the effect of distorting competition”.837 
This explains the Commission’s distrust of aggressive actions of a dominant firm838 due to 
its veiled concerns over the protection of SMEs.
839
 Furthermore, with the current position 
of the Commission it is very difficult to identify a list of ‘normal competitive actions’ 
which will escape the application of Article 102. Moreover, the general concerns that the 
position of the Commission toward bigness and size may lead to the reduction of 
incentives to compete continue to flourish because “businesses should not be punished 
merely because they have, through their hard work, succeeded in capturing a large share of 
the market”.840 As was already discussed, US antitrust law recognises the importance to 
separate unlawful conduct from purely successful business tactics
841
 but EU competition 
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law is still slightly unclear on this matter. If this separation does not exist then firms will be 
punished not for their anticompetitive conduct but for being in a privileged position.  It was 
argued that “the European antitrust authorities are prepared to accept ‘dominance’; but 
draw the line at conduct which can cause economic harm if that dominance is abused”.842 
This research agrees with this argument only to a certain extent because, at the time of 
writing, no evidence is found where dominance was allowed by EU competition law.
843
   
It has already been argued
844
 that in US antitrust law, mere size is not illegal because “not 
all monopoly is proscribed”.845 It could be extremely difficult to identify whether a firm is 
‘too large’ for a relevant market because if a relevant market is narrowed down to a very 
specific product or service then “which is small by ordinary concepts may become a 
giant”.846  It was suggested that the most plausible way to learn whether a firm was being 
too large, was to apply the test of experience which could show what happened to a market 
and competition after a firm had gained its size.
847
 It was concluded that “upon this 
pragmatic test of ‘works’ that our concerns should be concentrated, rather than in abstract 
and dogmatic condemnation of size as such”.848 The Supreme Court does recognise 
situations when monopoly was achieved via efficiency, granted by the government or 
thrust upon a firm.
849
 These situations, however, do not lead to an automatic misapplication 
of Section 2; rather, to a further investigation and examination of factors pertinent to a 
case.
850
 The US has never denied the fact that bigness carries certain benefits with it 
despite its obvious goal to eradicate unlawful monopolisation. This goal, however, is not 
antagonistic to big business as “its contribution to the national welfare, both in peace and 
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war, is recognised by all […] big business, too, has a tremendous stake in the maintenance 
of competition”.851 
Bigness and size can have beneficial effects on a market “as size appears to be directly 
proportional to technical innovation” as “only large firms can afford to spend the money 
needed in research and development”.852 This argument has a truth behind it, i.e. large 
firms have more resources to invest in the product development or innovation. However, 
this argument is based on the premise that bigness and size equal wealth; therefore, large 
firms will be in the possession of more resources simply because they can afford it. On the 
other hand, it was argued that technological development, innovations and other types of 
progressiveness “vary in nature and degree with sizes of businesses but none can rightfully 
claim this progressiveness is imputable solely to enterprise of a given scale”.853 This 
provides that size on its own could not firmly indicate whether a firm benefits or harms a 
market. In fact, it was further argued that many economists have conflicting views as to 
what “is optimum business size or scale in relation to efficiency and economy and the 
conflict of data regarding the casual relation between business size and actual or potential 
contribution to the economy”.854  
It was already argued that bigness had become a synonym to monopoly
855
 due to the 
infamous history behind the behaviour of large and powerful firms, at least in the US.
856
 
Various perceptions exist on the way bigness affects markets and consumers, depending on 
interests of the stakeholders. A large firm, a small firm, a consumer and antitrust 
authorities would all have different conceptions of bigness and its effects.
857
 It does not 
actually matter which party’s perception is the right one as this is not what antitrust law is 
eager to achieve. What matters though is to strike a fair balance
858
 between large and small 
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businesses,
 859
 large firm’s profits and fair share of it for consumers,860 large firm’s actions 
and effective competition. It was argued,
861
 for instance, that the main characteristics of a 
large firm are “large research laboratories and […] mass production methods” which all 
provide consumers with “an ever-expanding variety of new products, of constantly 
increasing quality, and at a lower price”.862 The fact that consumers would be paying lower 
prices for the products offered by large firms was meant in terms of the buying power of an 
hour of labour.
863
 This view on bigness comes from a stakeholder whose interests lie in the 
support of a more relaxed attitude toward large firms in the US.
864
 This, once again, shows 
that views on bigness vary in accordance with the interests of various stakeholders.  
Google is a classic modern example of a firm which combines it all, i.e. size, bigness, 
power, access to capital, large research centres and, more importantly, a well-known 
reputation as a leading provider of internet search services around the world. Frankly, it 
was a matter of time before Google had to face antitrust investigations into its business 
practices before both the EU and US antitrust authorities.  
 
7.2. The Case against Google 
The current proceeding against Google is the most recent example of the way EU 
competition law deals with dominant firms allegedly abusing the EU internal market. More 
importantly, the US law opened a proceeding against Google on the same grounds as the 
EU, albeit, with a different end result.  
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In November 2010,
865
 the EU Commission opened a formal investigation against Google 
under Article 102.
866
 It was the first time the Commission was involved in the investigation 
of the online search market. The Commission made it clear that its aims were to ensure that 
online users were provided with a choice; however, concluding that competition law was 
not an adequate instrument “to impose on Google a specific algorithm or to prevent Google 
from improving its services if it wishes to do so […] nor can the Commission act in this 
case as a regulator for all the issues arising in the online world or raised by stakeholders 
regarding Google”.867 The Commission’s acknowledgment of Google’s right to choose its 
own way to run its search algorithm cannot go unnoticed because too much interference, as 
expressed by some stakeholders, might deter innovation and raise concerns of “government 
control over access to information and speech”.868 
In February 2014, several attempts were made between Google and the Commission to 
settle the case with Google offering concessions
869
 which were decided not to be enough to 
remedy the Commission’s concerns. Joaquin Almunia said that the objective of the 
Commission was to ensure that Google’s competitors had a chance to compete fairly with 
Google’s own online search services and what the Commission wanted Google to do was 
to “give rivals a prominent space on Google’s search results, in a visual format which 
attract users”.870 This is a good example of the position in EU competition law where a 
dominant firm has to ensure that its rivals have an access to a dominant firm’s product or 
service to enable them to compete on a given market. It is true that Google is in a position 
of being able to cut out all competition due to its dominant market position; therefore, it is 
undeniable that Google carries a certain level of responsibility to ensure that it does not 
abuse its dominance. However, it is also true that there are a numerous number of online 
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search engines and it is a matter of personal taste which engine to use for online search, i.e. 
it becomes a consumer choice. At this stage, it seems that the Commission’s decision is 
more likely to benefit Google’s competitors rather than consumers. This is further evidence 
of the Commission’s enforcement policy to favour smaller competitors871 by ensuring they 
are protected from larger and, respectively, more powerful rivals. It was argued that in 
recent years the Commission was prioritising only those cases where abuse of dominance 
clearly and undeniably led to the consumer harm; however, in the case against Google, it 
was less obvious leading to the possibility that the Commission was supporting various 
competitors against Google.
872
 
In April 2015, the Commission sent Statement of Objections (SO) to Google arguing that 
Google might be abusing its dominant position in contravention to Article 102.
873
 Two 
separate investigations were launched into comparison shopping and the way Google was 
handling various mobile applications installed into Android operating system.
874
 According 
to the Commission, Google has over ninety per cent market shares in most EEA 
countries;
875
 therefore, making Google almost a monopolist. Google, on its official blog, 
accepted the fact that it was being the most used search engine; however, adding that 
“people can now find and access information in numerous different ways—and allegations 
of harm, for consumers and competitors, have proved to be wide of the mark”.876 Google, 
therefore, did not deny its dominance on the EU market albeit arguing that consumers’ 
choice is not limited to Google search engine only, as internet has various other available 
options. It was argued that the way the Commission, at this stage, approached market 
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definition
877
 remained unclear but the Commission seemed to focus on “Google’s position 
as a provider of organic search results”.878 It was concluded that “market definition and 
market power assessment should account for both sides of the market, which involved 
identifying the set of buyers and advertisers/sellers to whom a certain competitive concern 
may relate to as well as their substitutes to Google”.879 Despite Google’s ninety percent 
market shares, the assessment of market power might not be very straightforward. The 
measurement of market power in a two-sided market
880
 might require a very careful 
analysis as dominance in one side of a market might not necessarily signify dominance in 
another. The difficulty in the assessment of market power lies in the fact that an application 
of the classic definition of dominance
881
 is not really applicable to Google. This is so due 
to the fact that Google (and other search engines) allow their end-users to conduct a 
general search for free, for which reasons, “Google’s market power cannot be measured by 
a departure between the actual price and the competitive price over a sufficiently long 
period of time”.882 It was argued that market shares and barriers will only be relevant in the 
assessment of a dominant position if “great care is exercised in examining the quality of 
the services provided and the costs of switching”.883 The importance lies in the fact that, 
technically, consumers or end-users do not pay for using Google’s general search and, 
therefore, there are no switching costs at all. The end-users, as noted above, can easily 
choose which internet search engine to use so it might lead to an assumption that it is their 
choice to keep using Google’s search engine. Their choice might depend on the fact that 
either Google provides better quality search or the end-users are just unwilling
884
 to switch 
to a different search engine. It was argued that if it is the former, then the lack of switching 
would be “evidence of competition on the merits [and if] the latter, the question is whether 
irrational consumer behaviour can be taken into account in the assessment of 
dominance”.885 Including the behaviour of a consumer886 into the analysis of a dominant 
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position would undermine legal certainty
887
 especially when competition law does not have 
any tests for the assessment of the rationality of a consumer.   
In June 2011, the FTC
888
 also started an official investigation into Google’s actions in 
online markets. In January 2013, the FTC confirmed that Google did, in fact, take 
aggressive actions to gain advantages over its competitors; however, Google’s display of 
its own content on the internet search results was viewed by the FTC to be “an 
improvement in the overall quality of Google’s search product”889 and not as an aggressive 
anti-competitive act to eliminate competition in an online market. For such reasons, the 
FTC decided not to proceed further because “the FTC’s mission is to protect competition, 
and not individual competitors […] the evidence did not demonstrate that Google’s actions 
in this area stifled competition in violation of US law”.890  Or, in other words, for the FTC 
to being able to bring a case against Google it had to show “actionable harm”, 891 i.e. that 
there was a valid consumer harm on a relevant market and not  merely unfavourable 
competition conditions for Google’s competitors. It was argued, inter alia, that one of the 
reasons why Google was not caught by the FTC was due to the First Amendment
892
 which 
makes search results being protected under the free speech principle.
893
 Google’s reliance 
on the First Amendment coupled with US antitrust authorities’ more relaxed approach 
                                                                                                                                                                                
886
 Default position in competition law is that a consumer is taken as being a rational person—see, Chapter 3.  
887
 Nazzini, R., “Google and the (Ever-Stretching) Boundaries of Article 102 TFEU”, at p.307.  
888
 It should be noted that the FTC had started investigation against Google under Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Act 1914. Section 5, in this context, is applicable when the FTC believes that the actions of a firm 
apply ‘unfair method of competition’ and the promotion of consumer welfare lies at the heart of the FTC 
enforcement priorities. Section 5 is also known as a way to fill a gap in those cases where the actions of a 
firm are anticompetitive but they do not exactly fit into the prohibition under the Sherman Act. There is not 
going to be any discussion of the application of Section 5 FTCA to antitrust matters; however, the 
importance and the relevance of the FTC’s analysis of Google’s market behaviour cannot be avoided. The 
possibility still exists though that if it was the DOJ which investigated Google under Section 2 then the 
outcome might have been different. However, it was the FTC which initially investigated Microsoft and the 
case was only picked up by the DOJ after the FTC’s deadlock in 1993. This time, the FTC unanimously 
agreed on Google’s actions not being against consumer welfare, therefore, deciding to end the investigation.  
At the time of writing, the DOJ have not commented on the FTC’s decision not to proceed any further 
against Google.  
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toward monopoly led Google to offering certain changes to a display of its search results 
and, subsequently, avoiding  antitrust liability.  Many stakeholders were not satisfied with 
the FTC’s outcome of the investigation against Google894 arguing that “their problems 
competing with Google are cognisable antitrust problems rather than the consequences of 
vigorous competition, shifting consumer demand, and their own business decisions”.895 In 
other words, their complaints were based on the concerns that Google should have been 
investigated under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and not under the Section 5 of the 
FTCA.
896
  
Therefore, with the FTC closing the investigation against Google and the Commission 
issuing SO, keeping in mind that both antitrust authorities had dealt with the same issues, 
the differences in an approach toward treatment and assessment of market power here 
could not be ignored.
897
 One of the explanations behind such an outcome for Google lies, 
among others, in the fact that Google has almost ninety percent market share in the EU 
market in comparison with only sixty-five per cent in the US market. Such a percentage of 
market shares would even be enough to trigger the presumption of monopoly in the US, let 
alone in the EU where, as already discussed, market shares above forty per cent are 
regarded as a likely indication of a dominant position. Therefore, with high market shares 
being the indication of a firm’s size in the assessment of dominance, Google’s market 
position is much stronger in the EU online market than in the US.  
                                                          
894
 The FTC’s decision not to proceed with the case against Google was heavily criticised, with many 
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Google plays an important and inseparable role in the new economy market
898
 where it 
holds a primary and very strong position in the technology and innovation industry. This 
fact is undeniable. When it comes to new economy industries, innovation drives a 
competitive process there and leading firms could gain large market shares due to the 
“winner-takes-most” principle.899 In order to be able to keep their market shares, such 
firms should be constantly innovating and once they stop, their market shares will be lost 
to their competitors. The dynamic on such markets is very different; therefore, any firm 
may lose its market position very quickly. Therefore, by using market share as an 
indication of dominance in the new economy markets might hamper innovation and stifle 
competition. It was also argued that the special responsibility principle
900
 in EU 
competition law could have negative repercussions on the new economy because “it 
prevents companies with high market shares (which nevertheless are under competitive 
threat and do not have the power to act independently of competitors and customers) to 
compete vigorously on an equal footing with their rivals”.901 The reason behind this 
argument lies in the fact that if deriving the presence of dominance purely based on the 
high market shares is not the correct approach for the new economy markets, then firms 
which gained their market position due to their innovation and R&D would be unfairly 
prevented to compete. Furthermore, Google is an undeniably large firm: Its resources and 
privileges overs its competitors will be taken into account by the Commission since it has 
become an established practice in the assessment of a dominant position.  
                                                          
898
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The Commission commented on the differences in approach toward the case against 
Google by reminding the stakeholders that, in the US web search market, Bing and Yahoo 
(with the combined market share of around thirty percent) impose competitive constraints 
on Google while the position in the EU is entirely different. The Commission continued 
that the EU web search market relies on Google; therefore, “given the resulting 
commercial significance of Google for specialised search services, the way Google 
presents its web search results therefore has a much more significant impact on users and 
on the competitive process in Europe than it does in the USA”.902 Meanwhile, users or 
consumers would be limited in their choice to look for other specialised search services, 
which are in competition with Google and which might also contain relevant 
information.
903
 Such a situation is seen by the Commission as being a consumer harm; 
however, acknowledging that it is the consumers’ decision which websites to use for their 
online search. In addressing the comments about the FTC’s decision to close the case 
against Google, Michael Jennings
904
 told Reuters that “we have taken note of the FTC 
decision, but we do not see that it has any direct implications for our investigation, for our 
discussion with Google”.905 Therefore, the EU was very straightforward in distinguishing 
an investigation against Google in the EU and US, making it clear that the Commission has 
its own (unrelated to the FTC) opinion on Google’s alleged abuse of a dominant position.  
Clearly, the Commission has different reasons for holding Google as being dominant and, 
frankly, the Commission has all evidence to prove it. Google does have about ninety 
percent market share in the EU market; sunk costs in developing algorithm might become 
barriers to entry; customers’ preference of Google’s services; and Google brand has 
actually become a verb which could also lead to network effects with people choosing 
Google over other search engines and which, in turn, places Google into a privileged and 
advantageous position over its rivals. For such reasons, Google satisfies both elements of 
dominance, i.e. size and bigness. In other words, Google’s powerful and prominent market 
position cannot be denied; however, it does not necessarily mean that Google unlawfully 
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exploits its market power in order to suppress competition. As argued earlier, in this case, a 
link between dominance and its abuse should exist. In the US, for instance, antitrust law 
requires a link between monopoly power and monopolisation. Article 102, it was argued, 
does not require such a connection because it “makes the illegal act the ‘abuse…of a 
dominant position,’ and thus focuses on whether any dominant market power that already 
exists was improperly used”.906 It follows that the US recognises the strong connection 
between monopoly and monopolisation where the unlawful conduct might lead to market 
power which, in turn, would lead to higher prices to the consumers’ detriment. The EU was 
criticised for having a different perspective on the way dominance should be assessed 
because “when a firm uses proper conduct to create something sufficiently more valuable 
than existing market options to enjoy dominant market power, then any high prices it earns 
are the proper social reward for that creation, and the denial of that reward by E.C. law 
seems […] unsound”.907 This is a very valid point because with the current interventionist 
approach,
908
 the Commission does not give firms any freedom to grow and it denies firms 
an opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labour. This, as argued in Chapter 4, can lead to a 
consumer detriment because firms’ incentives to innovate, produce, invent and compete 
are hampered by the overly broad and flexible definition of a dominant position.  It was 
argued that “it is relatively easy for a large and successful firm to meet the preconditions 
for a dominant status [therefore], many or even most, large and successful firms will fall 
into the category of ‘dominant’ firms”.909 Such a practice has rooted in the core analysis of 
Article 102.  
In February 2015, US President Barak Obama “warned Europe against making 
‘commercially driven’ decisions to penalise companies like Google and Facebook”.910 The 
criticism that the EU was pursuing an anti-American protectionist policy was rejected by 
the Commission
911
 which argued that “political pressure had played no part in the decision 
to accuse Google [as] nationality and successful market domination were not issues for 
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[the Commissioner], only the abuse of market power”.912 This could be tied up with an 
earlier argument that politics could play an important role in the interpretation of antitrust 
law.
913
 It is unlikely that the Commission is pursuing an anti-American policy. However, 
the suspicion that it is probably lies in the fact that the US is the birthplace of corporations, 
for instance, on a global level Apple is, once again, the world’s largest firm with a market 
value of $725bn in the technology hardware and equipment sector.
914
 Google is currently 
on the fourth place, while Microsoft is on the fifth.
915
 It should be noted that, according to 
the ranking, seven out of ten top largest firms have originated in the US. Globalisation has 
most certainly led bigness to become an indication of global success with a considerable 
amount of power in the hands of a holder, at least in the US markets. With the world being 
involved in a trade which could go beyond national borders with firms having its 
subsidiaries opened in various countries, bigness can sometimes take a form of 
multinational corporations in respect of which size is measured by various factors like 
revenues, profits and market value.  
The difference between the EU and US in relation to Google adds another piece of 
evidence on the disparity in the treatment of monopoly and dominance in the EU and US. 
It cannot go unnoticed that Google does have ninety percent of the EU market and only 
sixty five percent of the US market. Ninety percent market share would even trigger the 
presumption of monopoly under US antitrust law so the position of the Commission is 
understandable. However, the Commission’s comment that Google has two competitors 
with a combined market share of thirty percent places competitive constraints on Google 
behaviour in the US cannot go unnoticed. This comment gives an assumption that if 
Google had sixty five percent of the market and two direct competitors then the 
Commission would not have been concerned. Such a scenario is highly unlikely. The 
Commission would still have taken the case against Google further because the only 
difference between Google’s market position in the EU and US is that with ninety percent 
market share the Commission has a stronger case to establish the existence of a dominant 
position.  
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7.3. Conclusion 
This penultimate chapter provided the final comparative analysis on bigness and size in the 
context of monopoly and dominance. Monopoly and dominance, as was discussed, place a 
firm into a privileged position and grants it with an opportunity to employ its power to the 
detriment of consumers and economic efficiency. The history behind the abuse of power 
and monopolisation has made bigness and monopoly synonyms and this fact explains why 
bigness is considered to be an undesirable feature of a market.  
This picture of bigness and size being associated with monopoly and dominance is, 
however, a general one in a sense that it will always depend on which party and 
jurisdiction is discussing it. As was argued throughout this thesis, US antitrust law does not 
perceive monopoly as being harmful per se and this chapter reaffirms those arguments. In 
addition it provided yet another comparative analysis of the treatment of monopoly and 
dominance in the US and EU and concluded that US antitrust law accepts dominance as a 
positive reality of a market performance unless it is proved otherwise. EU competition law, 
on the other hand, places a special responsibility on dominant firms, thereby, creating a 
presumption that dominance cannot be trusted. This means that the Commission and the 
courts are so suspicious of dominant firms that they automatically place restrictions on 
them even before such firms start engaging in anti-competitive practices. Therefore, in the 
EU, once a firm starts growing it gets a special responsibility placed on it in addition to its 
business development and prosperity being used as an additional evidence of dominance.  
It becomes of paramount importance to find out why the Commission pursues such a 
policy by making dominant firm inherently harmful. This chapter concluded that the main 
reason behind the distrust toward dominance lies in the fact that the EU was created from 
the number of countries and the eradication of internal barriers was incorporated in the 
aims behind the creation of the EU project. These internal barriers, as discussed, led to 
more local monopolies, therefore the EU used to have less natural, union-wide monopolies 
than the US.  
It was also argued in Chapter 3 that the Commission, despite its arguments to the contrary, 
does protect smaller competitors. This chapter took this argument further and concluded 
that the Commission does not trust aggressive actions on the part of dominant firms 
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because it is smaller competitors which are mostly affected by the aggressive business 
practices. This research believes that aggressive competition is healthy competition and if 
the Commission suppresses lawful competitive actions of dominant firms to protect SMEs 
then it, by implication, also supresses the firms’ incentives to compete. This will result in 
damage to consumer welfare and economic efficiency.  
In spite of the fact that this research is neutral toward dominance and monopoly, it was 
deemed important to discuss the benefits of having large firms on a market. Bigness and 
size or dominance and monopoly per se should not be labelled harmful and illegal as large 
firms do have access to large financial resources to invest into R & D and for some 
industries
916
 these qualities are important in order to progress innovation and product 
development.  
It was also highlighted in this chapter that multinational corporations are the prime 
examples of the modern type of monopolies and Google is one of such corporations. The 
current proceedings against Google in the EU are the final pieces of evidence which 
highlight the divergence between the EU and US. The case is still at the stage of SO; 
therefore, not enough information is available. What is important, or rather interesting, is 
how Google was investigated on the same facts by both the FTC and the Commission with 
the former dropping the case as no ‘actionable harm’ was found to make Google subject to 
antitrust law. The main difference between the US and EU was in the fact that Google had 
ninety percent market shares in the EU and only sixty five in the US. The Commission 
relied on this fact to justify its decision to initiate investigation against Google. This, 
however, was rejected by this chapter because even if Google had sixty five percent market 
shares in the EU, the Commission would still have sent the SO. And, it was argued that the 
Commission’s decision will protect Google’s competitors rather than its consumers.  
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, was to collect certain arguments discussed in the 
previous chapters, provide a further comparative analysis, highlight the fact that monopoly 
and dominance per se are not inherently detrimental and, finally, to link it with the case 
against Google in order to reinforce the earlier findings that the Commission of the 
European Union does hold an antagonistic approach to dominant firms in order to promote 
consumer welfare, progress economic efficiency and, more interestingly, protect SMEs.  
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Chapter 8:   Conclusion  
“We made no serious attempts to stop monopoly—certainly no intelligent 
attempt; partly because we lacked knowledge, partly because we lacked 
desire; for we had a sneaking feeling that perhaps, after all, a private 
monopoly might be a good thing, and we had no adequate governmental 
machinery to employ for this purpose”—Louis D. Brandeis.917 
 
In this last chapter of the thesis conclusions will be set out which assist in providing 
answers to the questions posed in Chapter 1.  
As was stated in Chapter 1, the famous essay of Louis D. Brandeis on the influence of big 
business on US markets and industries has inspired this research. In his essay, he argued 
that bigness could never be beneficial for markets and, therefore, it should be eradicated by 
sound and strong antitrust system. The essay Curse of Bigness
918
 was published in 1934 
and it still remains a very influential piece of literature, especially for the proponents of the 
regulation of monopolies. Thus, as mentioned above, the purpose of this research is to 
assess how much influence a firm’s bigness and size has on the assessment of monopoly 
and dominance in the US and EU. Or, in other words, whether the common prejudice, if 
not abhorrence, toward large firms with economic power is reflected in the way antitrust 
rules are being enforced by the two regimes, and in particular by the EU.  
In Chapter 1, it was submitted that a firm’s dominance and monopoly has two constituent 
parts: size and bigness. A firm’s size is measured by its share of a relevant market. A 
firm’s bigness, meanwhile, is assessed by the non-exhaustive list of ‘other factors’ in its 
possession which may include IPRs, access to capital, advertising, economies of scale, 
R&D, brand reputation, access and ownership of facilities, control of production, and 
vertical integration. These factors are also considered by antitrust law to pose barriers to 
entry or expansion, whilst this research groups them as commercial privileges and 
advantages a firm has over its competitors. Irrespective of the name, ‘other factors’ do 
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demonstrate the firm’s commercial and productive capacity and superiority over its rivals. 
Therefore, the firm which has both size and bigness is considered to be large in the context 
of this research.  
In order for Article 102 and Section 2 to apply, two elements should be present: a 
dominant position with abuse or a monopoly power with monopolisation, respectively. 
Dominance and monopoly, as examined in this thesis, are not interchangeable where the 
former is a term used in EU competition law and the latter is applied in US antitrust law. 
Both, however, relate to an economic entity which has market power in a relevant market. 
EU competition law, however, also employs a term ‘monopoly’ to describe a firm the 
dominance of which approaches market share of ninety percent or greater. US antitrust 
law, however, does not use the term ‘dominance’; therefore, making dominance an 
exclusive EU legal concept. 
Despite the differences in the terminology, both antitrust regimes apply almost identical 
tools for the assessment of dominance and monopoly. This, however, only relates to the 
economic tools which are used for the assessment of market power and which were 
described in Chapter 3.  
As for the legal interpretation and definition of dominance and monopoly, differences 
exist. Dominance is defined as a position of economic strength which enables a firm to act 
appreciably independently.
919
 Monopoly is a firm’s ability to control prices and exclude 
competition.
920
 The striking difference between the two terms lies in the fact that 
‘monopoly’ is defined in a very straightforward way, i.e. the monopolist needs to be able to 
control prices. ‘Dominance’, on the other hand, is defined in a more vague way which 
involves the firm’s ability to be appreciably independent which, as argued in Chapter 4, 
invites both flexibility and legal uncertainty into the definition of a dominant position. 
Such a difference between two definitions may well be intentional.  
In order to understand these differences, Chapter 2 focused on the historical events leading 
to the adoption of the TFEU and Sherman Act: Article 102 and Section 2, respectively. In 
the US the law developed when the US market was heavily affected by the spread of 
private monopolies or, as they were known, trusts. The public was so concerned with the 
                                                          
919
 United Brands v Commission 
920
 United States v E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 
 
 
 
185 
 
power of trusts on the US market that Congress had to adopt a legislation which would 
exert control on the behaviour of powerful firms. This led to the adoption of the Sherman 
Act. It was shown that, despite the common beliefs that trusts were inherently 
monopolistic, Congress did not prohibit monopoly altogether. This was explained by the 
fact that US markets were heavily influenced by the laissez-faire economics which 
promoted free competition without unnecessary government intervention. Congress, 
therefore, attempted to reflect this principle in the rules of the Sherman Act; thereby, 
requiring the act of monopolisation to be at the heart of Section 2. EU competition law, on 
the other hand, evolved from an entirely different history.  The EU itself was created for 
political reasons in order to unite countries after World War II.  The political situation in 
Europe required a new powerful entity consisting of various member states connected, 
inter alia, by common business and commercial interests. This led to the adoption of an 
EU competition law regime targeting, among others, firms which abuse their dominant 
position. It was demonstrated that the drafting of the main EU competition law provisions 
(Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) was influenced by the provision of US antitrust law; 
therefore, a certain level of similarity between the two regimes was unavoidable. Despite 
this, the text of the EU and US legal provisions is broad and neither provides a definition 
of dominance and monopoly. It was left to the antitrust authorities and the courts to 
interpret these terms. Chapter 2 also highlighted the fact that European Commission has 
authority both to investigate and to issue binding decisions, unlike the US antitrust 
authorities if the Commission pursues an interventionist approach to dominant firms, then 
this power allows it to pursue its own policy.  
Chapter 3 focused on the economic assessment of market power in the EU and US. It 
highlighted the main goals behind antitrust intervention: namely, the protection of 
consumer welfare and the promotion of economic efficiency. It also examined two 
economic models in order to show both sides of the spectrum, i.e. what happens with 
efficiencies in monopolised markets and in markets which feature perfect competition. 
Chapter 3 showed that US antitrust law was heavily influenced by the Chicago School of 
economics which believed in a self-correcting tendency of markets and minimum 
governmental interference in the affair of businesses. EU competition law, on the other 
hand, was heavily influenced by the Ordoliberal School of economics which followed the 
idea that markets should be liberalised from monopolies which, in turn, did not rely on the 
fact that markets may have a self-correcting tendency. This approach requires a stronger 
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governmental control and intervention into the way markets operate and promotes fair 
competition among rivals. This, according to the findings of Chapter 3, leads the 
Commission to hold an interventionist approach to firms in a dominant position. Whereas, 
the influence of the Chicago School and the view that markets have a self-correcting 
tendency led US antitrust law to retreat from its initial antagonistic approach to monopoly 
and allow firms to compete as long as they do not monopolise.  
Chapter 4 introduced and highlighted the main tools used by antitrust authorities to 
determine the existence of dominance and monopoly: market shares and barriers to entry in 
the relevant market.   EU competition law requires lower market share thresholds for the 
assessment of market power than under US antitrust law. EU competition law uses forty 
percent and above market shares as an invitation to conduct an economic assessment while 
US antitrust law, on the other hand, uses seventy percent and above to determine where the 
presumption of unlawful monopoly takes place. Both regimes consider market shares as 
the most important indication of dominance and monopoly, despite the criticism 
considered in Chapter 4 that a market share, among other limitations, does not include the 
dynamics of the markets and the behaviour of firms under consideration. Irrespective of the 
criticism, antitrust authorities and the courts take the size of the firms into account in the 
assessment of dominance and monopoly. However, the divergence in market share 
thresholds supports the proposition that US antitrust law allows firms to grow in their 
control of the market up to seventy percent market share which is not insignificant. EU 
competition law, on the other hand, is different: it was concluded that by keeping the 
presumption of dominance at fifty percent market shares,
921
 and the Commission’s ability 
to investigate a firm at forty percent, EU competition law retains flexibility in the 
assessment of a dominant position. This will also lead the Commission to avoid Type II 
errors which, according to the findings set out in Chapter 4, represent an under-inclusive 
approach to the enforcement of antitrust rules. Therefore, in Chapter 4 it was preliminarily 
concluded that US antitrust policy not only allows firms to gain up to seventy percent of 
the market but it also perceives high market shares  as an example of healthy competition. 
The EU competition law enforcers, on the other hand, have an inherent distrust toward 
dominant firms which is reflected in the lower market share perceptions in the operation of 
Article 102.   
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Chapter 5 focused on the study of a select number of US cases. It was shown that US 
antitrust law had several important cases where the Supreme Court held that size per se 
was not a violation of Section 2
922
 unless the target of investigation had been magnified to 
the point when it became an unlawful monopoly. This finding is very important because 
the principle of unlawful monopoly, as argued in Chapter 5, helps to distinguish between 
situations where size is gained in an anti-competitively manner from size which is 
achieved by legitimate  business practices. In relation to a firm’s bigness, it was 
demonstrated that the Supreme Court is not concerned with a firm’s advantages and 
privileges albeit the District Court in United Shoe did use certain privileges held by the 
firm in order to strengthen a finding of monopoly.  However, it was also stressed that the 
advantages were derived from the well-structured business policy which was aimed at the 
restriction of competition. It follows that when there is an illegality behind ‘other factors’, 
the US courts will use these factors against the alleged monopolist. The rest of the cases 
analysed in Chapter 5 had no similar references to bigness, leading to the conclusion that 
bigness of a firm plays no role unless there is an illegality behind their market conduct. 
The case studies also revealed that the Supreme Court had moved away from holding an 
antagonistic approach to monopoly and instead started to focus on economic efficiencies 
large firms may bring into a market. Therefore, Chapter 5 concluded that a firm’s size and, 
occasionally, its bigness become paramount for the assessment of monopoly only if they 
were achieved illegally. In any other scenario, a size below seventy percent and privileges 
or advantages held by such a firm, are evidence of a firm’s business success and 
prosperity.   
Chapter 6 conducted a similar exercise but in the context of EU competition law where 
several important cases were examined in order to identify whether size and bigness play 
any role in the assessment of a dominant position in the EU. The conclusion was that the 
EU, unlike the US, does not discuss size per se when applying Article 102. The 
Commission’s decisions and the courts’ ruling revealed that dominance would occur if a 
firm had significant market shares. Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 4, it was concluded 
that the size of a firm plays a central role in the finding of a dominant position. The 
assessment of bigness, unlike the situation in the US, was more interesting because the 
Commission and the courts include almost all advantages and privileges of a firm in 
support of a finding of dominance. The list of ‘other factors’ is non-exhaustive and places 
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any firm in a dangerous position of becoming automatically dominant under Article 102. 
Neither the Commission nor the courts have demonstrated consistency in the selection of 
‘other factors’, leading to the conclusion of the thesis that bigness plays a very important 
role in the assessment of a dominant position. This was explained by the fact that due to a 
considerably low market share threshold, the Commission and the courts need further 
evidence to support the findings of dominance and using a firm’s superior position as 
another piece of evidence is the best way to do it. Furthermore, the case studies evidenced 
the Commission’s interventionist approach toward dominant firms and its desire to keep 
flexibility in the definition of a dominant position. It was concluded that this approach will 
create an environment where firms will be cautious to grow and develop, fearing that 
severe sanctions may follow and this may well have a negative effect on  consumer welfare 
and economic efficiency. Lastly, unlike US antitrust law, EU competition law has not 
developed a difference between lawful and unlawful dominance, and instead it places on 
dominant firms a special responsibility not to abuse their dominance.
923
 This finding is 
very important for the purposes of the thesis because it leads to the conclusion that if a firm 
has forty to fifty percent control of the market then it has no chance to argue that its 
dominant position is legal.  
The key findings above support the proposition that the Commission has developed a 
certain level of distrust toward firms in a dominant position by not considering aggressive 
competition in a positive manner. The analysis undertaken in Chapter 7 demonstrates that 
the Commission protects the interests of the SMEs by applying Article 102 rigorously to 
dominant firms. This contrasts with the approach of US antitrust law which has been 
shown to be comfortable with aggressive competition. Furthermore, in Chapter 7, the 
importance of having larger firms on markets as they have more resources and finances to 
invest was discussed. This especially applies to the new economy markets, with Google as 
an example of such a firm.  Both regimes initiated proceedings against Google on the same 
grounds albeit with different end results: the FTC deemed it necessary to stop proceedings 
against Google after no unfair competition had been discovered. The Commission, on the 
other hand, holds a very strong position toward Google and recently issued a Statement of 
Objections (SO). The main difference between Google’s position in the EU and in the US 
is that in the former jurisdiction Google holds almost ninety percent of the market while in 
the latter only sixty five per cent. The Commission relied on this fact in order to deny 
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allegations that it was biased against American firms. In Chapter 7, however, it was argued 
that even if Google held sixty five percent of the market, the Commission would still have 
sent the SO. It is without doubt that with low market share thresholds and the acceptance 
of ‘other factors’ into the determination of dominance, Google would have satisfied the 
first limb of Article 102, i.e. the existence of a dominant position. This leads to the 
conclusion that Google has become too large for the EU market and the outcome of the 
case is highly awaited. The analysis in Chapter 7 has provided further evidence of the 
divergence in the treatment and assessment of dominance and monopoly in the EU and US. 
Lastly, this chapter has also addressed the final research question, namely, what are the 
reasons behind the EU’s interventionist approach to firms in a dominant position?  The 
answer lies at the core of the policy behind the formation of the EU: in order to create an 
internal market, the EU had to demolish national barriers among member states which 
were saturated with local monopolies. This explains the strive of the Commission to keep 
the EU market operators in small economic units, in order to avoid monopolies,  as it 
seems to believe that it is the only way to promote economic efficiency and protect 
consumer welfare. 
Therefore, in summation of the key findings, it is submitted that EU competition law is 
enforced with a certain level of distrust toward firms in a dominant position.  This is 
reflected in its interventionist position in the application of the first limb of Article 102 
and, to answer the series of short questions posed in Chapter 1, it follows that: first, a 
firm’s size and bigness are central to the establishment of dominance in the EU while the 
US is only concerned with a large size of a firm and has almost complete disregard of the 
firm’s bigness as long as there is no illegality or wrongful intent. Second, the reasons 
behind the Commission’s attitude to low market share threshold reflect the Commission’s 
desire to keep the meaning of dominance as flexible as possible and to avoid Type II 
errors. Third, a firm’s privileges and advantages play a much bigger role in the EU than in 
the US. Fourth, this thesis concludes that the Commission does hold an antagonistic and 
interventionist approach to firms in a dominant position. Lastly, the Commission’s distrust 
for private economic power lies in its political structure and its desire to protect SMEs in 
order to maintain diversity among competitors on the EU internal market.  
Therefore, the thesis introduces an original position on the assessment of a dominant 
position and monopoly in the EU and US, respectively. It has been demonstrated that 
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despite the similarities between the two regimes, considerable divergences exist in the way 
dominance and monopoly are interpreted. The key finding, however, is that the 
Commission does not have a notion of lawful dominance and this is an omission. The 
research undertaken does not suggest that the Commission is not correct in its approach to 
firms in a dominant position; however, the research does confirm that size and bigness 
should not be assessed in fear that they provide a firm with an opportunity to abuse. A 
well-balanced system should be created which will value both consumer welfare and the 
firms’ right to win the market and enjoy the fruits of their labour. Moreover, certain 
markets might require large firms to invest into R& D and engage in advance innovation. 
Furthermore, a strict and interventionist approach will discourage large firms which, in 
turn, will have a detrimental effect on consumer welfare and economic efficiencies. 
Globalisation, new economy markets, diversity of competitive conditions, political 
situations and economic influence are important features of current market reality and this 
should be taken into account by antitrust law enforcers. Some industries, such as the 
pharmaceutical and technological industries, can operate efficiently on the market only 
with the existence of large firms.  Innovation and development of new products, such as a 
new drug or a mobile phone require significant resources, such as research investment, 
development facilities and pooling of patents rights. However, at this stage, there can be no 
conclusion on whether large firms would be more efficient in such markets as this would 
require a separate study of each industry. For these reasons, the next step forward needs to 
be the study of individual industries in order to identify whether the presence of large firms 
would lead to economic efficiencies and consumer welfare.     
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